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 Introduction 
Political scientist Harold Lasswell was influential in establishing early parameters for 
studying public policy (1951).  He believed that policy study should be multidisciplinary, 
practical rather than semantic, problem oriented, and adaptable to the normative nature of 
policymaking.  The study of criminal justice policy is similar to research in any other policy 
sector in that it follows Lasswell‘s formula.  Criminal justice policy is multidisciplinary.  It 
draws directly from the fields of applied criminal justice, criminology, economics, criminal law, 
political science, and sociology.  Researching criminal justice policy has a practical importance.  
If anything, excepting recent forays into formal modeling, criminal justice policy is lean on 
theoretical justification and more strongly focused on empirical evidence.  Decisions made 
within this policy area address some of the most pressing and important issues faced by citizens, 
including violent crime, discrimination, and murder.  Lastly, criminal justice policy is 
pervasively informed by normative judgments, as it drips with value laden political posturing. 
Despite the existence, and indeed even requirement, of commonalities with studies in 
other policy areas, this dissertation also possesses differential characteristics reflective of its 
topical area of study.  In fact, every policy issue area has its own flavor, and in the case of 
complex issue areas such as this one, many different flavors.  The death penalty, prison 
construction, and policing are each occupants of distinct policy sub domains.  Each of these is 
populated, at least below the level of governing elites, by a different set of actors.  However, 
some basic observations about criminal justice policy hold true across these different actors and 
institutions.  First, the policy is dictated by elected officials get tough on crime rhetoric.  It is also 
subject to the unpredictability of deviant human behavior, actions which often quite effectively 
undercut the most well thought out of plans.  And finally, third, the fractured nature of America‘s 
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federalist system complicates crime policy.  In the realm of justice issues the dual nature of the 
country‘s court system can add another layer of challenges to policymakers at any level of 
government.       
 The three chapters of this dissertation examine the implementation and impacts of policy 
in criminal justice, including the efficacy of the juvenile death penalty (JDP), the influence of 
bureaucratic representation on citizens in police traffic stops, and the economic impact of private 
prison construction.  Although each chapter addresses a narrow slice of criminal justice policy, 
they share common themes.  First, people respond uniquely to broadly applied criminal justice 
policies.  Second, place matters.  The differences between an urban and rural area, as well as one 
state versus another are real and have significant implications for residents.  Third, unintended 
consequences are part of the criminal justice policy process, making this a complicated policy 
area.  And finally, better policies will present themselves through continual and well designed 
policy evaluation and analysis.  Putting the question of research cost aside, continual policy 
evaluation and analysis provides information to leaders that will better allow them to make 
legitimate explanations and predictions regarding a policy area.   
  The first chapter‘s conclusions could certainly serve to inform policymakers regarding 
the implementation, or even complete abolition, of capital punishment.  This chapter not only 
provides specific conclusions about the inefficacy of the recently overturned JDP, but it also 
models how the punishment could be analyzed in its totality.  Opponents of the penalty often 
scrutinize it by examining its application to certain subgroups.  For example, those opposed to 
the policy worked to overturn its application to the mentally ill (Atkins v. Virginia, 1991), then 
juveniles (Roper v. Simmons 2005), and have often focused on racial disparities in its use 
(Eisenberg, Garvey, and Wells 2001; Furman v. Georgia 1972; Kleck 1981; Radelet and Pierce 
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1991; Songer and Unah 2006).  Because a debate has emerged that centers on policy impact on 
population subgroups, it becomes germane to conduct data analysis sufficiently targeted at those 
subgroups.  Though aggregate violent crime trends will always remain relevant to the capital 
punishment debate, crime deterrence studies become more valuable when connected with public 
conversation on the topic.  Quite evidently that debate has taken a turn toward the punishment‘s 
effect on certain groups of people.      
 The body of writing on the death penalty is vast, but comparatively little has been written 
on the JDP in particular.  This is an important topic to examine.  The now five year old decision 
that ended the practice of executing those under age 18 (Roper v. Simmons), has provided 
scholars with a chance to analyze a slice of the death penalty from beginning to end.  The first 
chapter uses data on all types of juvenile crime that occurred in the 50 states during the time 
period that the JDP was in effect: 1974-2005.  The year immediately following its cessation, 
2006, is also included in the data analysis.  This unique data is broken down by gender, age, type 
of crime, and crime location, among other factors.  The chapter directly addresses the question: 
was there a deterrent effect to the JDP?  The results suggest that juvenile executions did not 
lower crime over the studied time period.  So I conclude that there is little evidence that the JDP 
was an effective crime deterrent.   
 While enjoining the ongoing death penalty debate is valuable, this chapter is made more 
compelling given the attention paid to the controversial Supreme Court decision overturning the 
JDP.  Justice Kennedy was highly criticized for including arguments reliant on international law 
in the authorship of his majority decision.  Also, the evolution of the American juvenile justice 
system is briefly addressed in the chapter, as it has evolved from a unique system of state care to 
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existing as another cog in a carceral system grounded in the ―get tough on crime‖ political 
rhetoric of the 1980s and 1990s.       
 The second chapter, which deals with bureaucratic representation, likewise possesses a 
rich context for its research question: racial interactions in police traffic stops.  As with the death 
penalty the interactions between police officers and citizens is the subject of much controversy 
and analysis.  These interactions are highly common and heavily scrutinized, but almost never 
observed by non-participants.  Consequently, studying a survey sample aimed at these 
interactions is an important way to gain insight into a daily occurrence in the fabric of American 
democracy.      
Bureaucratic representation is the idea that non-elected officials can address the interests 
of citizens just as effectively as elected officials are capable of doing.  It has been studied both in 
terms of its active component and its passive component.  The passive component, symbolic 
representation, is the concept that citizens are affected in different ways cognitively by a 
bureaucratic actor who resembles them rather than one who does not.  Bureaucrats such as police 
officers are different than elected government officials in that they tend to have more interaction 
with citizens and have characteristics similar to the general population.  In the past, the chief 
difficulty in addressing the question of their possible symbolic effect has been a reliance on 
aggregate level data that loses the individual response information.  This chapter uses as its data 
source supplemental surveys to the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) called the 
Police Public Contact Surveys (PPCS).  These surveys are valuable because they contain the 
individual level data necessary to assess the impact of symbolic representation on citizens.  
Through analysis of individual level data, a difference was found in how African-Americans and 
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white citizens react to police officers.  While the study‘s results are mixed, the research did find 
some evidence supporting the presence of symbolic representation in citizen-police interactions. 
Finally, the third chapter demonstrates that not all outcomes of criminal justice policies 
deal directly with crime prevention.  While prisons are at their root as much about crime as the 
electric chair and discretionary police traffic stops, this chapter deals instead with the economic 
impact of prisons.  More specifically, it addresses the economic impact of private prisons as 
compared with a sample of their public counterparts. 
State and local governments have turned toward private companies to provide services 
that were previously carried out by the public bureaucracy.  Justifying this change, officials have 
cited the need to save public money.  Some local officials go so far as to argue in favor of 
construction of private prisons within their jurisdictions on the grounds that their local 
economies will benefit.  The current effort will test that idea with a large and heterogeneous 
dataset.  This last chapter analyzes the economic impact private prisons have had upon the 
counties in which they are located.  First, this study will present a population census of all 
private prisons in the United States, regardless of the level of government with which they are 
serving.  It will also compare the economic experience of all counties with private prisons to 
samples of counties with new public prisons or no prison growth at all.   
The study shows that personal income rises with the construction of a new public prison, 
but not a new private prison.  This income rise is a short lived effect.  Similarly, this study has 
discovered a short term dip in unemployment associated with new prisons, perhaps attributable 
to temporary construction jobs.  But the results show that even medium term county level 
unemployment rates cannot be accurately correlated with the installation of a new prison facility.         
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This chaptered research work carries through four common themes, all while addressing 
different aspects of the same policy area.  As Lasswell intended when describing policy study 
almost 60 years ago (Lasswell 1951), this work draws from different disciplines, recognizes the 
normative nature of the topic, has practical application, and is problem oriented.  The lens of 
public policy analysis has allowed me to demonstrate with this dissertation that within criminal 
justice policy people will respond uniquely to broadly conceived policies, place matters in policy 
impact, and that unintended consequences will occur.  However, through policy analysis such as 
this, better policies can be continually redesigned and implemented.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 7  
 
Chapter 1 
 
The Deterrent Effect of the Juvenile Death Penalty 
 
I.  Introduction 
 The death penalty, like a number of other controversial public policies, often provokes 
strong feelings among citizens.  Some of the most controversial death sentences and state 
executions have been those of juveniles.  Like the public debate surrounding policies such as 
abortion, gay rights, and gun control, the dialogue regarding the death penalty often does not 
center on facts as much as first principles.  In this political debate theories are replaced by belief 
systems and empiricism oftentimes with faith.  In that vein, relevant facts are available that speak 
directly to the efficacy of capital punishment as a public policy tool.   Most obviously, rates of 
violent crime and the number of death sentences and executions speak to the policy‘s 
effectiveness.  In this particular instance, the available data can be counted on as a reasonable 
measure of the world as it actually is. 
 The death penalty has been justified with a variety of rationales.  While the penalty is 
most often framed in the public square by what scholars have called the fairness perspective 
(Baumgartner, De Boef, and Boydstun 2008), the justification most often used by proponents is 
the idea of criminal deterrence (Forst 1976).  Proponents of the death penalty argue that it deters 
criminal homicide, while opponents argue one of two things.  Opponents respond by denying the 
surety and force of this deterrent effect (Baldus and Cole 1975; Bowers and Pierce 1975; Choe 
2009; DPIC 2010; Forst 1976; Grogger 1990; Passell 2008; Radelet and Akers 1996; Sellin 
1961; Sorenson et al. 1999) or counter argue that it actually raises homicide levels in society 
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(Bailey 1990; Cochran, Chamlin, and Seth 1994; Decker and Kohfeld 1984; King 1978).  
Enjoining the death penalty debate from a perspective other than deterrence is possible.  
However, such dialogues exist more in the realm of moral ethicists than public policy scholars. 
 Still, an acknowledgment regarding the public volume of death penalty morality 
arguments, often religiously based ones, must be made.  To an even greater degree than with the 
execution of adults, the state sponsored execution of criminally guilty juveniles has provoked 
arguments rooted in moral indignation.  Perhaps this is because juveniles have a history of being 
treated differently in our nation‘s criminal justice system.  Despite this tradition, juveniles were 
subject to publicly decreed executions very similarly to adults in many states from 1977 to 2005.   
 Whatever the justification for the punishment might have been at the time, the question 
for objective crime analysis is simple:  ―Did JDP deter juvenile violent crime, and in particular 
murder?‖  The analysis uses data from all 50 states.   This data ranges from 1974, which was 
three years before the ―modern death penalty era‖ began, to 2006, which is one year after the 
Supreme Court ruled juvenile exactions unconstitutional.
1
  The study uses a multiple regression 
analysis to assess what effect, if any, the juvenile death penalty has had on serious juvenile 
crime.  A robust hierarchical time series design tests for the presence of a deterrent effect, or for 
that matter an exacerbating effect
2
, on both juvenile violent crime and juvenile murder rates.  
The inclusion of data from all 50 states plus the regression model employed allow for the control 
of the unique yet unknown effects each state has on its juvenile crime rate.  Most significantly, 
because policies allowing for the execution of juveniles have been overturned by the Supreme 
Court, the complete modern impact of these policies can now be fully assessed. 
                                                          
1
 2006 is also the most recent year of complete data available at this time. 
2
 As argued in the reply brief for petitioners in North Carolina v. Fowler (419 U.S. 963 1974) 
 9  
 
 The order of this chapter is as follows: Section I provides a brief overview of capital 
punishment in the United States, including its various justifications.  Section II focuses on the 
more narrowly cast domain of the juvenile death penalty, addressing in turn so-called death 
penalty exception cases and the unique nature of the American juvenile justice system.  Section 
III reviews the extensive scholarly literature accompanying the controversy over any deterrence 
effect realized by the punishment.   
 After this review of the literature, Section IV turns to alternative theories concerning 
possible determinants of juvenile crime and presentation of the hypotheses being tested.  
Subsequently, the model is presented and explained in Section V.  The chapter concludes in 
Section VI with a discussion of the results and a call for further research based upon this work.        
   
II. Capital Punishment in the United States 
 The policy evolution of state-sanctioned executions began when the first colonists arrived 
on American shores, and it has continued from the punishment‘s colonial beginnings to the 
present day (Decker and Kohfeld 1984; Dezhbakhsh, Rankin 1979; Masur 1989; Rantoul [1836], 
1974; Rubin and Shepherd 2003; Yunker 1976).  The pilgrims ferried to the new world not only 
a sense of civic pride and a strong set of religious beliefs (Lipset 2003) but also a healthy support 
for the harsh English legal policy of capital punishment (Bedau 1972; Laurence [1932], 1971).  
To understand the death penalty now, one must understand why the policy was initially codified 
in the new nation.  The colonists wrote the death penalty into law because it served four 
important functions in early American society: deterrence, incapacitation, retribution, and 
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penance (Banner 2002).
3
  First, and the focal point of this study, it was used to deter crime, 
which means to stop further illegal action by an individual guilty person.  In the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries, the punishment was carried out with the intent to stop hundreds of far flung 
malfeasances such as bestiality, concealing property to defraud creditors, embezzling tobacco, 
poaching deer, receiving a stolen horse, sodomy, squatting on Indian land, and stealing hogs, not 
to mention arson, rape, and murder (Banner 2002, 4-8).   
 Second, and even more basically than deterrence, is incapacitation.  The death penalty‘s 
most clear characteristic is that it inhibits further criminal acts from an individual through killing 
that person.  Clearly an individual locked up is no more capable of committing violent crime at 
that moment than a dead person.  But without an adequate supply of holding cells, early law 
enforcement authorities seeking incapacitation were faced with a choice of either expelling a 
perpetrator from a local community or killing them.  Eventually, the establishment of the 
American prison system provided society the option of forcing confinement upon offenders 
rather than ending their life.   
 Third, adhering to societal demands as well as biblical and historical tradition, execution 
was used to punish an individual in return for committing a crime: retribution.
4
  Finally, it was 
used to allow an individual to achieve atonement in the eyes of God: the idea of penance.  In an 
early example of policy diffusion, states changed their criminal codes to limit the death penalty 
to an increasingly smaller range of crimes. Some of the earliest innovators, that is to say death 
penalty limiting states, were Maine, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania. 
                                                          
3
 However absurd or personally deplorable, it is also sometimes said to serve a eugenic purpose (Sellin 1961; 
Yunker 1975). 
4
  Retribution can also be referred to with the more ideologically loaded terms ―revenge‖ or ―vengeance.‖  Some 
scholars do however draw a distinction between these ideas and retribution, stating that revenge is an act of anger 
while retribution is rational deserving punishment (Pojman 2004, 57).  Others have even made a distinction with the 
softer victim‘s rights ―pop psychology‖ concepts of ―closure‖ or ―moving on‖ (Zimring 2003, 59).  For present 
purposes, they can all be seen as capturing the same idea (e.g. Berns 1979), which is the idea of paying back an 
individual malefactor for a crime committed.   
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The Public Nature of the Death Penalty 
 Throughout world history, capital punishment contained a highly public element.  
Traditionally it has not been a public event in the way of an open town meeting.  Rather it has 
possessed the characteristics of a spectacle that is more parade than public hearing.  Ancient 
methods of execution reflected the spectacular nature of the organized death event, which served 
to point out greater society‘s disapproval of the condemned.  Some of the more notorious ways 
of publicly disposing of the unwanted included crucifixion, forced ingestion of molten led, 
throwing into a quagmire, beheading with axe or guillotine, burning alive, drawing and 
quartering with horses, and stoning (Laurence 1932).  Modes of execution and attitudes towards 
them might provide more penetrating insight into the nature of past societies than other more 
mundane public policies.
5
  Curiously though, since 1936 all American executions have been 
done in an enclosure that prohibits viewing by the general public (Delfino and Day 2008, 20)
6
.  
The movement to privacy slowly began in the early 1800s in a reflection of middle-class disgust 
at a public death (Masur 1989) and southern states‘ indignation at northern states‘ accusations of 
barbarism (Banner 2002, 155).   
 The trend toward hiding publicly sanctioned death is more than a footnote to history.  
Furthermore, the most curious aspect about the move from decreed death in the public square to 
concealed death in the prison is not the predictable evolution of changing norms of vulgarity and 
barbarism.  The very rationale for the punishment was now being undermined by its newly 
preferred locale:  in the prison yard out of the public‘s disapproving eye.  It appears illogical to 
implement a punishment that was developed for a deterrent effect channeled through violent 
                                                          
5
 For a modern example of the lucidity of such a study, consider that African Americans back the penalty less than 
whites, and that conservatives back it more than liberals (Ekland-Olson 1988; Nice 1992). 
6
 Public executions had already been abolished in Great Britain, source of most American law, in 1868 (9 Geo. IV, 
c.31). 
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public death that has been effectively sanitized through both  hiding it, and making it ―quick and 
painless‖ for the condemned. 
 In two ways, moving the punishment indoors diminishes deterrent effects.  First, a 
possible deterrent power is significantly diminished when the practice is hidden from the 
public‘s view.  A common sense argument posits that the maximum deterrent value of the 
punishment would be realized if decreed deaths were now broadcast widely on public television 
or webcast on the internet.
 7
  If only a select few are witnessing the punishment, as is now the 
case in the United States, then any information regarding its severity can only be second hand.  
Second, the notion of ―the community‖ doing the punishing has now been transferred to the 
―penal state‖ or ―bureaucracy‖ doing the punishing, creating an intermediary step in expression 
of public disapproval (Banner 2002).  Beyond gut reactions of revulsion, the logical reasoning 
behind the closeting of the death penalty was first articulated in the early 1800s by phrenologist
8
 
George Combe, who brought up the notion of an ―excitement of the mind‖ regarding those who 
were predisposed to violence.  In other words, this was the first articulation of the ―barbarizing 
effect‖ later brought up by modern death penalty scholars (e.g. Cloninger 1992; Cochran, 
Chamlin, and Seth 1994).  Ironically, the very argument that death penalty advocates most 
disdain, that it raises crime levels, is directly responsible for its lower public profile.                
 Public opinion for the death penalty eroded in the middle 1950s (Gallup 2008), though 
some observers have marked the time of public decline as late as 1967-1968 (Delfino and Day 
                                                          
7
 Public transmittal of executions is not without its legal entanglements.  Just a sampling:  KQED v. Vasquez (1992) 
found that California‘s first execution since 1967 did not warrant a camera there.  Lawson v. Dixon (1994) found 
that Phil Donahue could not film a death row inmate even at the inmate‘s request.  The most insightful case in this 
realm is Entertainment Network v. Lappin (2001) which held that broadcasting Oklahoma City bomber Timothy 
McVeigh‘s death to an auditorium of victim‘s families was constitutional, but that showing it more broadly was not.  
The present legal issue is not the risk of the presence of cameras and accompanying camera operators (such as a 
camera operator becoming distraught and breaking the glass viewing partition), but who the execution‘s audience is 
that ―endangers the solemnity of the event.‖         
8
 Phrenology was the study of the discourse of the mind. 
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2008).    Scholars have argued that a component of Supreme Court decision-making is the 
Court‘s responsiveness to public opinion (Barnum 1985, Fleming and Wood 1997; Marshal 
1989; Stimson, Mackuen, and Erikson 1995).  Whether it was due to eroding public support or 
other reasons, the Supreme Court halted the death penalty in 1972 (Furman v. Georgia).
9
  The 
high court determined that as it was being practiced, the punishment was unconstitutional.
10
  
However, the Court left room for Congress and individual state legislatures to enact new death 
penalty laws, a process which began in short order.
11
  Soon afterward, the ―modern era‖ of the 
death penalty in the United States began with the 1976 Supreme Court case of Gregg v. Georgia, 
which held that the concerns raised in Furman were adequately addressed by the new statutes in 
several respondent states.
12
   
 Now state law varies regarding the penalty, but in general terms, some states have the 
penalty while others do not.  Since 1977, 1,188 people have been put to death in the United 
States.
13
  The executions have been concentrated highly in southern states.  In fact, five states 
have executed approximately 66% of the condemned (Florida, Missouri, Oklahoma, Texas, and 
Virginia).  To illustrate, in 1997 Texas executed 37 individuals, a number equal to the sum total 
of executions in all other states (DPIC).  The legal landscape of the death penalty is more settled 
than it was pre-Furman.   Several relatively well established legal concepts regarding offender 
                                                          
9
 See particularly the noted phrase of Justice Potter Stewart in his concurring opinion:  ―These death sentences are 
cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual. For, of all the people 
convicted of rapes and murders in 1967 and 1968, many just as reprehensible as these, the petitioners are among a 
capriciously selected random handful upon whom the sentence of death has in fact been imposed.  My concurring 
Brothers have demonstrated that, if any basis can be discerned for the selection of these few to be sentenced to die, it 
is the constitutionally impermissible basis of race.‖ 
10
 The majority opinion did not take up issue with the punishment per se, as it did directly with the state statutes 
guiding its capricious usage. 
11
 Florida completed rewriting its statute a mere five months after Furman (Death Penalty Information Center 2008).   
12
 Gregg v. Georgia (1976, 428 U.S. 153), Proffitt v. Florida (1976, 428 U.S. 242), and Jurek v. Texas (1976, 428 
U.S. 262) are the three instances of state law being upheld known in shorthand as the Gregg decision.‖  The two 
death penalty statutes struck down by Gregg were those of North Carolina and Louisiana. 
13
 As of January 4, 2010 (DPIC). 
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eligibility and sentencing guidelines regulate the practice.  Legal advocacy on either side of the 
issue, pro or con, is generally subdivided within the framework of these six areas: 
1. Many crimes are not punishable by death, including rape and murder in and of itself 
(Coker v. Georgia 1977; Godfrey v. Georgia 1980).
14
 
2. The trial and sentencing phases of a death penalty must be separated from one another 
(Gregg v. Georgia 1976; addressing: Profitt v. Florida 1976; Jurek v. Texas 1976; 
Woodson v. North Carolina 1976; and Roberts v. Louisiana 1976). 
3. Mitigating and aggravating circumstances decrease or increase the chance of a death 
sentence (Spaziano v. Florida 1984; Ring v. Arizona 2002). 
4. There is an automatic appellate review of both the trial and sentencing phases in the 
event of a guilty verdict (Gregg v. Georgia 1976). 
5. The specific method of convict death must meet basic standards, such as not 
unnecessarily inflicting gratuitous pain (e.g. in Kentucky Baze v. Rees; in Nebraska 
State v. Mata 2008). 
6. Some characteristic of the offender prevents the person from being sentenced to death 
(Atkins v. Virginia 2002; Ford v. Wainwright 1986; Roper v. Simmons 2005). 
 
 This last point concerns the so-called ―death penalty exception cases.‖  It is this 
substantive point of contention that contains the JDP debate.  
 
 
II.  Death Penalty Exception Cases and the Juvenile Death Penalty 
 
 Though there were a staggering 14,713 reported executions worldwide between 2000 and 
2006, only 36 of those reported as executed were juveniles.  The countries that reported 
executing juveniles during that period were China, Democratic Republic of Congo, Iran, 
Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and the United States of America (Amnesty International 2007).  
Clearly, in a capital punishment-laden world, there is now something approaching consensus on 
                                                          
14
 Many crimes, however, are indeed punishable by death.  Even non-homicide related crimes such as multiple rapes 
(Montana Criminal Code Annotated 45-5-503) and attempting to overthrow the government (18 U.S.C. 2381) might 
be punishable by death.  For a complete list of non-homicide offenses, see Delfino and Day 2008, p. 4.  Examples of 
homicides that are death penalty eligible by statute include, most commonly, first-degree murder (e.g. 18 U.S.C. 
1111), murder of a state correctional officer (e.g. 18 U.S.C. 1121), murder for hire (e.g. 18 U.S.C. 1958), and 
murder of a federal judge (e.g. 18 U.S.C. 1114).       
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the idea of excluding juveniles from execution.  Justice Kennedy‘s decision noting international 
consensus was accurate (Roper v. Simmons 2005). 
 Legislation the world over has also specifically barred other population groups from 
capital punishment.  For example, different nations have ruled out the execution of the aged and 
pregnant women.
15
  Though the United States has no federal statutes which directly and plainly 
prohibit the execution of either pregnant women or the aged, this country does not presently 
extend the penalty to three subpopulations:  the mentally retarded,
16
 the mentally incapacitated, 
and juveniles.   
 Americans have approved of state-sanctioned execution of minors since the earliest days 
of the country (Bogdanski 2004, 613; Streib 1998, 1-2).  Though it is agreed upon that the first 
minor put to death by the state was Thomas Graunger in 1642 (Amnesty Index; Bogdanski 2004, 
613; Streib 2000; Streib 2003a; Streib 2003b), since that time it is not known exactly how many 
people who committed crimes as juveniles have been executed as there is no reliable count on 
information available before 1930 (Banner 2002, 313).  However, the number is believed to be 
around 365 (Bogdanski 2004, 614; Streib 2000, 2).  Following the early adoption of English 
common law, the legal evolution of the juvenile death penalty does not pick up again until 1988, 
when the Supreme Court took on the case of Thompson v. Oklahoma.
17
  The Court decided that 
neither of the two modern goals of the death penalty, deterrence or retribution, were being met 
by executing minors so young.  Those 15-years of age and younger, Justice Stevens wrote in the 
decision, fell under the fiduciary obligation of the state to protect children, thus rendering 
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 For example, Taiwan will not execute anyone over the age of 80, and Vietnam commutes death penalties to life 
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 The phraseology here is that of the US legal system, not the author‘s (Atkins v. Virginia 1991). 
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 Though presented with two chances, the Supreme Court avoided ruling on the constitutionality of the juvenile 
death penalty in both 1978 with Bell v. Ohio (438 U.S. 637) and again in 1982 with Eddings v. Oklahoma (436 U.S. 
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retribution inapplicable, and likewise, those so young did not make decisions in a calculated way 
as adults are thought to do, thus negating the deterrence effect (Thompson v. Oklahoma 1988).  
However, just one year after the seminal Thompson decision, in the case of Stanford v. Kentucky 
(1989), the court explicitly rejected the idea of excluding 16 and 17-year old perpetrators from a 
capital sentence.   
 Thirteen years later, in June 2002, the Supreme Court again expanded the groups of 
people immune from capital punishment.  The high court declared that the imposition of death 
sentences on ―mentally retarded‖ offenders stands in violation of the Eighth Amendment‘s ban 
on cruel and unusual punishment (Atkins v. Virginia 2002).  Legal experts saw in the logic of 
Atkins the seeds of overturning Stanford v. Kentucky, via the potential extension of the same 
arguments applied to mentally retarded offenders to juveniles (Fagan 2003; Feld 2003; Streib 
2003a; Bogdanski 2004; Marshall 2004).  
 The Supreme Court‘s series of changes regarding the death penalty had not escaped the 
notice of advocates on both sides of this issue.  One long running tactic of the modern anti-death 
penalty lobby has been to create litigation surrounding death penalty exception cases.  Death 
penalty advocates, in turn, took up the charge of defending the penalty as applied to unique 
subpopulations.  Death penalty exception cases only gain legal traction as part of an abolitionist 
legal strategy if the group of the population in question is held to be markedly different from the 
greater population.  After that point is proven, the subpopulation could potentially be judged to 
possess less culpability in the commission of a violent act.  In the present case of juveniles, both 
national and sub-national levels of government had long treated them exceptionally in other 
public policy areas, for example military service, voting, tobacco use, the attainment of 
commercial operating licenses, marriage legality, night time curfews, punishment for non-violent 
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crime, possession of pornography, workplace pay and safety, truancy laws, and alcohol 
consumption.   
 Even more distinctly, the United States has had a tradition of channeling minors who 
commit crime into a criminal justice system entirely separate from adult criminals (In re Gault 
1967).  Juvenile justice experts contend that there are unique sociological and biological reasons 
why minors commit crimes, and systems have been designed and put into place to cope with 
such transgressions (Murphy 1974; Gewerth and Dorne 1991; Guerra et al. 2008).  Armed with 
the concept of Parens Patriae,
18
 the nation‘s juvenile justice system sprung up in the early 1800s 
as a way to handle poor youth in the cities (Ferdinand 1991; Whitehead and Lab 2004, 33).  A 
resurgence in the ideas of rehabilitation and treatment in the 1960s and 1970s (e.g., Juvenile 
Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974) has been followed by a more recent return to 
punitive action directed at teenage wrongdoers (Ferdinand 1991; Krisberg et al. 1986; NACJJDP 
1984;  Whitehead and Lab 2004, 29-47).  Society will demand punishments for minors who 
perpetrate crimes that reasonably fit the present policy mood of society.  Traditionally, though, 
the urge to punish youth has been balanced with a legal system that recognizes the duty to 
answer the needs of society‘s troubled young (Corriero 2006). 
 From the fields of cognition and neuroscience, psychiatrists and other mental health 
experts engaged in modern brain-based research have found that adolescents have an immature 
mental process which causes their decision-making to differ from adults (ABA 2008; Harvard 
2001; Headley 2003; Moran 2003, Sowell 1999).  Perhaps it was the combination of evidence 
from society wide policymaking, juvenile justice, and modern brain scanning technology that 
                                                          
18
  Parens Patriae, the legal concept of the state intervening as parent, has been formally driving American criminal 
justice policy regarding youths since 1839 (Ex parte Crouse). 
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prompted the justices to hear a juvenile death penalty case again—or perhaps it was something 
else entirely.     
 As discussed above, the United States is one of a handful of countries that executed 
minors in recent history.  In a nod to international law, Justice Kennedy adopted the standards of 
the international legal community to overturn the execution of juveniles (Geneva Conventions 
1978, Protocol II Art 6, Part 4; United Nations 2002, Resolution 77).  Kennedy wrote in his the 
Roper v. Simmons decision, "It is proper that we acknowledge the overwhelming weight of 
international opinion against the juvenile death penalty, resting in large part on the understanding 
that the instability and emotional imbalance of young people may often be a factor in the crime 
(Roper v. Simmons. 2005).‖  After a uniquely American multi-century history of states executing 
juvenile offenders, it was ultimately an argument based on international consensus that justified 
its cessation (Truskett 2004).  
 
 
III. Deterrence Theory and the Death Penalty 
 
 The idea of juvenile capital punishment flowed out of the same theoretical headwaters 
from which the idea of executing adults still originates: criminal deterrence theory.  Eighteenth 
century Italian penal philosopher Cesare Beccaria is credited with the first modern call for 
criminal deterrence when he wrote, ―It is better to prevent crimes than to punish them (Beccaria 
[1764] 1963, 93).‖ 19  In the same classic work of criminal justice, On Crimes and Punishments, 
he also established himself as the first modern death penalty abolitionist when he wrote, ―The 
death penalty becomes for the majority a spectacle and for some others an object of compassion 
mixed with disdain; these two sentiments rather than the salutary fear which the laws pretend to 
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inspire occupy the spirits of the spectators.‖  Beccaria trumpeted the benefits of society 
developing policies of deterrence rather than policies of punishment, while simultaneously 
noting the inadequacy of the death penalty as either.  He believed that the ―violent passions that 
surprise men‖ would not be swayed by the short duration of previous offenders‘ executions 
(Beccaria [1764] 1963, 46-47). 
 In terms of intellectual lineage, Jeremy Bentham came after Beccaria with his notion of 
―felicific calculus‖.  The founding utilitarian philosopher couched the argument surrounding 
punishments in the terms of rational decision making: the weighing out of ―pleasure versus pain 
(Bentham [1789] 1961)‖.  The idea of crime deterrence was a major theme to utilitarian political 
and philosophical thought (e.g. Bentham [1791] 1995).
20
  From these early ideas regarding the 
cost of consequences to offenders, deterrence theory was developed into an operationalizable 
theory about punishing people within a formalized legal system.  Deterrence as an idea coupled 
with the power of an approving public fueled the rise of both the American penal and judicial 
institutional establishments.  Though Beccaria and Bentham wrestled with the deterrence power 
of the death penalty during the earliest days of modern penology, there was surprisingly little 
scholarly discussion on the topic until Thorsten Sellin upset the apple cart in 1959.
21
  Just as was 
the case regarding its legal status, its general popular acceptance served to mitigate and deflect 
much serious academic scrutiny on its efficacy as a public policy.   
 Sellin believed that there was no differential deterrent effect to capital punishment over 
and above life in prison.  Bluntly, Sellin took a soft view to the issue.  He was a death penalty 
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abolitionist and a sociology professor who thought in terms of root causes of crime and the 
environments in which crime occurred (Sellin 1959, 1961, 1967, 1980).  By today‘s standards his 
empirical analysis is wanting, but he strove to adjust for state level variance as well as control for 
other factors that would cause a change in the rate of violent crime and homicides.  If one were 
constructing a brief overview of capital punishment deterrence literature, the next major event 
would be the emergence of the work of Isaac Ehrlich.  Ehrlich responded to Sellin‘s approach 
with a measured disdain.  Trained as an economist, he used more advanced empirical methods to 
take Sellin to task for his findings (Ehrlich 1975a, 1975b, 1976, 1977a, 1977b, 1977c, 1981).
22
  
Ehrlich‘s work was presented in the seminal case of Gregg v. Georgia (1976), which was 
mentioned earlier as the triggering event for the modern death penalty era.  Ehrlich‘s scholarship 
therefore received a level of attention not customary for social science.  Much of that attention 
could be the specificity that Ehrlich gave in his deterrence answer:  each 1% rise in the rate of 
execution will cause a .06% decline in murders, and so on.  Put even more basically, Sellin stated 
eight lives will be saved per execution.  The public visibility created by the Gregg decision 
encouraged a "swarm of social scientists to the attempt to measure deterrence (Banner 2002, 
280)".
 23
    
 Despite the good press, it was not Ehrlich who initially discovered the underlying 
thinking of this work: it was Gary S. Becker.  Becker was a Nobel-Prize winning economist who 
penned the classic punishment as deterrence scholarly work (Becker 1968).  He joined the long-
standing theories on preventative punishment (e.g. Beccaria [1764] 1963, Bentham [1789] 1961 ) 
with the quantitative techniques and language of current econometrics.  With the robust 
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deterrence theory was.  His estimation procedure was developed in 1970 by an econometrician (Fair). 
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analytical tools of econometrics, the debate over capital punishment no longer had to be in the 
vague language of a remote worth or value.  After Becker and Ehrlich, the idea of pleasure 
versus pain (or the more updated version: cost benefit analysis) regarding the efficacy of capital 
punishment could be tested with precision. 
 As Becker did before him, Ehrlich wrote in the language of an economist: there is a 
supply of offenses, a demand for enforcement, and the production of means of deterrence.  The 
starting point regarding human nature is that an individual‘s ―obedience to law is not taken for 
granted‖ (Becker 1968).  In contrast, Sellin had started his research from an optimistic view of 
human nature, stating repeatedly that human beings do not just avoid committing acts of violence 
because of possible penalties passed on in a courtroom.  Rather, Sellin proposed, people don‘t 
kill or perpetrate acts of violence on others because of some, albeit possibly incoherent, 
internally developed moral codes.  Again to contrast, deterrence theory holds that the probability 
of an individual committing a crime is a function of the relative benefits of criminal activity 
minus the costs (e.g. Ehrlich 1975).  Here Sellin would bring up environmental concerns such as 
local unemployment and a low level of personal income as mediating factors.  
 The utility calculus of criminal action is more complicated than it might appear at first 
blush.  However, it is outside the scope of this study to cast judgment on the rational choice 
framework widely used in analyzing crime deterrence.
24
  The study does, however, apply the 
framework to the specific case of serious juvenile violent crime reduction due to the application 
of the death penalty.  Before moving on to theory application, some shortcomings of the theory 
as applied to juveniles in particular should be fairly brought out into the open.  Ehrlich wrote 
"the propensity to perpetrate such crimes (murder and other crimes against person) is influenced 
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by the prospective gains and losses associated with their commission (Ehrlich 1975, 398-399)".  
Juvenile violent offenders, as noted before, might possess conduct disorders that cause them to 
act irrationally (Myers and Scott, 1998).  Murders perpetrated in such a mental state have a 
heightened degree of criminal impulsiveness attributed to them.  The rational choice framework 
attempts to account for impulsive murderers by stating they have a very high discount rate, 
which means the perpetrator places a low value on the future relative to the present time.  The 
challenge for rational choice theory here is two-fold.  Does this idea of discount rate adequately 
express the decision-making of a mentally agitated juvenile delinquent?
25
  If so, how can the 
concept be operationalized?   
 Beyond the basic issue of impulsive decision making in juvenile delinquents, there is the 
issue of the limited cognitive processing of youths.  Do minors have the ability to perform a cost 
benefit analysis regarding a subsequent criminal act at all, never mind at a discounted rate of 
future value?  The perceived individual costs to criminal action are a function of the probability 
of getting caught considered simultaneously with the celerity (swiftness of application), 
certainty, and the severity (duration) of punishment.  Consequently, the hypotheses that the 
presence of the juvenile death penalty reduced the murder rate beyond lifelong incarceration, 
rests on the questionable assumptions that juvenile offenders were aware of the death penalty 
statute in their state, and further, were aware that they could be prosecuted under it at their age.  
And, frankly, that they assigned a cost to it greater than a life sentence.
26
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 The assumption that never waivers within the rational choice perspective is that juvenile criminal action is indeed 
rational.  Some adult violent crime too has an element of impulsive decision making.  For instance, a street robbery 
can be committed by an adult criminal acting impulsively, expressively, with moral ambiguity, or even shamefully; 
therefore, this presents problems to a strict rational choice framework (Haan and Vos, 2003).  That question, 
however is one that is best confronted head on by a study that does not focus on a unique subpopulation group.  
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 Many condemned and imprisoned have requested their own demise (see Windsor v. Kentucky 2008). 
 23  
 
 Though executions are not open to the public as they once were, shame could play a role.  
Put more directly, the guilty could assign a cost to the shame felt by their loved ones because of 
their execution.  The level of reasoning required of juvenile offenders for the juvenile death 
penalty to have lowered the rate of murders committed during the commission of another violent 
crime is even more difficult to imagine.
27
  In these instances, the conditional probability of being 
punished for murder would have to be understood by the young perpetrator prior to the 
commencement of, for example, the armed robbery of a convenience store.  It would have to be 
understood by the juvenile criminal that a murder has the potential to occur during such a crime 
because of the uncertainty associated with this violent and unpredictable act.   If an offender had 
no murderous intent when he or she began the lesser offense, such a level of certainty regarding 
conditional probabilities in the face of environmental or exogenous uncertainty is hard to 
conceive. 
 Finally, and from a quite different perspective, any deterrence power of the punishment 
rests in its ability to uniquely eliminate the possibility of violent juvenile recidivism.  Put another 
way, does the existence or application of the juvenile death penalty stop juvenile perpetrated 
violent crime and murder the way a lifelong prison sentence without the possibility of parole 
cannot?  There are murderers in prison, but only in the event of an escape would inmates 
endanger a population other than fellow inmates and prison employees (usually guards).  Even 
given that small pool of possible victims, there is far from an epidemic of murders committed in 
prison by juveniles.  The cost of an execution and its inevitable appeals does not make it a state 
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victim rather than just non-lethally assaulting them. 
 24  
 
money saver.
28
  At the risk of being overly blunt, killing someone before the end of their natural 
lifespan is not a cost saver that some might imagine it to be.       
 
A Literature Review of Deterrence Theory and the Death Penalty 
 
 Becker and Ehrlich on the effectiveness side and Sellin on the abolitionist side set the 
table for most of the research that followed on deterrence and capital punishment.  And although 
no published study before this one has tackled the deterrence effect of just the juvenile death 
penalty,
29
 many have looked at the death penalty generally.  With a wide assortment of research 
methods, analysts have made various statements about the punishment‘s effectiveness as a crime 
deterrent.  Most who have taken the time to investigate the complex idea of criminal deterrence 
and the death penalty believe that it is indeed ―knowable‖ phenomenon.   However, there are 
criminologists who claim that social science may not be able to answer the deterrence question 
(Tittle 1985).
30
 
 A pair of 1975 Yale Law Journal pieces confronted Ehrlich from two very different 
directions.  Bowers and Pierce (1975) point out that the data used during Ehrlich‘s time frame of 
1933 to 1967 is compiled from error filled FBI files.  Just as with the data in this study, Ehrlich 
made use of the Uniform Crime Reporting System, but Bowers and Pierce note that the data 
from its early years are far from valid representative measurements of crime.  The authors move 
past this initial inadequacy, though, and replicate his study using Ehrlich‘s own modeling 
technique.  Most troublesome was that they discovered Ehrlich alternatively added and removed 
years from either end of his study, which substantively alters the alleged deterrent effect (Bowers 
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 A recent Maryland study found that each execution cost the state (Roman et al. 2008) $37 million.  Similar studies 
found that put the cost of executions millions of dollars above the cost of housing an inmate for life (Cook 1993; 
Drehle 1988). 
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 The detailed work of Streib (1998, 2000, 2003a, 2003b) dealt thoroughly with its legality however. 
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 Among a number of issues, Tittle (1985) points to cofounding lags arising between crimes and punishments as 
well as data quality problems and bias among researchers. 
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and Pierce 1975, 197).  Another methodological problem is the transformation of Ehrlich‘s 
variables into their logarithmic form (Ehrlich 1975, 406).  By using a multiplier in his linear 
regression, he accentuates the effect from an increase in the lower range of the dependent 
variable.  For example, a change in the number of executions from three to four would be more 
potent than a change from 200 to 300 (per 1000).  Thus. in Ehrlich‘s study, the declining rate of 
executions in the 1960s that coincided with a lower crime rate is more heavily weighted than in 
other time periods.  Put another way, in his study‘s design one year (a year in the 1960s) weighs 
more heavily than another year (a year in the 1940s).
31
  And those years happen to be the ones 
with an overstated execution risk ―effecting‖ a lower crime rate.  The second critique of the log 
form is that when the number being transformed is undefined, as in executions = 0, then the 
number is made up.  The solution taken is to insert a value three standard deviations below the 
mean, but this requires quite a leap of faith.    
 Baldus and Cole (1975) take a more fundamental tact to critiquing Ehrlich.  They praise 
Sellin‘s (1959) ―more simple work‖ from an earlier era because it accounted for state level 
effects.  Their critique would support later state level designs, as they attack Ehrlich‘s early work 
which used exclusively national level data (Baldus and Cole 1975, 170).  They note that Ehrlich 
has more sophisticated statistical modeling, but the flaw to his work is more primal.  They argue 
for the use of legal status of the penalty as a variable rather than its actual use, and to do that at a 
state level, as the present study does.  Baldus and Cole were correct to focus on the existence of 
the penalty rather than on the details of its applications such as time between sentencing and 
execution, etc.  The most likely fact to be known by criminals is whether or not the penalty 
exists, as opposed to length of stay on death row and convictions overturned on appeal, etc.  The 
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at the same time as the lowest number of executions during his study.   
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legislative rational for the penalty, deterrence, is more directly addressed by such a frontal 
engagement of the policy as well.
32
 
 Passell, contributing to a special edition of the Yale Law Journal in 1975, called Ehrlich‘s 
model into question.  He brought up the point, now frequently made decades later, that in all 
likelihood we know very little about the deterrence of the penalty without considering many 
environmental variables.  He then conducted a study using state level data that included a 
variable for the south (Passell 1975).     
 Yunker (1976) enjoined the debate soon after this initial wave of attention with a 
―cobweb‖ model of supply-demand interaction borrowed from agricultural economic literature 
(ibid 49).  He presented not just formal equations of the relationship between the rate of 
executions and the rate of homicide, but also drawings of supply and demand curves.  Yunker 
moved the deterrence literature forward because he questioned the simultaneous equations of 
Ehrlich and proposed the use of a lag effect.  Yunker found a deterrent effect to the penalty 
stronger even than that noted by Ehrlich: one execution will deter 156 murders given a US 
population of 200 million people.  However, Yunker‘s paper was later criticized for its over 
simplistic statistical approach (Chressanthis 1989; Fox 1977) and limited time-span (1960-1972).   
As with Ehrlich‘s work, this particular time span is problematic because of Department of Justice 
data collecting techniques during that era.
33
  
 Forst also wrote on this topic in the 1970s, and he made several empirical points of his 
own.  He called for statistical modeling that was not conducted just over time but also across 
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2
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 The UCR data collection program changed substantially in 1958, but continued to evolve through the time period 
of this work.  For instance, data this early did not have the benefit of estimation procedures that were improved in 
the 1970s based on crime information from similar areas (Lynch and Addington 2007, 75-76). 
 27  
 
geography, for example, the states (Forst 1976).  Second, he took on the commonly held notion 
that the rise in 1960s homicide rates was directly attributable to the abolition of the death penalty 
by examining this state-by-state variation.  His summation of Ehrlich‘s results strongly sums up 
the criticism of the literature that had found a deterrence effect to that point: 
His evidence of deterrence depends upon a restrictive assumption about the 
mathematical relationship between homicides and executions, the inclusion of a 
particular set of observations, the use of a limited set of control variables, and a 
peculiar construction of the execution rate, the key variable. (Forst 1976, 744-
745). 
 
 At this point, a disaggregation of crime data to the state level became the standard in the 
literature (e.g., Black and Orsagh 1978; Cloninger 1977; Cloninger 1992).
34
  Scholarship within 
the broader field of state criminal justice policy would support this level of analysis (Smith 
1997).   Ehrlich himself published a cross-sectional time series study, abandoning his earlier 
modeling (Ehrlich 1977b) for a better specified design.  Perhaps unsurprisingly, he still finds a 
deterrent effect.  He also, perhaps unsurprisingly, employs a logarithmic transformation of the 
variables but this time justifies it more extensively through the work of Box and Cox (1964) on 
functional specification.  Not all scholars committed to cross-state studies, however.  Cloninger 
later used a 57 city sample (1991), and other scholars would look at just one state (Decker and 
Kohfeld 1984; Grogger 1990; Grogger 1991).  These approaches are not comprehensive and 
have fewer observations but are not thought to be without validity.    
 At this point, the debate between a logarithmic, semilogarithmic, or natural specification 
of the economic prices in the equation was ripe within the literature (e.g., Layson 1985), 
sometimes with scholars even debating themselves on the transformation of variables (e.g. Black 
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and Orsagh, 1978, 629).  It is the position of this study that there is no theoretical justification 
nor a justification in econometric literature for the use of a log-linear form over a standard linear 
form when considering this research question (for a similar conclusion see Klein, Forst, and 
Filatov 1978, 357).  Disconcerting, though, is that the use of a logarithmic transformation has 
consistently yielded a higher deterrent effect to the punishment (Bowers and Pierce 1975; 
Brumm and Cloninger 1996; Klein, Forst, and Filatov 1978; Passell 1975; Passell and Taylor 
1975).   
 The next major methodological debate surrounded the use of simultaneous systems of 
equations while modeling.  Generally, it seems that those who knew and understood these 
systems used them (e.g. Chressanthis 1989; Fisher and Nagin 1978), though not without 
reservation.  Their use was based on the idea that a simple single equation regression will 
generate a bias and inconsistent result when working with crime data because the relationship 
between variables was interdependent.
35
  However, a simultaneous systems approach presents a 
major logical problem regarding the occurrence of events being studied and their causal 
relationship to one another.  The problem is that a purely simultaneous equation will not allow 
for a recursive effect.  While there is a subset of simultaneous equation models that can be 
employed, the decision to use such a recursive system must be made early in the model building.   
This decision can alternatively be viewed as an ―either/or‖ decision with a simultaneous systems 
approach (Pindyck and Rubinfeld 1981) or as a decision made within it (Greene 2003, 715) 
depending upon the degree to which this decision is seen as departure from a more traditional, 
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The above equations explain the appeal of a simultaneous system.  The mutual interaction between x and y makes it 
impossible to assume that either equation is independent regarding the stochastic disturbances.  
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non-recursive, modeling technique.  All of this discussion about recursive models does matter 
heavily in the present case because of the issue of lags. 
 Consider that perhaps, as has been proposed by criminal justice scholars, deterrence 
studies using simultaneous systems are merely capturing the strain put on law enforcement 
resources during a period of high crime (Hoenack and Weiler 1980, see also Ehrlich and Brower 
1987).  This supports the general supposition that crimes affect punishments and punishments 
affect crime, both at the same time and with a time lag.  To address this complex phenomenon 
statistically, a simultaneous equations system either excludes exogenous variables from one 
equation while using them in another or develops them sequentially in the manner used by 
Chressanthis (1989).  The omission of any variable could be committed with human error and 
thus invalidate estimated parameters, so the use of a recursive model has appeal.
36
   
 Of course, once the decision to use a simultaneous set of equations or a recursive set is 
made, it does not mean that model construction concerns are put aside.  Variables must still 
always be supported by sound theory, and further refinements to the modeling might be 
necessitated, such as considering a structural model to account for the murder (supply) function 
(Hoenack and Weiler 1980; Cameron 1994).
37
  Another dilemma is the degree that the data 
should be temporally disaggregated to address simultaneity.  This is a particular problem with 
capital crime because it is a low frequency event compared to assaults.  For a well-done study 
which, to address simultaneity problems, used a higher frequency crime in a cross-sectional 
study see Corman and Mocan (2000).  Within the capital punishment literature, however, the 
most widely used data by far is annual, because FBI data is collected and packaged that way.  
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preventative police response, and legal system punishments. 
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However, Grogger conducted a unique study using daily California crime data (1990).  His 
project of analyzing four years of daily time series data provided no evidence of deterrence in the 
short term (Grogger 1990), but it did provide insight into the utility of the certainty versus the 
severity of punishment (Grogger 1991).  Another work used monthly state level data from Texas 
and found no evidence of deterrence either (Sorenson et al. 1999), but a later study used monthly 
state level data from Texas and did find evidence of deterrence (Cloninger and Marchesini 
2001).  Evidently, different sorts of projects have yielded different sorts of results.     
 By the mid 1980s, capital punishment deterrence literature seems to have at least defined 
its most basic methodological dilemmas.  Studies such as Kohfeld and Decker‘s (1984) would 
now move past an obligation to define basic modeling issues and instead again delve into 
primarily questioning the punishment itself.  In this instance, the authors studied 48 years of 
Illinois data and found no deterrence effect of executions (Decker and Kohfeld 1984).  They used 
a time series model and very simple correlational cross-tabulation, a basic approach that reflects 
their commitment to making a policy study such as this one relevant to actual policymakers.
38
 
 One understandable question is why are there so many methodological debates within 
this particular research question, situated within of all things, criminal justice policy?  One 
explanation is that studies such as Leamer (1985) indicate that the question of capital punishment 
deterrence was both theoretically straightforward and debatable.   This means either it works or it 
does not work.  The question of capital punishment is also salient enough within econometrics to 
attract methodologists wishing to employ rather narrowly cast ideas.  In other words, it has a vein 
of quantitative work behind it that is both very visible and easily tapped.  It is also possible that 
so many methodological studies abound in this area because it is a matter of life and death and 
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therefore assertions of policy efficacy carry enormous weight.  Another idea to consider is that 
there is a call for econometrics in a capital trial‘s courtroom.   
 Whatever the case, this research question has a quantitative modeling legacy to it that 
adds a layer of appeal to its study.  To illustrate this siren call, consider the work of Leamer who 
proposed a particular type of organized sensitivity analysis that he called ―global sensitivity 
analysis (1985)‖.  Leamer and Leonard (1983) also developed a tool called extreme bounds 
analysis (EBA) that was then applied by McAleer and Veall to capital punishment (1989).  In 
short, these scholars noted that explanatory variables are described with uncertainty, and they 
could measure this variable specification uncertainty in an attempt to find its effect on estimated 
coefficients.   An additional article that developed methodology by Brumm and Cloninger finds 
support for Ehrlich while using a covariance structure analysis (1996).  Ehrlich published on the 
deterrence effect of capital punishment again (Ehrlich and Liu 1999) to respond to the EBA 
critique of his work mentioned above (Leamer and McManus 1983), which had refuted his 
finding.  He pointed out the flaws in EBA while developing an alternative sensitivity analysis 
that supported his earlier finding of a deterrent effect.
39
    
 Throughout this 30 year journey of methodological exploration, fewer scholars 
questioned the basic premises of the economic model of crime.  Those who did explore the 
underlying theory related to deviancy and control were often sociologists (e.g., Amelang 1986, 
Opp 1989), several of whom wrote in their native German (Kaiser 1988; Wiswede 1979), and 
often talked past the quantitatively oriented economists.  It is not surprising but indicates a 
deficiency in the literature nonetheless when the fields of sociology and econometrics talk past 
each other.  This is a shame, because both are interesting theories worth considering.  For 
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 It is interesting that at this point Ehrlich discusses a hybrid model that conducts a log transformation on only one 
variable, perhaps indicating in him a draw down from his earlier advocacy for log form variables (Ehrlich and Liu 
1999, 475). 
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example, one finds that the more serious the crime, the less deterrence makes a difference in the 
individual decision to commit it (Morris 1951).  This has not been well tested to date in any sort 
of comparative analysis between different degrees of felonies.  When quality theory is tested, 
such as Cloninger‘s study of capital punishment deterrence using a portfolio approach to crime, 
then the results can be enlightening (Cloninger 1992).  In this work Cloninger develops a 
measure, beta, that relates the percentage change of a specified crime in a given community to 
the percentage change of all crime in the state or nation (Cloninger 1992; Cloninger and 
Marchesini 1995a; 1995b; Cloninger 2001).  In another sound theoretical piece, Mendes and 
McDonald examine certainty versus severity of punishment (2001).       
 
IV. Theory of Crime and Tested Hypotheses 
 Researchers applying thought from the Chicago school of microeconomics to the 
potential criminal deterrence of the death penalty often believe that before Becker (1968) and 
Ehrlich (1975) there was no legitimate debate on the issue at all (e.g. Cameron 1994).  While 
there certainly was pre-Chicago school debate, the application of current econometric 
methodology to this question has framed scholarly discussion for forty years.  Therefore, in order 
to most relevantly engage the deterrence debate, this shared language must continue to be 
spoken.   
 My central argument in this chapter is that the juvenile death penalty was not an effective 
deterrent of juvenile violent crime, particularly murder.  Murder is of course the crime that the 
state execution of juvenile offenders was most directly intended to stop.
 40
  Thus this chapter has 
                                                          
40
 A review of the case summaries of the former juvenile death row inmates exhibits that, minimally, over 60% of 
the murders were committed during the commission of another violent crime (data from Death Penalty Information 
Center) such as rape, burglary, or robber, and so by extension of that, violent crimes can be seen as the gateway to 
 33  
 
two primary suppositions: first, that the juvenile murder rate, and second, that the juvenile 
violent crime rate were not a function of either a state having the juvenile death penalty policy 
―on the books‖ or of the juvenile death penalty‘s actual application.  An application of the 
penalty can be taken to mean one of two fairly independent phenomena.  This concept of the 
punishment‘s application is explored in the paper as either a sentence or an actual execution.  
Consider that a capital sentence, which may take decades to carry out or be overturned on 
appeal,
41
 could still carry weight as a deterrent.   
 The best crime data available indicates that juvenile murder and violent crime totals both 
experienced a sharp rise from the levels of the 1960s and 1970s during the early to mid-1980s.  
After a peak was reached in 1993-1994, an equally sharp decline was experienced that brought 
crime levels approximately back to the levels seen in the 1960s and 1970s once again.  This rise 
and fall corresponds with a similar rise and fall in adult violent crime and murder trends.  
Notably, adult crime can be interpreted as having two peaks that form a plateau of high crime 
levels, and a subsequent post 2000 decline that has plunged crime below the 1960s and 1970s 
rates.   
 Any individual picture of crime must correspond to the picture painted of society wide 
crime occurrence.  Rules of aggregation dictate that data added together, in this instance the 
known violent crimes, must correspond to one another logically at both the collective and the 
singular level.  Put another way, the thought on why a person commits any given single crime 
must align with thought on why ―all Americans‖ or ―all Kansans‖ commit crime.  It would lead 
to an ecological fallacy to view each act of criminal violence as a unique case unto itself 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
murder.  The 19 states that had a provision for executing juveniles could have legally applied the punishment to non-
murdering offenders, though no such sentences were handed down.  See Appendix 1 for a listing of what constitutes 
a capital crime in the states which had a sanctioned juvenile death penalty. 
41
 72 people remained on death row for crimes committed when they were juveniles at the time the penalty was 
overturned in March, 2005 (DPIC). 
 34  
 
regarding motive, and then postulate on societal influences on criminal activity that exist 
independently of personal motives.    
 The decision to commit any given crime is an individual one, made by a unique person.  
That decision might be affected by such things as out of control emotion, a limited cognitive 
processing ability, or illegal narcotics, but the decision to commit an act of violence ultimately 
lies with the person perpetrating it (Rhodes 1999).  These sorts of individual decisions aggregate 
into the many thousands of acts of tragic violence committed annually in this country.  This 
multitude of decisions to break the law and harm another person, stand in stark contrast to the 
countless times other people decide not to commit an act of violence.  Both the motivations for 
harming others and the situations such harm occurs in changes on a case by case basis, but the 
decision rules remain the same.  Violent crime has a cost and, one can only assume, a perceived 
benefit to its perpetrator.  The present question becomes how heavily discounted any future cost 
is to a juvenile offender, even one facing death as a penalty for offense. 
 A failure in the criminal deterrence literature has been to adequately integrate individual 
criminal decision making with environmental factors.  A review of the literature explaining 
crimes and how to deter them indicates that criminal justice theorists tend to see a powerful 
individual explanation of crime: the reason why an individual acts criminally.  Lawyers call this 
motive; economists call this benefit.  However, when aggregate criminal data is examined, the 
argument tends to become one of two highly divergent arguments.  First, environmental factors 
are the cause of crime, known as the sociological ―soft‖ explanation.  The second argument is 
that individual decision making is still what counts and environmental factors are nebulous and 
do not explain much.  This is the ―hard‖ position of the deterrence works scholars.  The correct 
approach is to build a model for study that as coherently as possible stays true to the idea that 
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individuals commit crime for individual reasons, but that they are encouraged or discouraged by 
incentives in their environment. 
 The statistics employed here represent real people who have committed real crimes, and 
by extension the data also begin to explain those who have not acted violently.  A wealthy white 
person with married parents, a PhD, and a home in Beverly Hills might commit murder for a 
lark.  A poor unemployed African American who just moved out of a single parent home, and 
who never went to high school, might repeatedly choose not to commit armed robbery to support 
his family.  Nevertheless, environment often makes a difference, and educational attainment and 
a high standard of living reduce a person‘s propensity to harm others.  This is because a person 
with more to lose has a higher potential material and personal cost to getting caught committing 
a crime.  Such measured indicators of external environment as personal income and the percent 
of people with a bachelor‘s degree reflect the real world places in which crime may or may not 
occur.  A well painted picture of the criminal‘s world will shed light on why he or she committed 
an act of violence as well as why either this was a relative surprise or a reflection of a life that 
coexisted with desperate circumstances and a high level of preexisting violence. 
 The hypotheses tested in this chapter reflect a test of deterrence theory as applied to the 
juvenile death penalty policy.   My quantitative model integrates individual criminal decision 
making with environmental influence.  I expect that the policy will not influence juvenile crime 
rates over the studied time period. 
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Hypotheses Tested  
 
1 :H   States that have the juvenile death penalty will not have a significantly lower juvenile 
murder rate (murders perpetrated by juveniles). 
2 :H   States that have the juvenile death penalty will not have a significantly lower juvenile 
violent crime rate (violent crime perpetrated by juveniles). 
3 :H  The number of juveniles sentenced to death by a state will not significantly lower the 
juvenile murder rate. 
4 :H   The number of juveniles sentenced to death by a state will not significantly lower the 
juvenile crime rate. 
5 :H   The number of juveniles executed by a state will not significantly lower the number of 
murders committed by juveniles. 
6 :H   The number of juveniles executed by a state will not significantly lower the number of 
violent crimes committed by juveniles. 
 
 
 
V.  Data Analysis 
  
Logic of Quantitative Analysis 
 I employ data from the American states with the unit of analysis being state years.  
Research has demonstrated that American states have cultural differences between them that 
influence public policy (Elazar 1984; Hanson 1991).  State level cultural traits are particularly 
important to keep in mind given the death penalty‘s firm roots in both the scientific calculations 
of crime deterrence and the particularities of American culture (Banner 2002; Hood and Hoyle 
2008, 112-128; Masur 1989).  Southern culture in particular has supported public executions 
since the nation‘s founding (Banner 2002; Masur 1989; Zimring 2003, 89-118).  Though cultural 
boundaries are not as defined by state borders as statutory law is (Gray 2004, 1-29; Smith 2008. 
11-15), there are real differences in how citizens living in different regions of the country view 
punishment (Abramsky 2007; Banner 2002; Masur 1989).   
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 Actual state-by-state execution numbers, not just execution laws on the books, reflect the 
established idea of state level cultural variation.  National statistics on the efficacy of the juvenile 
death penalty prohibit the unique characteristics of individual state politics and culture from 
being studied as an influence on crime rates.  Disaggregation to the level of counties or census 
tracts and municipalities, while theoretically possible, would serve little substantive purpose for 
this research question.  Death penalty law is state law, not county law.  Additionally, effects of 
populations, politics, and culture that vary by each city or metro region would be confounding to 
sort out.  As mentioned previously, some death penalty studies have used a single state 
(Cloninger and Marchesini 2001; Sorenson et al. 1999).  However, the use of a comprehensive 
50 state dataset is superior because of the problems of generalizability inherent to extrapolating 
from a handful of states, or a subnational region, to the other states.  Including all states 
necessitates increased data, but the inferences are of a higher quality. 
 The time period used in this study is 1974 to 2006.  No study of the deterrent effect of the 
juvenile death penalty has ever been published in the policy studies literature, so there is little 
frame of reference for what the comprehensive nature of this dataset offers.  However, within the 
larger question of the deterrent effect of the death penalty as a whole, the most recent published 
works which employ larger datasets offer much less.
42
  Yunker (2001) uses state level data from 
1976 to 1997, which fails to capture the decline in aggregate crime levels seen since the middle 
to late 1990s.  Dezhbakhsh, Rubin, and Shepherd (2003) use Lott‘s county level dataset, which 
while providing a level of specificity note seen in a state level study, leaves out the same recent 
crime drops as Yunker does.  Part of this is a function of when those studies were written and 
part of it is a function of the understandable limitations to large data collection.  However, the 
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inclusion of more recent observations reflecting a drop in aggregate crime not seen in decades is 
more valuable than a county level data analysis.  As previously noted, this is a state level issue, 
and the strongest unit by unit variation in various descriptors is seen at the state level.  This 
equates to a comparison of one state policy to another, with an N of 50.  From a practical policy 
analysis standpoint, it is easy to not distinguish the forest from the trees when the N becomes 
3,054.  One example of this would be employing a data set that sacrifices recency for 
questionably valuable detail. 
 The first execution, including adults, after the modern era ban on capital punishment was 
on January 17, 1977.
43
  The use of data for the years immediately before that allow for more 
observations of state-year dyads without an execution event of any kind.  Similarly, though the 
juvenile death penalty was overturned in March 2005 (Roper v. Simmons 2003) and the last 
juvenile offender was executed in March 2003, the use of data through 2006 afford the study an 
ability to examine a 1, 2, and 3-year lag effect for juvenile sentences and executions.  Policy 
scholar Paul Sabatier (2007) pointed out that a time period of a decade or more is needed to 
coherently study the implementation and effectiveness of a public policy, and this is the first 
study done in such a manner regarding the juvenile death penalty.    
 
 
Measurement 
  
The selection of variables is a critical part of any policy analysis.  In this instance of 
dealing with juvenile criminal deterrence, the variables selected contain data that provide the best 
possible portrait of juvenile crime rates.  Accompanying the  crime rate data are variables that 
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account for state environmental conditions such as ideology, the economy, and demographics.  
All of this information is studied alongside the legal status and use of the juvenile death penalty.  
 
Dependent Variables.  The dependent variables of juvenile murder rate and juvenile crime rate 
are at the center of this study.  The data for these variables was gathered from original data tables 
attained from the Federal Bureau of Investigation‘s (FBI) Criminal Justice Information Services 
department.  This information processing branch of the Justice Department responded to a data 
request for this information gathered under the Uniform Crime Reporting Program system 
(UCR).
44
  The data include crimes committed from 1970 onward and are sorted by age, state, 
gender, and race.
45
  The FBI tables also include information for each of 29 violent crimes tracked 
by the UCR (DOJ 2008).  The data kept and distributed by UCR are gathered on a voluntary 
basis from city, county, state, and federal law enforcement agencies.  It provides a nationwide 
view of crime unique in both its breadth and its scope.  The system is not without its flaws, but it 
is the most widely used aggregate crime data.  It is studied by criminologists and examined by 
others working in the criminal justice system, such as prosecutors and police chiefs. 
 The rate of arrest was determined through gathering the 5-17 year old population of the 
state using numbers from the Bureau of the Census.  The issue of controlling for population is an 
important one.  For one, there has been a broad trend in youth populations nationally, which has 
seen a rise in the number of minors living in states which had the juvenile death penalty.  
Similarly, the juvenile population of non-juvenile death penalty states has decreased overall.  
Though this rate calculation is not the same as the number of murders or violent crimes in the 
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real world, it is the best proxy available for this time period, due to both UCR reporting issues
46
 
and continuity in publicly available census data.     
 A variety of crime data is available that presents itself as an alternative to UCR.  There 
are statistics gathered from criminal prison interviewees, but no such data is free of problems, 
most notably that of comprehensiveness.  By its very nature, crime data attempting to capture 
broad trends is only as useful as its breadth.  The most notable broad data collection program that 
presents itself as an alternative to the UCR is the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS).  
The NCVS is inferior to the UCR for this study for four reasons.  First, the NCVS was designed 
to give law enforcement agencies a measure of unreported crime, whereas the UCR is a complete 
set of aggregate data for ―total‖ crime (DOJ, Bureau of Justice Programs, 2008).  Second, 
because it is a victim based reporting system, the NCVS excludes crime committed against 
children under age twelve.  This is problematic for a study of this nature, because a frequent 
aggravating circumstance of capital crime is the murder of a child.  Third, the NCVS, while 
useful to answer certain criminology questions, is subject to a great margin of error because of 
the methodology used in obtaining data for it.  Finally, the NCVS uses a set of crime definitions 
different than that of the UCR, which can serve to distort the total number of robberies.
47
        
 Why look at juvenile violent crime as a dependent variable alongside juvenile murder, 
when the execution of a juvenile murderer only took place for murders?  The driving reason to 
look at juvenile violent crime in this context is that many capital murders happen during the 
commission of a violent crime (Rhodes 1999, 72-73).  Mentally picture here not a well planned 
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 Beyond obvious issues of the totality of crime reported under UCR, the UCR ―murder‖ numbers include crimes 
normally classified as ―non-negligent manslaughter.‖   
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 The NCVS does not ask victims to ascertain the motive of a person who broke into their home.  That means that 
every attempted entry into a private residence might be classified as robbery, whereas in the UCR robbery has a 
more strict definition.  This UCR definition makes the total number of robberies smaller and better reflects the 
everyday phenomenon of robbery as understood by police and criminal attorneys.  
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scheme of murder for hire, as seen on television shows, but rather a killing that occurred during 
an act of violence such as rape or armed robbery.
48
  Under a rational actor model, a deliberating 
rapist, robber, or assaulter would consider the potential murderous repercussions of future action 
and might elect to desist from criminal planning and action.  If that were the case with juveniles, 
then the juvenile death penalty would have caused a decline in not just murder but also other 
crimes holding the potential for murder.
49
  Also, on its own merit, it is valuable to observe the 
relationship in a given state between the death penalty and violent crime perpetrated beyond 
murder.  Finally, the lethality of criminal assault has decreased due to breakthroughs in both 
emergency room treatment and medicine (Harris et al. 2002).  As a result, the violent crime trend 
is more divergent from the homicide trend than it used to be.  The four categories of violent 
crime are murder itself,
50
 forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated assault.
51
      
Independent Variables.  The first two variables in the study are dichotomous indicators of the 
presence or absence of the death penalty and juvenile death penalty.  It is important to verify the 
historical accuracy of this measure, as it is not uncommon for a state to have the death penalty 
one year and not the next.
52
  The idea driving their inclusion is that not all of any potential 
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 To the extent the phrase can be properly used, non forcible rape is statutory rape, which is not included in violent 
crime totals.  Robbery is usually defined by statute as taking something with force or fear.  A perpetrator need not be 
armed to make a theft a robbery, though brandishing a weapon is usually the necessary circumstance for the legal 
standard to be met for aggravated robbery.  Here, to be clear, a robbery need not meet the statutory definition of 
―aggravated robbery‖ to be counted.  The determination of the use of force or ―fear‖ is made by reporting law 
enforcement agencies under FBI guidelines.  Robbery is not to be confused with burglary either, which broadly 
defined is the act of entering a building to commit any kind of felony. 
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 Information on execution laws was gathered from and cross-checked using the following four sources: the Death 
Penalty Information Center; Streib (2004); The Book of the States (various); and a variety of state-level official web 
resources.   
 42  
 
deterrent effect of the penalty is attributable to its use.  Rather, there might be an effect that is 
driven just by the penalty being ―on the books.‖  Examples of this include the Cold War nuclear 
deterrence theory or MAD (mutually assured destruction), which postulated that no country 
would launch a nuclear first strike for the fear of later reprisal.  This example is pertinent because 
of the life-altering nature of the decision to commit murder.  More pedestrian examples of 
deterrence include the idea that a police officer might be running radar over the next hill, so all 
drivers slow down all of the time when this risk is taken into account.  Another example is that a 
random search by a security officer will prevent a concert attendee from sneaking in contraband. 
 The second two variables are counts of the juvenile sentences and juvenile executions 
themselves.  They are separately listed in case the sentence receives more media exposure, or at 
least different exposure than the actual execution.  It is these two events in the state execution 
process that are the most publicized, more so than say the beginning of the appellate process, and 
would therefore carry with them the greatest chance of deterring crime.  Information for these 
variables was gathered from the Death Penalty Information Center (2008).   
 A study of the deterrence effect of juvenile capital punishment also needs to include a 
measure of incarceration rates.
53
  One of the major dilemmas in criminal justice research is the 
question of simultaneity.  A perennial issue in the field is sorting out what drives crime and 
incarceration from what they in turn cause.  The best predictor of incarceration rate has been 
demonstrated to be the violent crime rate (Michalowski and Pearson, 1990; Young and Brown 
1993), which is reassuring because capriciously locking up citizens would be problematic.  
Different scholars studying incarceration have noted that states tend to monitor each other‘s 
incarceration rates and move towards a sort of normative mean rate of imprisonment (Ouimet 
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and Trembly, 1996), thus avoiding a situation of too much or too little incarceration.  Research 
has shown that the results of incarceration are mixed, with some studies finding that fewer 
homicides are committed (Marvell and Moody, 1997; Zimring and Hawkins 1995), while others 
find a negligible reduction in violent crime (Van Dine, Conrad, and Dinitz 1979).  I expect that a 
higher rate of adult imprisonment will be correlated with higher crime numbers, putting aside the 
question of which one exists as the cause of the other.   
 It seems counter-intuitive that a high lock-up rate will be associated with high crime 
levels.  After all, are not prisons supposed to drive down crime levels by removing deviant 
individuals from the general population?  But consider what is happening.  States are adjusting 
their prisoner population based on crime trends--the more crimes, the more people who are 
collectively put behind bars.  It should also be remembered that the dependent variables in the 
present case reflect only the occurrence of crime within one population subgroup: juveniles.  It 
can therefore be expected that the number of individuals in jail, most of whom are adults, is an 
indicator and perhaps contributor to state crime.  The number is drawn from the Sourcebook of 
Criminal Justice Statistics (2008), and it is representative of the number of adult prisoners per 
one hundred thousand people in the state‘s population. 
 Economic conditions are also widely believed to affect crime rates (Michalowski and 
Carlson 2000; Montalvo-Barbot, 1997), suggesting that economic measures must be included in 
this research.  Recent crime theorists explain that changing social structures have an impact on 
crime and punishment (McNamara 2008; Merton 2008; Michalowski and Carlson 2000; Wright 
et al. 1998), and in particular on the occurrence of youth criminal activity.   Indeed, economic 
change has been directly linked time and again with deviant youth behavior (Feld, 1999; 
Guarino-Ghezzi 1994; Hagan and McCarthy 1997; Sherman 1995; US Congress 1995; van 
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Wormer 2003).  This idea that society‘s macro-level changes, particularly regarding its economic 
class structures, has an effect on crime has been applied not only to the United States, but also to 
policing in Britain (Crowther, 2000), juvenile delinquency in Russia (Pridemore, 2002), drug 
trafficking in Puerto Rico (Montalvo-Barbot, 1997), and the increasingly mobile population of 
China (Curran, 1998).  This study uses each state‘s gross product per capita as reported by the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis as a measure of overall economic strength.   
Economic development has become ever more important to state policymakers and has 
therefore attracted more attention from researchers of state politics (Brace and Jewett, 1995).  
Due to its emergent nature, there is still no consensus on measuring the economic condition of a 
state within the field of public policy (Smith and Rademacker, 1999).  Brace and Jewett write 
that "For at least a decade, economic development has become the Esperanto of state politics.  
Virtually every policy is now weighted by its anticipated impact on economic development".  
Political science studies attempting to measure state economic output have tried a variety of 
measurements over the years, including, but by no means limited to, real disposable income 
(Niemi, Stanley, and Vogel, 1995), personal income (Chubb, 1988), and three variations of the 
same (Hendrick and Garand, 1991).  No one model has been found ideal, but some guidance, and 
solace can be found in economic literature.  Two examples include Digby (1983), who looked at 
manufacturing employment growth, and Benson and Johnson (1986), who analyzed per capita 
manufacturing investment by state.  Here the manufacturing output dollars of the state per capita, 
as well as the private industry output per capita, are used to capture the vitality of a state‘s 
economy.   
 I also account for each state‘s unemployment rate.  Information for this variable was 
gathered from the Bureau of Labor Statistics data gathering work as reported through the Bureau 
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of the Census‘ Current Population Surveys.  Unemployment (Grogger, 1991; Palermo et al. 
1992), divorce rate (Palermo et al. 1992), and urbanization (Palermo et al. 1992) all have been 
shown to have at least some effect on the crime rate (for a case study of a particular metropolitan 
area that uses these measures, see Palermo et al. 1992).  Looking at national unemployment as 
distinct from state unemployment allows the model to account for employment conditions across 
state lines, so it is included as well.  Information for this federal level variable was gathered from 
the Bureau of Labor Statistics.  Divorce rate was calculated from the U.S. Census Bureau‘s 
Statistical Abstracts of the United States.  Though divorce rate is not seen as an optimal predictor 
of the concept of family or overall social stability, it is an adequate predictor with state-level data 
available for multiple decades.   When considered with husband-wife households, a picture 
emerges of stability that includes notions of both single family households as a percentage of all 
living situations as well as the longevity of nuclear families.  Data on husband wife households 
was gathered from US Census Bureau‘s Statistical Abstract of the United States in conjunction 
with Current Population Reports issued by the Commerce Department (1970-2008).
54
 
 Population density is the measure included as a proxy for state urbanization levels.  This 
figure was gathered from the State Politics and Policy database for 1975-1991; for other years, it 
was calculated in a similar manner using Bureau of the Census statistics and known land area 
figures.  
 Tax per capita is also included in the study‘s model.  This variable was included as 
another economic measure, one that gets at the strength of a state‘s tax base, which in turn 
affects the state‘s ability to spend on discretionary programs, such as efforts aimed at troubled 
youth.  Also, the effect of state and local taxes on economic growth has been demonstrated 
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previously (Helms, 1985; Kone and Winters, 1993; and Mofidi and Stone, 1990).  Information 
was gathered from the U.S. Census Bureau‘s Statistical Abstracts of the United States. 
 A state‘s investment in its own infrastructure, including education, is important to the 
overall well-being of the state‘s people (Smith and Rademacker, 1999).  Therefore a measure of 
spending on primary and secondary schools was gathered from the Department of Education‘s 
National Center for Education Statistics, as reported by the Census Bureau.  Furthermore, robust 
public education spending should be seen as a preventative measure to reduce problems such as 
youth gang activity and truancy.  
 Finally, this chapter has emphasized and recognized the validity of the idea of state 
culture several times.  Culture is defined here as the aspect of a citizenry‘s collective liberal to 
conservative ideology that either changes very little or not at all.   This concept recognizes that 
the shared history of Alabama‘s citizens is very different than the shared history of California‘s 
citizens and is taken into account.  Data was gathered from the work of Berry et al. (1998, 
updated online thru 2006).        
Model Description.   The results of this study do not show support for a deterrent effect of any 
kind regarding the juvenile death penalty upon juvenile violent crime or juvenile murder.   
 The model used to arrive at this conclusion is a multilevel regression (Frees 2004; see 
also Greene 2003; Gujarati; Pinheiro and Bates 2000; Raudenbush and Byrk 2002).  The 
terminology of multilevel modeling can be interchanged with hierarchical modeling or clustered 
modeling, as data in a multilevel model can be considered clustered or existing in a hierarchy.  
The nomenclature surrounding this type of model depends more upon the manner in which the 
researcher approaches the technique.  Some researchers declare multilevel models to be a type of 
mixed effect model dealing with not-so-unusually nested data (e.g. Frees 2004), while others see 
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in this kind of model a new empirical way of looking at the world deserving of its own technical 
lexicon (e.g. Raudenbush and Byrk 2002).  The mathematical principles are the same; the 
difference is stylistic, though Frees ceases to call this model a regression, preferring instead 
―mixed linear framework‖ (Frees 72). 
 There are five assumptions to the basic linear regression model (see Kennedy 2008, 41-
42).  If any one of them is violated, then the use of a simple model is precluded.  In this instance, 
the assumption that all disturbance terms have the same variance and are not correlated with one 
another is violated, thus rendering ordinary least squares an improper functional form.  This data 
experiences both heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation
55
.  Given the cross-sectional time series 
nature of the data, this is not an unusual experience.  The basic cross-sectional design of 
 
ascribes disturbance solely to .  In the model used here, observation specific parameters can 
vary with .  Assuming  contains a certain consistent distribution, such as normal distribution, 
and remains homogenous across sampled observations is incorrect. 
 The FGLS approach used by Parks is a way to transform this statistic up to an acceptable 
level (Parks 1967).  The Parks method estimates new models accounting for first order 
autocorrelation, and it then uses these residuals to estimate cross-correlation across units, which 
is named spatial autocorrelation.  Results from this step are used to fill in more values of the 
matrix of covariances, and the model is estimated again.  In the end, the result of this is ―extreme 
overconfidence‖ through permissive estimation of Parks‘ FGLS variant (Beck and Katz 1995).  
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 A Durbin-Watson test on the juvenile violent crime model had a value of .6211, which is unacceptable.  The 
Durbin-Watson‘s d statistic is optimally 2.0.  This statistic is calculated in R from the residuals of an OLS regression 
and reflects both heteroskedasticity and first-order autocorrelation.  True autocorrelation was reported to be greater 
than 0.  A Breush-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test of constant variance of a null hypothesis showed that I have 
heteroskedasticity in both the juvenile murder rate models as well as in the juvenile violent crime rate models.  This 
test was run using an OLS regression because it has the benefit of not demanding a correct functional form prior to 
estimation.        
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Through Monte Carlo analysis, Beck and Katz (1995) demonstrated that one should instead 
assume that the AR coefficient is the same for all cross-sectional units; in this study the states.  
Consequently, OLS should be used, but the standard error of the Bs should be corrected.  This is 
the ―panel corrected standard errors‖ (PCSE) approach used often in research, which is actually a 
result of OLS analysis.  Pragmatically, Beck and Katz argue that even if their approach is wrong, 
there will be less harm than using Parks‘ method.56 
 Beck and Katz‘s work moved the field‘s ability to deal with longitudinal panel data 
forward, but it is unsatisfying because it assumes that Bs are the same across space and time.  In 
this instance, California is different than Kansas in matters of both crime and economics.  One 
state cannot be estimated in the same ―pool,‖ to borrow Beck and Katz‘s language, without 
generating biased results.  There are two procedural approaches that recognize this problem by 
employing a standard PCSE approach.  The first is to use a fixed effect regression that would 
create factor variables for each state.  This would eat up many degrees of freedom, but more 
importantly, it is logically wrong.  It assumes that each of these state variables have an effect 
upon one another in a regression.  In truth, California is not seen as influencing Kansas‘s juvenile 
violent crime rate.  They must be treated independently, an idea that is supported by the second 
approach: the hierarchical model employing mixed effects. 
 In short, cross-sectional studies conducted over time have non-deviating error terms that 
are dependent upon the subject classification alone.  With this approach, Kansas is still Kansas 
and California is still California no matter which year it is, and they will always remain so.  
Recent political science work acknowledges that state level effects matter, particularly when 
being cautious about making an ecological fallacy in inference (e.g. Gelman 2008).  As 
                                                          
56
 Pointedly, they demonstrate that in Park's method, the number of observations (T) must be at least as big as the N 
in the NxN matrix.  This assumption violates many and most political science research designs.  STATA, for one, 
has a command for PCSE that explicitly uses this method of analysis rather than a FGLS or a WGLS approach. 
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described in the first approach, these terms could be accounted for by dummying up all 
components of the subject class; in this instance all of the states.  Instead, the approach used here 
treats the s'  as if they are drawn from an unknown population and are thus random variables.57    
Parameters in estimating equations vary for each individual observation in a regression, and that 
rule holds in this mixed approach as well.  But here a model is employed that creates a category 
for all of the Kansas observations, all of the California observations, and so on.  Each grouping 
of states is assigned its own unique intercept, an intercept which does not vary by year.  With this 
model, inferences can be made from one state versus another state over time, and inferences 
about the entire population of states are more accurate.
58
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 For a death penalty study using both fixed and random effects see Jongmook (2009). 
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 The R code used in the NLME package is available from the author.   
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Table 1: Determinants of the Juvenile 
Violent Crime Rate 
   
    Linear mixed-effects model fit by R with NLME 
   
    Adjusted for AR(1) and Heteroskedasticity 
   Correlation Structure AR(1) 
  1642 Observations 
   50 groups 
   
    Parameter Estimate PHI=.548 
  Random Effects: 
   Group Name: STATE 
 
Std. Dev. Residual 
 
(Intercept) 0.587 0.63 
Fixed Effects: 
   
  Variables Coefficient S.E. t-value 
Intercept 0.058 0.5 0.16 
DP State -0.038 0.1 -0.37 
JDP State -0.003 0.1 -0.03 
Juvenile Death Sentences -0.006 0.04 -0.15 
Juvenile Executions -0.046 0.09 -0.5 
Adult Death Sentences 0.01 0.004 2.69 
Adult Executions -0.0008 0.008 -0.098 
Incarceration Rate 0.0009 0.0003 3.06 
Divorce Rate 0.028 0.03 1.07 
Education Spending Per Capita -0.0001 0.0002 -0.72 
GSP Per Capita  0.048 0.034 1.4 
Husband Wife Households 0.47 0.55 0.86 
Citizen Ideology -0.007 0.003 -2.7 
State Ideology 0.001 0.001 1.02 
Manufacturing Per Capita 0.049 0.034 1.42 
Population 5-17 Year Olds 0.00005 0.00008 0.67 
Population Density 0.002 0.0004 4.93 
Private Industry Per Capita -0.042 0.04 -1.16 
Taxes  -0.0001 0.00005 -2 
National Unemployment Rate 0.018 0.021 0.845 
State Unemployment Rate 0.027 0.02 1.6 
    AIC 2893.5 
  BIC 3022.9 
  Log Likelihood -1422.8 
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Table 2: Determinants of the Juvenile 
Murder Arrest Rate 
   
    Linear mixed-effects model fit by R with NLME 
   
    Adjusted for AR(1) and Heteroskedasticity 
   Correlation Structure AR(1) 
  1642 Observations 
   50 groups 
   
    Parameter Estimate PHI=.34 
  Random Effects: 
   Group Name: STATE 
 
Std. Dev. Residual 
 
(Intercept) 0.009 0.04 
Fixed Effects: 
   
  Variables Coefficient S.E. t-value 
Intercept 0.04 0.02 1.57 
DP State -0.0006 0.004 -0.14 
JDP State 0.002 0.004 0.53 
Juvenile Death Sentences 0.003 0.003 0.93 
Juvenile Executions -0.00002 0.006 -0.003 
Adult Death Sentences 0.0005 0.0002 2.14 
Adult Executions -0.0005 0.0005 -0.98 
Incarceration Rate 0.000005 0.00001 0.43 
Divorce Rate 0.001 0.001 1.14 
Education Spending Per Capita -0.000019 0.000009 -2.01 
GSP Per Capita  0.003 0.002 1.99 
Husband Wife Households -0.018 0.03 -0.7 
Citizen Ideology -0.00006 0.00014 -0.41 
State Ideology 0.0001 0.000009 -2.01 
Manufacturing Per Capita 0.002 0.002 1.52 
Population 5-17 Year Olds 0.000005 0.000002 2.23 
Population Density 0.000005 0.000009 0.5 
Private Industry Per Capita -0.003 0.002 -1.9 
Taxes  -0.000002 0.000003 -0.85 
National Unemployment Rate -0.002 0.001 -1.99 
State Unemployment Rate 0.0006 0.0009 0.65 
    AIC -6151.6 
  BIC -6022.2 
  Log Likelihood 3099.8 
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   The model was estimated with a Gaussian distribution, which in generalized linear 
modeling has the effect of making the canonical link the identity/normally distributed link.
59
  
The GLM model has no closed form solution to it.  This approach, as developed in R‘s NLME 
and LMER packages, can be flexibly applied to distributions that are not normal (Bates and 
DebRoy 2003).  This has a practical advantage in this line of research because a Poisson 
distribution could be applied if the data suggested that as the proper form.  In other words, the 
entire method need not be discarded if the shape of the data distribution changes, which is 
important going forward with further modeling in this subject.
60
 
 The Akaike information criterion and the Bayesian information criterion are reported. 
They should be looked at as a goodness of fit measure between two different models (Gill 2002; 
Katagawa and Akaike 1982; Lancaster 2004, 100-101).  In other words, standing alone the 
numbers mean very little; there value is as a point of comparison between models in this study as 
well as between models other researchers might subsequently explore.  There is no p-value listed 
on t3hese results, because the inclusion of a p-value makes no sense because the study does not 
presuppose to know the shape of the distribution as in OLS modeling.  Instead a t-statistic is 
reported.  Models should not be chosen and judged however based upon their t-statistics either.  
Rather, the assumption is that the study has offered forward the correct model based upon sound 
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 More data on GLM modeling is available from Gill (2001). 
60 A hierarchical model is a superb analytical tool for political science, because much data in the field is nested in 
groups, or best looked at as existing in different levels.  For instance, a hierarchical model would be appropriate to 
look at different units of government within a federalist system.  Indeed, these nested sub-national layers of 
government lend themselves to the approach outlined by Raudenbush and Byrk (2002).  Another use of a 
hierarchical model within political science is to look at time series data, even that within a single unit of analysis.  
In other words, is there something about 1980’s effects on policy that makes it different than 1990’s effect on 
policy?  Also, if the unit of analysis in the output variable is individual, but the input variables are aggregated at a 
state level, then a hierarchical approach could help make sense out of this otherwise nonsensical (but yet 
frequently attempted) jumbling of units of measure. 
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empirical theory.  In this instance, the t-statistics serve simply to estimate the variability of the 
s'  based on this proper specification.  Likewise, the  and adjusted  are not reported as 
pertinent measures of the goodness of fit of this model because in a time series dataset they will 
inevitably approach one (Kennedy 2008).
61
 
 
 
VI. Discussion of Results and the Potential for Further Research 
 
 
Discussion of Results 
  
 The Supreme Court wrote in Thompson v. Oklahoma that 
The likelihood that a teenage offender has made the kind of cost-benefit analysis 
that attaches any weight to the possibility of execution is so remote as to be 
virtually nonexistent.  And, even if one posits such a cold-blooded calculation by 
a 15-year-old, it is fanciful to believe that he would be deterred by the knowledge 
that a small number of persons his age have been executed during the 20
th
 
century.  (1988) 
  
Given the mysterious logic surrounding the high court‘s opinions on this issue, it is probably 
apropos that in the above decision the justices specifically limit their finding to 15-year-olds 
while simultaneously making a statement regarding all teenagers.   
 To summarize the results of my research, this chapter has shown that the presence or 
absence of a rarely used punishment has no discernible effect on the tiny portion of the juvenile 
population that commits violent crime.  The results indicate stable models showing theoretically 
predictable findings.  Support for all six hypotheses was found.  It is important to note that given 
the length of time studied and the sheer amount of ―cells‖ of data that support this research,62 as 
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 If more variables are included in this model the R2 will go up; taking variables out will lower it.  See Green (1990) 
and Kennedy (2008).   is calculated by 1-SSE/SST.  As the sample size grows in a time series dataset, two 
unrelated series can trend together, causing the to approach unity. 
62
 23 years and 98,760 cells in its original iteration, more if the lagged data is included; but who‘s counting? 
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well as the nested nature of the data, the models show impressive functional stability with the 
addition and removal of variables, including the exchange of one dependent variable (murder 
rate) for another very different one (the much higher violent crime rate). 
 Noting the multi-decade period of study, the substantially complex nature of violent 
crime, and all the factors that go into the individual decision for a juvenile to commit a violent 
crime, the results are predictable and would surprise few who study juvenile delinquency and 
violence.  The analyses make it clear that a number of factors have significant, yet small effects, 
on aggregate state crime numbers.  In other words, the results support earlier theoretically based 
assertions that individuals make closely held personal decisions to plan and carry out violent 
crime with intent.  While environment has an effect, the decision to commit a crime is one 
person‘s alone.  At the same time, the juveniles‘ decisions are impulsive, emotional, and have a 
tenuous link with rational thought, an argument supported by these results.  To the extent that 
decisions to commit youth violence are rational decisions, a distinction perhaps best left to those 
in neuroscience and cognition rather than econometrics, consequences are highly discounted.
63
 
 Taking first, juvenile murders, education spending reduces their occurrence.  This should 
come as no surprise as these dollars are often used to fund programs like gang prevention 
programs, building security measures, after school activities, educator professional development, 
and other social programs that directly engage the young in positive activities.  It is akin to the 
classic guns versus butter argument.  This study supports the notion that controlling youth 
behavior is a zero sum game with education on one side and youth violence on the other.  Many 
things do not matter in controlling extreme juvenile violence, but education funding is certainly 
one of them.  The youth population in a state increases the rate at which they commit murder, but 
                                                          
63
 The position of this paper is that the rational choice decision-making framework is open for discussion, but 
because of its dominance as a theory of criminal behavior it is here being tested.  For an explanation and application 
of the idea to an area beyond capital punishment see Corman and Mocan (2000). 
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only slightly so.  States with youthful populations are Texas and Nevada; states with older 
populations include Massachusetts and North Dakota (US Census 2007, 2008).   It is doubtful 
that many youth gathered together in one place to foment murder, so much as states that have 
young populations have highly mobile, immigrant populations that possess the exogenous factors 
contributing to murderous tendencies.   
 Two variables showed borderline significance in one model while dropping off slightly in 
the other.
64
  State ideology barely accounts for higher levels of murder.   However, this is an 
unlikely function of an individual‘s ―liberalness‖ or ―conservativeness‖ directly causing murder. 
Rather more likely, states where those people live possess environmental influences on juvenile 
populations, namely urbanization.  The other borderline impact variable is a decrease in national 
unemployment, which in one model shows a correlation with lower state juvenile murder rates  
(-2.02 in one model; -1.99 in the other).  Other research has also found that a decrease in 
unemployment leads to a decrease in crime (Decker and Kohfeld 1990).  The idea that reduced 
unemployment has a weak effect on juvenile crime reduction (as opposed to adult crime 
reduction) makes sense.  Many factors effect unemployment rates, just as many things go into 
the milieu that is youth crime.  As is supported by simple arithmetic of youth crime and adult 
employment data, many more adults standing around without work translates into only slightly 
more youth with a propensity to kill someone. 
 Perhaps the most fascinating finding regarding the juvenile murder rate is that adult death 
sentences are actually associated with higher levels of juvenile murder.  Past work has found a 
similar phenomenon (Bowers and Pierce 1980; Cochran, Chamlin, and Seth 1994; Decker and 
Kohfeld 1990; King 1978), a finding that is not without controversy in its own right.  This 
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 Assuming a cut off in significance of .05 with a one-tailed test, the two are actually very close together from one 
model to the next.      
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observed phenomenon of capital punishments raising crime levels is called the ―brutalization 
effect.‖   A spike in juvenile murders did not show up in any of the lagged models run in this 
study, which would support the idea that there is a brutalization effect.  Research that has looked 
for immediate rise in crime rates following an execution has been more likely to capture 
brutalization (Cochran, Chamlin, and Seth 1994).  The theory explaining this effect states that if 
society legitimizes lethal violence, then potential offenders lower their inhibitions to commit 
violence.
65
  Particularly in instances when the potential murder victim is a stranger, meaning that 
feelings of empathy are at their lowest, perpetrator‘s barriers against killing another person are 
relaxed.  Once the idea of official deterrence efforts actually raising crime levels is mentally 
wrestled with, there is something intuitive about the cheapening of the value of life when the 
state is volunteering itself to end lives (Beccaria [1764] 1963).  
     Regarding juvenile violent crime, the same brutalization effect turns up.  This is a 
finding in opposition to scholars who have proclaimed the deterrent effect of capital punishment.  
In the adult death sentences model, and in the accompanying model with a ―folded together‖ 
variable representing ―any adult or juvenile death sentence or execution,‖ there is noticeable rise 
in juvenile violent crime occurring in the same year as the event. This effect does not show up in 
the lagged models, which again emphasizes the quick nature of any societal impact of execution 
events.  The impact of state death sentences and executions should be thought of more like a 
match flashing than a slow-burning wax candle.   
 However, other possible crime rate drivers can be thought of as possessing the slow 
burning effect.  In the violent crime models, there could be some evidence of a delayed and 
prolonged effect from incarceration rate and population density.  This possible effect is 
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 Immanuel Kant saw this as a ―cost‖ to punishing individuals beyond that of ―promoting another good‖ (Kant as 
discussed in Zimring and Hawkins, 1974, 35-42). 
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associated with higher crime levels among the young.  The present interpretation is that this 
could be either a driver of high crime levels or a reaction to them.  Questions of simultaneity 
again cannot be ignored, and a study addressing these variables directly might be better equipped 
to answer them if a shorter duration time period is used.  A year is not the best unit of time when 
the core research question is the temporal aspect of crime deterrence policy.  Shorter duration 
data for such a study is only available on a per jurisdiction basis, however.  A few counties or a 
few cities might have kept these records, rather than at the comprehensive aggregate level 
employed in this study. 
 A higher tax rate is seen to exist alongside lower crime.  This can be understood in two 
ways.  The first idea is that taxes fund social programs that lower crime.  After all, tax programs 
fund such things as drug education programs and urban renewal programs.  The second idea is 
that higher tax rates are found in communities that would have lower crime rates anyway.  But, 
given that large metro areas have both higher crime and higher taxes generally, it seems that this 
study offers the beginnings of support for crime prevention programs.  The tax variable is 
including revenues spent on all sorts of public goods, not just crime prevention programs, so any 
conclusions based upon this finding should be made with caution.   
Finally, citizen ideology is shown to have an effect on juvenile violent crime.  In this 
instance, states with a more conservative ideology tend to see higher levels of violent youth 
crime.  It could be seen as spurious, along with the result on liberalness driving murder.  More 
likely, there are broad social trends that reflect both the lasting public mood and ideas about 
social programs that have an effect on crime.  These results would not be seen as spurious, but 
rather valid information to debate within the realm of state culture defined by Elazar (1984). 
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 To conclude, this chapter centers on a rare event in the criminal justice universe whose 
legality is now expired:  the execution of a murderous youth.  In an American justice system 
where state sponsored executions are rare punishments, the execution of a minor, when legal, 
was rarer still.  However, this research is valuable on two fronts.  First, this study is unique in 
that it looks at one punishment from beginning to end, with a timeframe that is comprehensive in 
its scope, yet manageable, and comparable from beginning to end (1974 to 2006).
66
  Knowledge 
is not gained from looking at the effect of capital punishment in just 1950 because of the quirks a 
single year might have had.  Likewise, an enormous database spanning 1900 until 2009 would 
present crime trends that are both spurious and intervening, necessitating a high level of 
historical context to make sense of them.  Temporally intelligent studies must be conducted to 
fairly evaluate a public policy.  This work is valuable because it takes one subpopulation targeted 
by capital punishment and finds no evidence that it swayed their murderous and violent 
tendencies.  Indeed, some evidence is found that it had the opposite effect. 
 That raises the question:  ―What other subpopulations are not deterred by the death 
penalty, or might even commit more violence because of it?‖    
 
 Further Research 
 Criminal justice literature has produced a corpus of research on the validity of capital 
punishment as a crime deterrent.  Yet none of this work has broken down the offender population 
into its constituent pieces.  Data has been separated by time, and to an extent place, but not by 
characteristics of the convicted.  There is a disjunction between such a general approach and 
research that looks at the sort of person who commits an individual criminal act.  Types of 
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 One important book regarding policy theory places the call for policy studies of a sufficient length on its first page 
(Sabatier 2007; see also Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Derthick and Quirk 1989; Eisner 1993; Kirst and Jung 1982; 
Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993).  
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people who hold a certain opinion are also looked at when polling data tracking public support 
for the penalty is analyzed.  For instance, the fact that men support the penalty more than women 
is well known (General Social Survey 2009).  This disaggregating approach should also be 
applied to the question ―Whose behavior, specifically, does the punishment control or not 
control?‖67      
 Pursuing death penalty exception cases, such as those concerning the mentally challenged 
and juveniles, is a common legal strategy for punishment opponents.  But again, there is a 
disjunction between breaking the offender population up into those population categories in a 
courtroom setting versus in an academic one.  Abolitionist legal advocates have seen the value of 
highlighting subpopulations who will be little deterred by the threat of being put to death.  This 
legal pursuit alone makes germane academic research important within the policy realm.   
 Age, ethnicity, and gender would make meaningful characteristics to examine when 
looking at whether or not the punishment affects population groups differently.  Capital 
punishment should be seen in this diverse context, as a potential upward driver of crime upon 
certain populations because of the brutalization effect.  This brutalization effect may have varied 
strength with these different groups.    Selective enforcement has been brought up by the 
Supreme Court regarding capital punishment, as noted earlier, but what about systematic effects 
on different subpopulations‘ criminal activity? 
 Beyond replicating this study and looking at another population group, the model could 
be extended to questions of juvenile delinquency that are not punishable by death.  In other 
words, if juveniles are different cognitively and they respond differently than adults to the 
potential costs found within the criminal justice system, then what punishments work and do not 
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 As was the case in social control research beyond the question of capital punishment (e.g. Houston and 
Richardson 2004; Lukes and Scull 1983; Sherman 1984).  
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work on them in a given situation?  Under a rational choice model of crime, how much of a 
future discount do juveniles place on their actions, and is it so great that alternative sentencing 
policies make sense rather than the hand of the state more firmly applied?  Can this discount rate 
be quantified to an exact point?    
 Research could also be advanced by looking at some different variables or ―old‖ 
variables in different ways.  Variables for gun ownership and policing were not included in these 
models but have been studied many times for their own impact on crime.   The role of police was 
not included primarily because it is difficult to get accurate data measuring police activity at the 
state level for this extended time period.  It is the view here that the role of police in stopping 
homicide and juvenile crime are two separate matters.  Furthermore, policing policy as a juvenile 
crime deterrent will not be directly linked to the size of a police budget or the number of full 
time sworn officers.  Even if reliable data for those basic measures of police force size were 
included, it is likely that the type of police activity conducted matters more than the number of 
officers carrying it out.  One issue of variable construction is the composition of the execution 
data in previous capital punishment work.  For instance, were the 22 juvenile executions 
included?  If so, was the crime rate simultaneously studied inclusive or exclusive of juvenile 
crimes or did it just include the adult data?   
 The challenge long recognized within criminology is to conduct research that best fits 
together individual decision making with the environment.  It would be accurate to say that the 
criminal justice subfield‘s grappling with this issue has largely defined it for the past fifty years.  
Research dealing with criminal deterrence generally and the death penalty specifically is no 
exception to this rule.  Questions regarding efficacy can often be reduced to the relative weight 
assigned to exogenous factors and internal decision making under a cost-benefit framework of 
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some kind.  The debate framing scholarship on capital punishment‘s potential deterrent effect fits 
in with this lasting debate engulfing the larger subfield of crime research.   
 Going forward, more advanced methodological techniques such as those adequately 
dealing with nested data will continue to emerge as accepted practice.  Still, it is the need for 
better data that is even more pressing.  The theoretical dilemma presented above, the melding of 
individual criminal decisions with macro-level influences, can be best addressed by studying 
data that is at the individual level.  Imagine the insights a study offering the 22 individual cases 
of executed juveniles would add to this study.   How aware were these individuals of executions 
and sentences?  At the time of their crime, did they realize they were in a state that might execute 
them for their crime?  Such data presents challenges to the aggregate data collection now 
practiced by the federal government.   
 To the credit of the Department of Justice and the scholars and law enforcement 
professionals who called for it, such a new crime reporting system is now being implemented.  
This system, the National Incident-Based Reporting System (NIBRS), is coming online in many 
states and has great potential to offer new data for meaningful study as it comes online.  As of 
yet there is still not enough NIBRS coverage to make statements about national crime trends, but 
the prospect of combining this more detailed data with existing information is exciting. 
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Chapter 2 
 
 
Symbolic Representation in Police Traffic Stops 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 One of the central questions to evaluating the effectiveness of American governance is 
how well the link between citizens and government officials functions.  Key to addressing this 
concern lies in understanding the process of democratic representation through examining policy 
outputs.  Consider that tangible measures of policy success, such as the unemployment rate, the 
amount of favorable legislation, or reduced crime levels, could be evaluated in terms of their 
alignment with citizen preference.  A different approach to evaluating governance is to examine 
what actions of their government citizens perceive to be legitimate.  This is of particular 
importance when discussing minority groups, who due to the majority rule nature of American 
political processes are less likely to see the realization of their policy wishes.    Put another way, 
trust in government matters just as real policy outcomes do.   Further, high levels of distrust can 
plant the seeds of citizen unrest and provide the potential for protest movements.   
One can hypothesize that a citizen will trust the actions of government officials who 
resemble them more than those officials who do not resemble them.  The idea that people in 
government mirror members of the general population regarding such characteristics as age, 
education, gender, income, occupation, and race is called descriptive representation.  A higher 
degree of descriptive representation has been linked to improved policy outcomes for a group 
(Bratton 2002; Bratton and Haynie 1999; Eisinger 1982; Haider-Markel, Joslyn, and Kniss 2000; 
Lim 2006; Mladenka 1989; Saltztein 1989).  Improved outcomes for a particular group from 
descriptive representation can be argued to have been caused by active representation.  Active 
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representation means that an agent chooses to act on behalf of a principal to create a desired 
change.   
 Though active representation is important to the proper functioning of representative 
government, there is a parallel phenomenon contained within descriptive representation called 
symbolic representation.  Symbolic representation is the notion that the mere presence of a 
government official similar to a citizen has a cognitive effect upon them that leads to feeling of 
trust and legitimacy in government (Pitkin 1967).  Because symbolic representation occurs 
simultaneously with active representation, the effects they might have upon citizens would be 
confounded.   
 In this chapter I explore the impact of descriptive representation using individual level 
data rather than aggregate level data.  In doing so I am able to examine the effect of symbolic 
representation separate from active representation.  Symbolic representation after all is an 
individual mental response, not a policy or political process, so its existence must be analyzed at 
the level of a single involved citizen.  Following Theobald and Haider-Markel‘s (2009) analysis, 
stop data from the Police-Public Contact Survey (PPCS)
68
 is used to produce findings on the 
interaction between individual citizens and a government employee.  However, rather than use 
1999 data as they did , this research uses survey data regarding traffic stops in 2002 and 2005  to 
investigate symbolic representation.  The survey data recounting interactions between police 
officers and citizens presents the opportunity to study the feelings an individual has about 
government legitimacy after an encounter with a government official.  The surveys‘ 
demographic data offers information on the interaction between same race minority citizens and 
bureaucrats, alongside interactions between minority citizens and white police officers.   
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 The Police-Public Contact Survey (PPCS) is a supplement to the National Criminal Victimization Survey (NCVS) 
conducted by the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) 
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 The chapter begins with a literature review of elected and unelected representation. This 
is followed by a brief explanation of symbolic representation, which serves to distinguish it from 
active representation, particularly regarding its effect on minority groups.  Next, some 
background is provided on racial profiling in order to provide context to discretionary police 
traffic stops.  There is indeed is a history to race and traffic stop policy that needs to be 
introduced.   I then outline my strategy of analysis and variable measurement.  Following the 
presentation of the model and results, I discuss the policy implications of the results.        
 
Elected Representation 
 American representative democracy operates on the assumption that elected 
representatives act on the behalf of citizens rather than in their own self interest.  Through the 
voting process, citizens delegate most of their governmental decision making authority to elected 
officials.  This model of governance assumes that elected officials are more capable of steering 
the policy process (Selden, Brudney, and Kellough 1998; Wamsley et al. 1990).  Instead of 
putting their own concerns first, professional politicians are supposed to manifest the desires of 
their constituents through actions taken while in office.  There are two primary groups of actors 
in this model.  The first is citizens, who are called principals, and the second are elected 
officials, who are referred to as agents.  The accompanying formal reasoning of principal-agent 
theory (Barro 1973; Weingast 1984; Zou 1989) dominates how political scientists conceptualize 
the relationship between high officials and the citizenry (Lane 2005; e.g. Pitkin 1967; Manin 
1997; Mansbridge 2003; Mezey 2008; Miller and Whitford 2006; Rehfield 2005; Urbanati 
2006).   
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 While representative democracy allows those who are at least in theory better prepared to 
govern to take the reins of government, it creates a misalignment of goals.  In other words, those 
who push the buttons and the pull the levers that make American government run are self 
interested individuals just as are the people who elected them.  Therefore, they intrinsically have 
different selfish interests than the selfish interests of those who put them into office (Smith 
[1776] 2003).  This is the conundrum of representation--a gain in governing efficiency is made at 
the expense of realizing divergent goals amongst principals and agents.   
 Representation of citizen interest through agents has been studied extensively in political 
science beyond the dyadic relationship between a citizen and an individual legislator
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(Kuklinski 1979; e.g. Fenno 1975; Lijphart 1999; Miller and Stokes 1963).  A strict dyadic 
conceptualization of representation is too simple to accurately portray the complex environment 
in which democratic governance occurs.  Scholars of representation have noted that a single 
principal model is highly unrealistic (Meier and England 1984; Moe 1984, 1987; Mitnick 1991; 
Waterman and Meier 1998).  In fact, a study of an EPA program identified 14 possible principals 
that might influence elected agents to shape policy (Waterman, Wright, and Rouse 1994).   
 
Bureaucratic Representation 
 Multiple agents are typically involved in the policy process, and these agents may be 
either elected or unelected (Ostrom 2007; Waterman and Meier 1998, 178).  Researchers in this 
area have applied the principal agent model to control of unelected bureaucrats (Brehm and 
Gates 1997; Garvey 1993; Moe 1984; Zucker 1987).  In its most simple form, it is 
conceptualized that a bureaucratic agent is responsible to either a supervisor in a hierarchy or to 
the legislature which conducts oversight and provides funding (Lipsky 1980, 216 fn 20; Lowi 
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1979).  The most obvious difference between bureaucratic models, as opposed to congressional 
principal-agent models
70
, is that now the agent is a non-elected public employee.  Rather than a 
periodic check on office holding through a ballot box, bureaucrats have more indirect lines of 
accountability.  However indirect they may be, relationships between citizens and the agents of 
their bureaucracy still exist in this unelected environment.   
 Scholars of bureaucracy and public administration have developed more complex models 
explaining the relationship between bureaucrats and citizens (Mitnick 1973, 1975, 1980; Moe 
1982, 1984, 1985; Scholz and Wei 1986; Waterman and Meier 1998; Wood 1988; Wood and 
Waterman 1991, 1993, and 1994).  For one, it has been recognized that the policy process is 
often not based on hierarchical formations, but rather on networks (Adam and Kriesi 2007).  
Bureaucratic behavior has been explained while taking into account such things as organizational 
theory (Brehm and Gates 1997; Harmon 1995; Meier and Nigro 1976), a sense of responsibility 
or ethics among bureaucrats (Kaufman 1969; Leland 1999; Vincent and Crothers 1998), and 
agent accountability (Dubnick and Romzek 1991, 1994; Romzek and Dubnick 1987).  The basic 
truths underlying the reasoning of the principal-agent model remain, just as with the case of 
elected members of a legislature.  For instance, the condition of information asymmetry is 
present with unelected officials as it is with elected ones (Niskanen 1971; Stein 1990).  
Similarly, as is the case with Congress, there is goal misalignment with unelected officials and 
the greater population (Mitnick 1973, 1975, 1980; Lipsky 1980; Perrow 1986; Sjoberg, Brymer, 
and Farris 1966; Waterman and Meier 1998).  
 The behavior of bureaucrats as representatives of citizen preferences is an important topic 
in understanding American democracy (Krislov and Rosenbloom 1981; Meier and Stewart 2003, 
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125; Nachmias and Rosenbloom 2003; e.g. Bratton and Ray 2002).  In 2004, the United States 
government had 4,186,938 employees (OMB 2006).  The vast majority of these people, 
including the approximately 1.5 million active duty members of the military, will rarely be 
encountered in a professional capacity by a typical citizen.  Those bureaucrats who do encounter 
citizens most frequently are among the class called street level.  Street level bureaucrats, be they 
federal, state, or municipal employees, provide a front line service to citizens (Vinzant and 
Crothers 1998).  Counted among their ranks are teachers, postal letter carriers, and police 
officers.   
 Although not managers, street level bureaucrats such as police still exercise considerable 
discretion in their job (Chaney and Saltzstein 1998; Cook 1996; Downs 1967; Handler 1986; 
Hedge, Menzel, and Williams 1988; Kaufman, 1960; Lipsky 1980; Maynard-Moody and 
Musheno 2000).  Scholars have found that they might deviate from instructions because they feel 
like it, are opposed to a particular policy output, or would rather produce a negative output 
(Brehm and Gates 1997, 30).  Though not mirror images of the general population (Cayer and 
Sigelman 1980; GAO 1991), bureaucrats resemble the general population more than elected 
officials do (Engstrom and McDonald 1981; Long 1962; Sigelman 1974; Woll 1963).  
Consequently, in terms of democratic governance, the bureaucracy stands as an opportunity for 
government to closer align its preferences with the citizenry.  For instance, minority employment 
in a bureaucratic agency increases the implementation of policy favorable to minority groups 
(Aaron and Powell 1982; Cole 1986; Meier 1979; Meier, Stewart, and England 1991; Weiher 
2000).   
 Due to the discretion possessed by street level bureaucrats, the matter of their adherence 
to citizen preferences is arguably as important as it is with elected members of government.   
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This idea has been dubbed ―representative bureaucracy‖ (Meier 1984; Pitkin 1967).  The study 
of bureaucrats being representative can be traced to the growth of twentieth century bureaucratic 
governance.  Because of the labor pool from which they draw, Marxist scholar J. Donald 
Kingsley believed that English bureaucrats would tend to reflect middle class society (Kingsley 
1944).  Later, Levitan (1946), and Van Riper (1958) made clearer the notion of unelected 
officials reflecting not just society broadly defined, but more specifically the policy preferences 
of the public.  While bureaucrats can shape policy actively (Levitan 1946; Van Riper 1958; 
Wood 1988), they can also passively represent citizen interest (Eulau and Karps 1977). 
 
Active and Symbolic Bureaucratic Representation  
 The riddle to bureaucratic representation becomes to what extent are favorable outcomes 
for a minority group achieved by active representation, and what is achieved just by passive 
representation?  First, two definitions need to be established.  Active representation is the 
decision making behavior on the part of a specific group of civil servants that tends to affect 
systematically the resource allocation of a specific group of citizens (Hindera 1993).  At the 
street level, individual level evidence of this behavior has been found in female child care 
workers through examining direct contacts with children (Wilkins 2006).  Passive representation 
is descriptive representation that, through no active behavior, leads to subgroups‘ perceptions 
that the actions of their government agents are justified or legitimate (Fox 1997; Saltzstein 1989; 
Theobald and Haider-Markel 2008, 411).  It makes sense intuitively that a subgroup member 
acting in an official capacity will work towards the goals of that subgroup.  However, it must be 
noted that descriptive representation does not always translate into positive policy representation 
for a subgroup (Endersby and Menifield 2000; Whitby 1997).   
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 Bureaucratic representation, as a way to conceptualize bureaucracy, is made up of both of 
these components:  an active piece and a passive piece (Coleman, Brudney, and Kellough 1998; 
Hindera 1993; Meier and England 1984; Pitkin 1967).  Some scholars say they are linked 
together (Thompson 1976), as Fenno does when discussing minority representation in the House 
of Representatives (Fenno 2003).  The active component can be seen as mediation between the 
demographics of the bureau and the policy interests of a minority subgroup (Selden, Brudney, 
and Kellough 1998).   While this mediation of interests is important in advancing a group‘s 
agenda, officials are also thought to propagate the realization of favorable policy by their mere 
presence (Browning, Marshall, and Tabb 1984; Gerber, Morton, and Rietz 1998; Haider-Markel, 
Joslyn, and Kniss 2000).   
 There are countless bureaucratic decisions made that influence the lives of citizens. But 
there are fewer that have as directly measurable an outcome as a traffic ticket that is singularly 
discretionary by a street level bureaucrat.  This means police traffic stops offer a chance to 
disentangle the active and passive threads to bureaucratic representation.  During police traffic 
stops, a street level bureaucrat is acting with considerable delegated authority and discretion.  
After all, it is up to the individual officer if he or she will or will not pull a vehicle over for a 
traffic violation.  When performing this official duty, the officer is both making an active choice 
to engage in a selective enforcement behavior while also simply existing as a minority or non-
minority public employee.  Though citizen-bureaucrat one on one interactions are not rare, such 
face-to-face dyadic exchanges between a citizen and a bureaucrat are not commonly tracked  
regarding the participants‘ race and the discretionary outcome.  Even rarer than systematic data 
collection on a set of such interactions is an attitudinal survey instrument mated to the outcome 
of each citizen-bureaucrat exchange.  Fortunately, the data presented here offer an opportunity 
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for such analysis.  This chapter poses the question:  Is there a symbolic representation effect 
evident in how citizens view the legitimacy of police stops that can be separated from the 
outcome of the stop itself?        
 
Racial Profiling 
 Descriptive representation is more likely to lead to passive representation when the policy 
is in the domain of race (Thompson 1976).  Police traffic stops are a citizen bureaucrat exchange 
suitable to study passive representation in this regard.  Three reasons present themselves to make 
this case.  First, police have considerable discretion in their jobs as they interact with minorities, 
a fact that citizens are aware of (Barlow and Barlow 2000, 2002; Skolnick 1966).  Second, police 
hiring practices have a lengthy history of not reflecting minority populations with accuracy, 
though there is increasing diversification within their ranks (Alex 1969; Barkan and Bryjak 
2009; Leinen 1984).  But most important, the contentious history and practice of traffic stops 
places this discretionary behavior firmly in the camp of race relevant government action (Tyler 
and Wakslak 2004).  
 In particular, the policy and practice of racial profiling has created a high degree of 
interest within African-American communities regarding their police‘s behavior (Christopher 
Commission 1991).  Evidence has pointed to minority citizens being either stopped while driving 
or frisked while walking at a consistently higher rate than whites (Barlow and Barlow 2002; 
Boydstun 1975; Harris 1999; Lamberth 1997; Meehan and Ponder 2002; New York Attorney 
General‘s Office 1999; San Diego Police Department 1999).  This phenomenon has come to be 
called ―driving while black‖ or ―walking while black.‖  Research in this area has gone beyond 
merely looking for its existence.   Recent work analyzing traffic stop data from Boston was 
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examined to determine the impact of the officer‘s race on the relative frequency of white and 
minority driver stops.  The study found that when officer race and citizen race are different, stops 
are more likely (Antonovics and Knight 2009).  Another study used the NCVS datasets from 
1999 as well as the 2002 set used in this study.  That research looked only at frequency of stop 
by race but not the feelings of legitimacy possessed by citizens.  Incidentally, their work did find 
a race effect using these data: black officers are less likely to ticket black traffic law violators 
(Gilliard-Matthew, Kowalski, and Lundman 2003).  
   Though there is strong evidence for the impact of race on police traffic stop practice, 
there is a portion of the research that has found only qualified or contingent results for racial 
profiling (e.g. Novak 2004).  For instance, sometimes this higher per-capita minority stoppage 
rate has been explained away by increased patrols of predominantly minority neighborhoods, 
which tend to have higher crime rates (Petrocelli, Piquero and Smith 2003; San Jose Police 
Department 1999).  Going a step further, other work has found that there is no evidence of racial 
profiling (Florida Highway Patrol 2000; Smith and Petrocelli 2001), though subject reactivity 
and agency reporting bias is a concern in any research using participant observation techniques 
(Manheim 2002; Neuman 1997).   
 As a matter of constitutional law the fourth and fourteenth amendments preclude stopping 
a person in a car just because they are a racial minority.
71
  In light of this basic principle, many 
states have made racial profiling explicitly illegal per statutory law (e.g. Connecticut).  The 
relevant governing federal decision on racial profiling is Whren v. United States, 1996 (517 U.S. 
806).  It can be argued that the Whren case leaves the door open to racial profiling because it 
allows police to stop African-Americans without probable cause or reasonable suspicion (Barlow 
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and Barlow 2002).  All an officer must do to unnecessarily stop African-Americans at a higher 
rate and avoid prosecution is possess the willingness to lie about their intent (Bast 1997; Harris 
1997, 1999).  The standard for discerning proper and improper discrimination in traffic stops is 
now the question, ―What would a reasonable police officer acting reasonably do?‖ (Whren v. 
United States, 517 U.S. 806)       
 An abundant body of research exists on race and the frequency of what are ostensibly 
traffic stops,
72
 but much less work is done on the citizens‘ perceptions of the legitimacy of 
discretionary stops.   The Supreme Court has set the guiding legal standard of proper conduct 
against the yardstick of police operating procedures followed reasonably.  But what is the 
opinion of the American public on this issue, particularly of citizens of a minority race?  What 
are the perceptions of the public regarding the legitimacy of police behavior?   
 The most compelling early study to examine officer and citizen race was done by Perry 
and Sornoff in 1973 using data from the Rochester, New York Police Department.  The research 
used a smaller N than this study, as well as that of other subsequent efforts (Lundman and 
Kaufman 2003; Theobald and Haider-Markel 2008), but the sample was designed to be 
statistically representative.
73
  Although presenting a more thorough examination of policing than 
research solely focusing on race, the researchers did devote some of their citizen interviews to 
their perceptions of police behavior in a racial context.  The data revealed mixed support for the 
notion of variant police treatment toward people of minority racial status.  Interviewing 
conducted for the study found evidence that police were perceived to treat ―upper class, rich, 
influential‖ people better than most (Perry and Sornoff, 1973, 25).  Those citizens who lived 
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outside the inner-city as well as the police themselves found minority treatment to be fair, but it 
was not judged so justly by the inner city residents (26).  That supports the conclusions reached 
in this chapter.      
 A more recent research effort used neighborhoods in Washington D.C. as a sample to 
gather aggregate level data on perceptions of police behavior toward minorities.  Race was found 
to be a significant predictor of citizen attitudes regarding police (Weitzer 2000).  This study 
makes an important conclusion about the context of neighborhoods in determining perception, 
but it does so employing a sample of 169 people in a single metropolitan area.  More pointedly, it 
aggregates the data into a public opinion poll response format rather than using incident level 
information.  While this approach might be suitable for studying the question of environmental 
influence on perception, it does not suffice to make statements about the ground level 
interactions between citizens and police officers of particular races.  Another study using a 
public opinion survey found that minorities perceive racial profiling to be more prevalent than 
whites do (Weitzer and Tuch 2002).  While nearly 85% of surveyed whites were shown to 
disapprove of the practice, blacks were shown to disapprove at a higher rate of 94.3%.
74
   
 It is important to note that when discussing citizen perceptions of the validity of police 
stops, an officer does not typically give race as a reason for a stop (Tyler and Wakslak 2004).  
That leaves the citizen guessing what the actual motive for a stop is.  Telephone surveys 
conducted with citizens of New York City and two cities in California found that citizens believe 
racial profiling occurs.  Relevant to the present work, minorities were more likely to state that 
race-based profiling exists as police practice (ibid, 272).  Again, this is distinct from a study 
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gathering data on police stops at the incident level, but it points out that minorities have different 
perceptions of discretionary police behavior. 
 
Data and Measurement 
 
 The data for this study comes from the Police Public Contact Surveys (PPCS) conducted 
as periodic supplements to the annual National Crime Victimization Surveys (NCVS).  Both the 
NCVS and the PPCS supplement are conducted by the Bureau of Justice Statistics.  BJS is a 
branch of the federal government housed within the U.S. Department of Justice.  The NCVS is a 
data instrument well received in the field of criminology for studying crime victimization (Lynch 
and Addington 2007; Rennison and Rand 2007).  The NCVS sample design is built around the 
concept of statistically representative households, within which multiple individual interviews 
may be conducted.  The survey interviews take place either in person or through the use of 
CATI.  To learn more about how often and under what circumstances police-public contact 
becomes problematic, a periodic supplement to the NCVS was designed and beta-tested in 1996.  
The 1996 pretest was employed with a nationally representative sample of 6,421 people aged 12 
and older.  The survey revealed that about one in five citizens had direct, face-to-face contact 
with a police officer at least once in the year preceding the survey.   
 Based on information gleaned from the 1996 effort, BJS redesigned the instrument for 
1999.  The sample universe became all NCVS respondents aged 16 and older.  It was developed 
to be nationally representative.  94,717 individuals were included in the NCVS data.  Of those, 
80,543 were administered the PPCS.  The reason for the smaller number of respondents to the 
PPCS is primarily the exclusion of proxy interviewers, though non-English speakers are also 
precluded from taking the supplement. 
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 The PPCS, following its scheduled three year rotating implementation plan, was also 
administered in 2002 (ICPSR 4273) and 2005 (ICPSR 20020).  The basic conception was the 
same as the 1996 effort, which was to gather information about police and citizen encounters.  
However, the instrument has changed each year it has been used, so there is no perfect continuity 
between the three available years of full survey data.  The rotating sample frame has remained 
the same, though there have been budgetary constrictions that continue to reduce the number of 
in-person interviews conducted to gather data.
75
   
   
Dependent Variables 
 
 The dependent variables for the logistic regression are yes and no questions from the 
PPCS supplements for 2002 and 2005.  Yes responses were coded ―1‖ and no responses were 
coded ―0‖. 
The 2002 dependent variable is: 
  
 Would you say that the police officer(s) had a legitimate reason for stopping you? 
 
The 2005 dependent variables are as follows: 
  
1. Would you say that the police officer(s) had a legitimate reason for stopping you? 
 
2. During this contact do you feel that a majority of the police officer(s) were respectful? 
 
3. Looking back on this contact, do you feel the police behaved properly or improperly? 
 
4. Do you feel that a majority of the police officer(s) were professional? 
 
                                                          
75
 As opposed to the more cost effective CATI. 
 76  
 
 See Appendices II and III for the response numbers for each question.  All responses that 
were not originally ―yes‖ or ―no‖ were excluded from study.  Omissions include ―don‘t know‖ 
and ―system missing‖ data entries. 
 As discussed earlier, data regarding the direct individual impact of discretionary decision 
making by street level bureaucrats is rare.  When available, data more commonly measures 
policy impact in terms of a tangible external effect such as a raised test score or a higher 
unemployment rate.  Instead the data presented in this chapter provide insight into policy impact 
in terms of an internal cognitive reaction to a bureaucrat and that bureaucrat‘s behavior.  These 
variables allow for the quantitative analysis of what people are actually thinking about a 
bureaucrat who is similar or different from them.  Citizens‘ attitudinal response is studied here 
by examining how citizens stopped while driving view the legitimacy, professionalism, 
respectfulness, and behavior of the involved police officer.    
 
Independent Variables 
 The primary variables of interest here involve the race of the stopping officer and the 
involved citizens.  Because the surveys present individual level data, the citizen race information 
simply reflects if the respondent indicated they were black or not.  It should be pointed out that 
the officer race variable information comes from citizen reporting, not actual police department 
records.  This naturally will involve problems related to incorrect recall, inaccurate reporting, or 
misjudgment on race from the standpoint of the respondent.  To create the officer race variable, 
if multiple officers were involved in the stop, than the majority had to be judged black for a 
positive response to be recorded.  The interaction variable is coded positively when both the 
citizen and officer variables were both ―1‖ responses.  In line with past research on the issue, it is 
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expected that a black citizen will generally be less favorable in perceptions of police than a white 
citizen (Bayley and Medelsohn 1968; Boggs and Gallier 1965; Erez 1985; Frank et al. 1996; 
Hindelang 1974; Percy 1980; Scaglion and Condon 1980). 
 Age is included as a control variable with no expectation as to any significant predictive 
value.  In past work, gender has come into play in the shaping of citizen perceptions on 
legitimacy of stops (Engel 2005; Theobald and Haider-Markel 2008).  It is expected that males 
will be more suspicious of police action.  Two mutually exclusive categorical variables for 
income were generated from the PPCS response data.  It is expected that those with a self 
reported income below $20,000 will be more suspicious of discretionary police action and those 
with a reported income over $50,000 will be more accepting of the official behavior (ibid). 
 Perhaps counter intuitively, some past research has shown that citizen satisfaction with 
police stops does not vary with the decision to issue a ticket or not (Tyler and Folger 1980).  But 
satisfaction has been shown to vary when a ―satisfactory outcome‖ is considered in combination 
with perceptions of fairness and equality in the administration of justice (Tyler 2001).  The 1999 
PPCS data revealed that tickets mattered when questioning stop legitimacy (Theobald and 
Haider-Markel 2009), and the same result is expected here.  Similarly, the discovery of criminal 
evidence is expected to reduce levels of citizens‘ acceptance of a police stop (Engel 2005).  
Likewise, a count variable indicating the number of times a citizen reported being stopped in the 
last 12 months is included.  It is expected that the more times a stop has occurred, the less 
accepting the citizen will be of the stop in question (ibid).   
 A categorical variable capturing the population size of the area in which the stop was 
made is included.  It is expected that the larger the population of the area, the less trusting the 
citizen will be of police action (Haider-Markel, Epp, and Maynard-Moody 2005; Theobald and 
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Haider-Markel 2009).  A further variable exploring the impact of social status is included in this 
study that was not in previous research.  A variable for ―work‖ is included which indicates 
whether or not the citizen was employed or not at the time of the interview.  It is expected that 
those out of work will be less trusting of police behavior.  The ―number of vehicle occupants‖ 
variable present in study of the 1999 PPCS is not included because of lack of continuity in the 
data collection instrument. 
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Table 1 
       Likelihood that Citizens Believe Police Stop was Legitimate, 2002 
PPCS   
    Logit Coefficient SE   
Log Odds 
Ratio SE 
Black Citizen 
 
-0.640 *** 0.125 
 
0.527 0.066 
Black Officer 
 
-0.204 
 
0.144 
 
0.815 0.117 
Black Citizen and  
            and Officer 
 
-0.012 
 
0.284 
 
0.988 0.280 
Age 
 
-0.004 * 0.003 
 
0.996 0.003 
Male 
 
-0.209 *** 0.079 
 
0.811 0.064 
Income $0-20,000 
 
0.047 
 
0.097 
 
1.048 0.102 
Income over 
$50,000 
 
0.188 ** 0.091 
 
1.206 0.110 
Ticket 
 
-0.242 *** 0.078 
 
0.785 0.063 
Evidence Found 
 
-1.546 *** 0.392 
 
0.213 0.084 
No. of Police 
Contacts 
 
-0.159 *** 0.030 
 
0.853 0.025 
Population 
 
-0.061 
 
0.048 
 
0.941 0.045 
Work 
 
0.099 
 
0.095 
 
1.104 0.105 
Constant 
 
2.36 *** 0.187 
   Log Likelihood 
 
-2299.777 
     Chi-square 
 
115.2 
     Pseudo R
2
 
 
0.02 
     Observations  5370      
Note: * Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; and *** Significant at 1% 
 (One-tailed significance for directional hypothesis) 
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Table 2 
       Likelihood that Citizens Believe Police Stop was Legitimate, 2005 
PPCS   
    
Logit 
Coefficient   SE   
Log Odds 
Ratio SE 
Black Citizen 
 
-0.649 *** 0.139 
 
0.522 0.069 
Black Officer 
 
-0.191 
 
0.139 
 
0.826 0.072 
Black Citizen and  
            and Officer 
 
0.121 
 
0.361 
 
1.128 0.407 
Age 
 
-0.008 *** 0.003 
 
0.992 0.003 
Male 
 
-0.216 ** 0.086 
 
0.806 0.069 
Income $0-20,000 
 
-0.097 
 
0.113 
 
1.101 0.125 
Income over 
$50,000 
 
0.038 
 
0.034 
 
1.038 0.035 
Ticket 
 
0.044 
 
0.085 
 
1.045 0.088 
Evidence Found 
 
-1.17 ** 0.58 
 
0.312 0.181 
No. of Police 
Contacts -0.128 *** 0.031 
 
0.880 0.027 
Population 
 
-0.141 *** 0.05 
 
0.869 0.043 
Work 
 
-0.092 
 
0.11 
 
0.912 0.099 
Constant 
 
2.51 *** 0.207 
   Log Likelihood 
 
-1927.123 
     Chi-square 
 
73.11 
     Pseudo R
2
 
 
0.019 
     Observations  4425      
Note: * Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; and *** Significant at 1% 
 (One-tailed significance for directional hypothesis) 
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Table 3 
       Likelihood Citizens Believe Police were Respectful during Stop, 
2005 PPCS   
    
Logit 
Coefficient   SE   
Log Odds 
Ratio SE 
Black Citizen 
 
0.181 
 
0.101 
 
0.695 0.160 
Black Officer 
 
0.211 * 0.211 
 
0.881 0.150 
Black Citizen and  
            and Officer 
 
0.402 
 
0.402 
 
0.677 0.272 
Age 
 
0.004 *** 0.004 
 
1.013 0.004 
Male 
 
0.112 *** 0.101 
 
1.126 0.114 
Income $0-20,000 
 
0.131 
 
0.131 
 
0.990 0.130 
Income over 
$50,000 
 
0.041 
 
0.041 
 
1.067 0.044 
Ticket 
 
0.105 *** 0.105 
 
0.678 0.072 
Evidence Found 
 
0.51 *** 0.51 
 
0.185 0.094 
No. of Police 
Contacts 
 
0.031 *** 0.031 
 
0.904 0.028 
Population 
 
0.062 
 
0.062 
 
0.965 0.059 
Work 
 
0.122 * 0.122 
 
1.255 0.153 
Constant 
 
0.233 *** 0.233 
   Log Likelihood 
 
-1465.458 
     Chi-square 
 
74.51 
     Pseudo R
2
 
 
0.025 
     Observations  4526      
Note: * Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; and *** Significant at 1% 
 (One-tailed significance for directional hypothesis) 
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Table 4 
       Likelihood Citizens Believe Police were Professional During Stop, 
2005 PPCS   
    
Logit 
Coefficient   SE   
Log Odds 
Ratio SE 
Black Citizen 
 
-0.217 
 
0.178 
 
0.805 0.143 
Black Officer 
 
-0.460 ** 0.209 
 
0.632 0.132 
Black Citizen and  
            and Officer 
 
-0.345
 
0.394 
 
0.709 0.280 
Age 
 
0.010 *** 0.004 
 
1.010 0.004 
Male 
 
-0.047 
 
0.104 
 
0.954 0.099 
Income $0-20,000 
 
0.155 
 
0.131 
 
1.168 0.153 
Income over 
$50,000 
 
0.12 *** 0.041 
 
1.128 0.046 
Ticket 
 
-0.334 *** 0.107 
 
0.716 0.076 
Evidence Found 
 
-1.699 *** 0.511 
 
0.183 0.093 
No. of Police 
Contacts 
 
-0.118 *** 0.031 
 
0.888 0.028 
Population 
 
-0.082 
 
0.061 
 
0.921 0.056 
Work 
 
0.237 * 0.124 
 
1.268 0.158 
Constant 
 
2.034 *** 0.237 
   Log Likelihood 
 
-1425.082 
     Chi-square 
 
81.25 
     Pseudo R
2
 
 
0.028 
     Observations  4527      
Note: * Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; and *** Significant at 1% 
 (One-tailed significance for directional hypothesis) 
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Table 5 
       Likelihood Citizens Believe Police Behaved Properly During Stop, 
2005 PPCS   
    
Logit 
Coefficient   SE   
Log Odds 
Ratio SE 
Black Citizen 
 
-0.566 *** 0.158 
 
0.568 0.090 
Black Officer 
 
-0.579 
 
0.196 
 
0.560 0.101 
Black Citizen and  
            and Officer 
 
0.433 *** 0.396 
 
1.542 0.611 
Age 
 
0.004 
 
0.003 
 
1.004 0.003 
Male 
 
-0.11 
 
0.101 
 
0.896 0.091 
Income $0-20,000 
 
0.115 
 
0.128 
 
1.122 0.144 
Income over 
$50,000 
 
0.088 ** 0.04 
 
1.092 0.044 
Ticket 
 
-0.351 *** 0.103 
 
0.704 0.073 
Evidence Found 
 
-1.614 *** 0.511 
 
0.199 0.102 
No. of Police 
Contacts 
 
-0.122 *** 0.031 
 
0.886 0.027 
Population 
 
-0.118 ** 0.058 
 
0.888 0.051 
Work 
 
0.242 ** 0.121 
 
1.274 0.154 
Constant 
 
2.359 *** 0.232 
   Log Likelihood 
 
-1501.856 
     Chi-square 
 
82.35 
     Pseudo R
2
 
 
0.027 
     Observations  4523      
Note: * Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; and *** Significant at 
1% 
  (One-tailed significance for directional hypothesis) 
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Results 
 
 Logistic regression of the 2002 PPCS data indicate that black citizens are more likely to 
believe police stops are illegitimate.  However, there is no statistical support for the notion that 
the interaction between citizen and officer race shapes citizen perceptions.  The first column in 
Tables 1-5 presented above provides the logistic coefficient and the direction of the relationship 
between the variables in the model.  Standard errors are listed in column two.  For ease of 
interpretation, the log odds ratio is provided in column three for each variable, along with their 
standard errors.  The log likelihood, Chi-Square, and Pseudo R
2 
reported are all typical of a 
logistic regression model and are quite similar to past work analyzing the 1999 dataset (Theobald 
and Haider-Markel 2009). 
 Tables 1 and 2 present the question of perception of legitimacy for 2002 and 2005.  Age 
is shown to be significant at the 10% level (using a one-tailed test for significance) but not to a 
very strong degree.  Males are less likely to believe police stops are legitimate, which was 
expected.  People with an income over $50,000 were more likely to indicate that a stop was 
legitimate, which is not surprising.  Those issued a ticket, found possessing criminal evidence, 
and making more frequent contacts with the police were more likely to find a stop illegitimate.  
Table 2 demonstrates that side-by-side analysis of 2002 and 2005 yields fairly similar results on 
most variables.  Higher income was no longer found to be a predictor nor was the issuance of a 
ticket.  However, population in 2005 was a predictor, with a larger metropolitan area pointing to 
more feelings of police illegitimacy.   
 Tables 3, 4, and 5 show the results for dependent variables that were not used in the 2002 
instrument.  The models‘ reported diagnostic numbers are substantively the same as each other, 
as well as the work presented with analysis of the 1999 PPCS.  There are some interesting results 
 85  
 
reported regarding race that differs from the 2002 analysis and the 2005 question regarding 
―legitimacy.‖  Age was again found to be a significant predictor in the case of ―respectfulness‖ 
but not in the matter of ―proper‖ or ―professional‖ behavior.  Results for income and gender are 
mixed, with more consistent results found for questions that are more likely to reflect citizen 
behavior such as evidence found and number of police contacts.   
  
Discussion and Conclusion 
 The results for this study provide insight into the interaction between citizen race and the 
race of a street level unelected official.  Only one of the five models showed the instance of a 
black citizen interacting with a black police officer to be a predictor of public attitudes.  As the 
results in Table 5 indicate, if a black citizen interacted with a black officer that person more 
likely to think the police ―behaved properly.‖  This highlights the value of the different 
dependent variables examined with the 2005 data.  The four variables were legitimate, respectful, 
professional, and proper behavior.  It could be that proper behavior, a question not asked in 2002, 
reflects the overall driver perception of police actions more than the other variables.  In these 
cases, perhaps black citizens are willing to give a black officer ―the benefit of the doubt‖ if the 
officer goes about business after even a frustrating stop decision is made in a straightforward 
fashion.  Perhaps these same black respondents would not view a black police officer‘s behavior 
as ―professional‖ or ―respectful‖ because they disagreed with being pulled over in the first place.  
However, once they were pulled over, the citizen then believed the officer ―behaved properly.‖  
More exploration is needed to distinguish between the finer points of citizen‘s viewpoints on 
bureaucratic ―professionalism‖ juxtaposed with proper bureaucratic behavior.  As the PPCS 
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authors realized when they wrote the instrument, judgments on ―professionalism‖ and general 
behavior are two different things. 
 Black citizens in both 2002 and 2005 were less likely to believe police behavior was 
legitimate (in fact this finding is almost statistically identical in the models).  Blacks were also 
less likely to see the behavior of police officers as proper (see Appendices II and III for cross-
tabulation of the variable data).  However, citizen‘s race did not come into play with judgments 
of ―professionalism‖ or ―respect.‖  Again, citizens separate matters of respect given by a police 
officer from attitudes regarding official behavior in a more general sense.  Also note that an 
attitudinal question on ―respect‖ is very different from most of the other questions on the NCVS 
instrument.  However, officer race is a significant predictor of citizen attitude regarding respect.  
Black officers in 2005 elicited more feelings of ―respect‖ but less of ―professionalism.‖  One 
possible explanation is that a bureaucrat can convey respect to an individual but is not seen as 
occupying a professional space with legitimacy.  This could be due to the historical lack of 
minority police officers until recent years.   
 Past research has indeed often found a link between descriptive bureaucratic 
representation and favorable policy outcomes for a minority group (Hindera 1993; Seldon, 
Brudney, and Kellough 1998; Thielemann and Stewart 1996; Thompson 1976).  However, 
studies such as one using data from Texas schools that found a link between percentage of 
minority teachers and minority test scores (Weiher 2000) are not able to explore passive 
representation the way this chapter does.  In the Texas research, it is not clear if minority 
teachers are simply teaching differently.  A different pedagogical approach by African-American 
high school teachers would be a manifestation of the idea of active representation.  There is no 
way to accurately discern from that research if minority teachers instruct systematically different; 
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or rather, are affecting the cognition and subsequent success of minority students just by simply 
existing as a minority teacher. 
 This study, by being able to single out whether or not a traffic citation was issued, can to 
a reasonable degree control for the effect of bureaucratic discretion.  The minority status of an 
officer is therefore separated from police behavior.  With that in mind, this study shows that 
passive and active components to bureaucratic decision making each have a role in how the 
officers are viewed by citizens. 
 It is interesting that the results for income and gender are mixed, indicating that these 
citizen characteristics are not stable predictors of attitudes toward the bureaucracy in the same 
way that citizen race is.  Some past research has noted that men respond more negatively 
attitudinally to the police than women (Hindelang, Dunn, Aumick, and Sutton 1975), but these 
mixed results are consistent with past research on this question (Bayley and Mendelsohn 1969; 
Boggs and Galliher 1975; Davis 1990; Jesilow, Meyer, and Namazzi 1995).  Similarly, results 
for the age variable were mixed, which is consistent with other past work as well (Bayley and 
Mendelsohn 1969; McCaghy, Allen, and Coffey 1968).  Also, income and gender are not as 
strong of predictors as is the behavior of the officer in whether or not a ticket is issued. It is also 
worthwhile to recall that citizens answered the four questions in the 2005 PPCS differently.  
Unless one is to believe that respondents are answering survey questions in a haphazard manner, 
this indicates that they are considering different aspects of policing, such as proper behavior and 
the legitimacy of a traffic stop, as distinguishable from each other.  These results point to the 
ability of survey opinion work to analyze police behavior with a precise instrument.  
 The recent National Race and Crime Survey (NRCS) demonstrated that African-
Americans experience the criminal justice system in a very different way than whites do (Peffley 
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and Hurwitz 2010).  African-Americans both experience the criminal justice system more 
frequently than whites and are more skeptical of it (ibid).  While a broad systematic survey such 
as the NRCS has provided a strong foundation for exploring minority citizens‘ attitudes toward 
different policies, more targeted efforts such as the present one fill a different gap in the 
literature.  It is necessary to have data on the outcome of a discretionary bureaucratic action to 
make statements about how individuals think about the actions of frontline government 
employees.  Further research in this area will hinge on the collection efforts of the PPCS, which 
is conducted every third year and held by the government for a few years before its release. 
 It is expected that this study will be linked with ensuing work in the area of public 
perceptions of democratic representation.  Mating the findings here with the surveys from 1999 
and what emerges from the BJS later will provide a more robust study as the data grows.  
Important literature has recently emerged that is dealing with minority groups and their 
experiences achieving substantive representation in this country (Haider-Markel 2010, Peffley 
and Hurwitz 2010).  Just as with studying legislative output, the careful exploration of survey 
data is an important piece of unlocking the puzzle of just representation.      
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Chapter 3 
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Government is an abstraction.  Public acts are carried out by men and women who agree, though 
various types of organization and contractual arrangements to serve their fellows.  The particular 
kind of relationship called civil service has some symbolic and practical properties that are 
especially valuable for tasks that are difficult to arrange through the market. 
 
- John D. Donahue 
 The Privatization Decision 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I have never yet found a contractor who, if not watched, would not leave the government 
holding the bag. 
 
 - President Harry S. Truman (speaking while a U.S. Senator) 
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Introduction 
 Debate concerning which portions of government should be staffed and managed by 
public employees versus private employees has been one of the central currents of modern 
American politics and public policy.  The core controversy of the issue centers on the use of 
public money.   Advocates of privatization argue that there are potential cost reductions as well 
as local economic benefits that can be realized by shifting duties from government employees to 
privately owned businesses.  Privatization is important to public management and, at times, 
widely salient.  Despite this, public policy analysts have devoted relatively little scholarly 
attention to privatization, either in its Reagan heyday (Heilman and Johnson 1992) or more 
recently.   
 Previous research has focused on narrowly cast questions of administrative efficacy and 
efficiency.  Questions of efficacy ask:  does contracting at least minimally provide a particular 
service?  Questions of efficiency ask:  how much more or less does it cost to privatize a 
particular task?  To illustrate the program specific nature of this research, consider the following 
studies:  Who can most cheaply perform a municipal service (e.g. CSG 1999; GAO 1997)?  
Which type of firm is more profitable: public or private (e.g. Dewenter and Malatesta 2001)?  
And finally: How should contracts be drawn up between governments and private firms (e.g. 
Dyck and Wruck 1998; Hart 2003; Schmidt 1996; Unruh and Hodgin 2004)?  Indeed, the 
effectiveness of privatization often centers on contract design and monitoring, while cost savings 
centers on comparative advantages private firms might have over public service delivery.   
 This chapter does not look at either questions of contract administration or cost savings 
directly.  Rather, it incorporates any tangible effects efficacy and efficiency might have into an 
economic impact study with broader implications.  Therefore, this research effort is both more 
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unique and practically useful because it approaches the topic from the vantage point of a 
community or a citizen.  It zeroes in on a single policy area, prisons, in order to study what 
impact a privatization decision has on a community‘s local economy.  By focusing in on prisons, 
broad contextual effects of privatization can be incorporated into an orderly research agenda. 
 A careful analysis of the economic impact of prison privatization will be informative for 
students of other policy areas.  Tackling just one privatization issue area at a time is more 
coherent than making overly broad statements about privatized services as a percent of GDP.  It 
is a hard fact that limited aggregate data exists to provide even somewhat accurate estimations of 
the totality of privately provided government services.  Such solid data is difficult to come by in 
no small measure because of the closed management environments of contracted firms.  Any 
industry captured government bodies are equally unforthcoming.   
 While dealing with a criminal justice topic, this chapter does not address prison 
construction‘s effect on crime or blight.  Again, it is an economic impact study.  Personal income 
and unemployment provide a snapshot into how prison privatization impacts local economies.  
Putting a slice of a local economic pie under the scrutiny of a focused analytical microscope in 
order to learn about any system wide effects of a particular privatization program is a logical first 
step in learning about privatization‘s total impacts. 
 
 
I. Prison Privatization 
 
Privatization and Politics 
  Though economic concerns are critical to evaluating the quality of any public policy, 
sound research on privatization must also be capable of dovetailing with the study of American 
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politics at both the national and subnational levels.
76
  Statements about any economic impact 
have not yet been connected in the literature with political concepts such as the adoption 
decision, interest group pressure, or policy drift.  Perhaps this is explained by the attention 
focused on operational contracts that define the policy‘s implementation with legal specificity.  
Talking about overtly political matters is also made more difficult because of privatization‘s 
winding path through the United States (US) federal system.  Private corporations that contract 
are not tied to operating in any single level of government or geographic area.   
 Privatization is best understood for what it is, a political phenomenon.  It is more than a 
budgetary approach to policy implementation.  It is more than a legally binding agreement 
between public and private parties.  It is a complex policy choice as political as any other.  
Privatization‘s enactment is predicated upon political actors‘ notions of government service 
provision and political ideology, not cost concerns and localized economic benefits alone (Block 
et. al. 1987; Block 1996; Heilman and Johnson 1992; Lindblom 1984).  Privatization properly 
understood occupies a place on the political left-right continuum of ideological positioning (see 
NES through 2004).   
 The economic thinking of a community‘s voters matters when political actors are 
considering privatizing.  Voters do actually vote with economic information in mind (Keech 
1995; Kiewiet and Rivers 1984; Kramer 1971; Lewis-Beck 1980, 1988; Norpoth 1984; Rogoff 
1990; Suzuki and Chappell 1993; Tufte 1978; Weatherford and Sergeyev 2000).  While some 
scholars believe they fall short of truly understanding the real state of the economy (Conover, 
Feldman, and Knight 1987; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1997; Fiorina 1981; Godbout and Belanger 
2007; Goren 1997; Holbrook and Garand 1996; Krause 1997; Lupia 1994) others argue they are 
very capable of processing accurate economic data (Alt 1979; Chappell and Keech 1985; 
                                                          
76
 Both in-the-electorate and in-government. 
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MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson 1992; Mutz 1992).  Whatever the case may be, voters take note 
of economic matters (Nadeau and Lewis-Beck 2001), and that has an influence on leaders‘ 
eagerness to privatize. 
  
Prison Privatization as a Marketplace Good 
 Though there is abundant past work on government service provision (e.g. Lowi 1972; 
Heckathorn and Maser 1990; Ripley and Franklin 1991) and other policy activity such as 
regulation (e.g. Gormley 1983; Tatalovich and Daynes 1998; Wilson 1980), there is no well 
received theoretical framework dealing exclusively with privatization.  Such a framework would 
be contingent upon a sound understanding of market function, American state economies, and 
the public private distinction.  With a risk of stating the obvious, understanding privatization as 
political scientists requires more than placing the idea within the field of applied economics in 
some varying degree of union with public administration.
77
   
 Privatization is the financial, legal, and policy process through which private actors 
assume service providing functions previously delivered by a publicly operated organization.  
Government workers who were paid a wage and supervised by a public agency are replaced with 
privately salaried and supervised workers. 
 To illustrate four types of good provision, Donahue offered the following figure in his 
book (1989, 7).  His thinking, while not a developed theory, captures both service provision and 
funding.  The examples are my own. 
 
 
                                                          
77
 The best framework in the literature to date is Donahue‘s work (1989), though it is just a first step which stops 
short of developing a full framework or model of the policy. Notably, it is now twenty years old and has not been 
adopted as a springboard for further research. 
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Figure 1 
   Collective   Individual 
   Payment   Payment 
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Private  
Sector 
Delivery 
  
  
 
 
 
This figure could be reproduced using examples from any one specific level of government, 
rather than the mix employed here.  Its 2x2 form is simple, but it provides a parsimonious look at 
the issue.
78
   
 It is important to note that privatization in an international political economy context 
means something different than it does in the US, though some characteristics are shared.  In 
comparative politics literature, it has often been taken to mean the selling of state assets to 
private ownership. Much of this work deals with former Soviet satellite states or newly liberal 
Latin American societies (Biais and Perotti 2002; Biglaiser and Brown 2003; Dlouhy and 
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 For other breakdowns of the public/private dichotomy see Finley 1989, 6; Feigenbaum, Henig, and Hamnett 1998, 
10. 
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Mladek 1994; Feigenbaum and Henig 1994; Hibou 2004; Jones, Tendon, and Vogelsang 1990; 
Korsun and Murrell 1995; MacLeod 2004; Ott and Hartley 1991; Ramamurti 1990; and Van 
Vugt 1997).  As with matters within American political economy, variances in institutional 
structures affect market behavior and private firm‘s financial decision making (D‘Souza and 
Megginson 1999).   So, aspects of privatization efforts underway overseas are at least somewhat 
similar to those in the US, and there is an accompanying body of work that can be useful for 
students of US politics.  For a comparative study of postal delivery privatization see Crew and 
Kleindorfer (2008).   
 Prisons, whether public or private, provide a service.  How that service being provided is 
conceptualized and defined has a direct bearing on how prisons should be analyzed.  They can be 
thought of as providing a space to confine convicted criminals, or they can be thought of as 
providing public safety more generally.  Under the first conception, the market is for guarded 
cells in mostly cinder block buildings surrounded by razor wire.  The direct cost for this is 
concretely, and rather easily, measured in terms of the per diem cost to house an individual 
prisoner.  Costs that are often overlooked include such items as the construction cost of the 
building and the expense of running water and septic lines to it.  An additional layer of hidden 
costs also exists that includes items such as the reduced income tax revenue stream, increased 
litigation expense for prison mishaps, contract oversight cost versus bureaucratic management 
expenses, and increased community policing rates caused by a new prison and the rise of so 
called ―prison communities‖.  Another downstream cost to a community might be a rise in 
unemployment benefit expenses caused by firing municipal prison guards in the name of a lower, 
and much more visible, per diem rate.  All of these components of the cost formula have a direct 
bearing on any realized local economic impact. 
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 However, perhaps the good offered up by a prison is not just the service of incapacitation 
by way of prison cells, but rather the communal safety or peace of mind caused by that.  This is 
analogous to conceptualizing national defense as a public good.  Thought about this way, a real 
or imagined sense of safety is the market good and a prison cell is just a tool constructed to 
realize it. 
 Prisons provide this good, be it thought of as cells or ―public safety‖ through a market 
mechanism.  When a prison is constructed, there has already been a decision to achieve the good 
of public safety in a particular way: the operation of guarded cell blocks to house criminals.  The 
market is thus a prison market, albeit one without anything approaching perfect competition.  
The construction of a prison is a significant barrier to market entry and not just because of high 
construction cost.  Laws prevent the completely free entry of a new prison, and by extension, a 
new prison firm, into the market.  Indeed, firms hoping to operate a prison must lobby for and 
achieve the approval of government officials.  This is not a more freely operating retail market 
for a good such as toys or watches, or even a heavily subsidized commodity market like the ones 
for sugar or corn. 
 The behavior of marketplace competitors is shaped by the nature of the prison market 
itself, which includes the actions and motives of relevant principles and agents to carceral 
transactions.  The principal agent problem is driven by the fact that an agent has a specialized 
ability to serve a principals‘ objective, but the agent has conflicting incentives and thus the 
agent‘s efforts can‘t be monitored (Haugen and Senbet 1981; Pratt and Zeckhauser 1985).  In this 
case, the question arises as to who is the principal and who is the agent?  The identification of 
these actors is critical to discovering motivations in marketplace behaviors.  Three reasons 
emerge as to why motivations, shaped by incentives, are important in principal agent 
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relationships: goals can be divergent between P and A, information asymmetries can exist, and 
there are commensurate costs associated with verifying performance (Zou 1989).  This is not a 
problem unique to the prison market.  Public administration literature has long coped with the 
necessity of identifying just who the principal is in a complex political environment (Lane 2005).  
It is an existing research complexity to synchronize the notions of a simple marketplace buyer-
seller dyad with knowing who the customer is in a democratic hierarchy (e.g. Waterman and 
Meier 1998; Wood 1988). 
 In this instance, the government officials are simultaneously serving as principals and 
agents.  City managers and prison bureaucracy employees are both working for the public at 
large and potentially competing with firms they oversee.  These public employees (or elected 
politicians) are sandwiched between citizens and profit seeking companies, a situation not unique 
to prisons.  As bureaucrats and politicians, they seek to operate in their own best interest while 
also serving their public (Barro 1973; also see Maynard-Moody and Musheno 2000).  Operating 
only as agents are the contracted prison firms, who are filling a clearly defined role for a charged 
cost.   
     
Subnational Politics and Privatization 
 Subnational American governments have turned to privatization of public services for a 
variety of reasons.  It is valuable to know why privatization is initially brought up as a policy 
option in order to soundly evaluate ensuing policy outcomes.   
 Before examining this issue more closely, a term tied to it needs explanation.   In the 
debate upon privatization, the term public service could be construed as a loaded phrase.  The 
ontology of public service is intertwined with the increasing demands placed upon government 
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by American citizens (Sharp 1990).  What is now seen as a public service might have been seen 
as a private concern in a different era.  For example, demands placed on community school 
systems change with time.  Primary and secondary education is a private good that citizens‘ taxes 
subsidize by either providing a school or an educational voucher.  The desire for a certain type of 
education changes with the existing job market faced by citizens.   
 In an ever more varied governmental landscape, alternative service delivery has sprung 
up as a way for bureaucrats to create acceptable policy output for its citizens (Finley, 1989).   
Such diverse programs as contracting, self-help, vouchers, subsidies, franchise concessions, 
volunteer work, and tax incentives could help governments lower cost and still deliver services 
to citizens (Manchester 1989, 15-19).  Many of these relatively new ways to deliver public 
services are forms of privatization.  More broadly speaking, these alternative service delivery 
methods are also called public-private partnerships (Heilman and Johnson 1992).
79
    
  Besides growing societal complexity and change, there has been political pressure from 
conservative interest groups and conservative politicians who embrace privatization per se, 
particularly since the Ronald Reagan presidential administration.  Ronald Reagan‘s first official 
act as President was his January 20, 1981 freeze on all federal hiring (Tygiel 2006).  Subnational 
policymakers in turn took cues from him.  Reagan created a movement parroting a British 
government that had sold off the publicly held British National Oil, Cable and Wireless, British 
Aerospace, Associated British Ports, Jaguar, National Freight Consortium, and Amersham (Kent 
1987, 13).  The re-allocation of government work to private firms has been seen as a solution by 
Democrats and Republicans alike.  Recent history saw the booming 1990s elicit the Clinton 
Administration efforts to privatize government, which was part of their drive of ―reinventing‖ it 
(Gore 1996).  Vice President Gore headed a task force that looked deeply into matters of 
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 For a review of the multiple meanings of ―public-private partnership‖ see Linder 1999. 
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privatizing the bureaucracy (Gore 1993).  More recently, the 2008-2009 economic downturn has 
privatizing interest groups, such as the Association of Private Correctional and Treatment 
Organizations, touting the cost savings offered by their efforts (APCTO 2009).
80
  Under 
President George W. Bush, private defense contractors such as Halliburton and Blackwater made 
headlines in Iraq (Schahill 2007), while social security privatization made political waves 
domestically (Beland 2005; Edwards 2008, 247-312).           
 Proponents of privatization often tout cost savings.  They argue that government 
employees lack incentives to save money and work efficiently; they claim that a private business 
will be more likely to spot waste and make sure work is completed in a timely way as 
inexpensively as possible:  ―When the economy sneezes, the states catch cold.  At the same time 
as revenues constrict, the pressure for additional social services, especially public welfare, 
increases‖ (Wulf 2002, 273).  In recessionary quarters as experienced in the late 1970s thru early 
1980s and again after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, some states have turned to 
privatization as an alternative to higher taxes:   
The economic-political aspect for states is the difficulty in raising additional 
revenues to cover shortfalls.  From an economic point of view, that action might 
not be wise because it could deepen a recession.  But even if they were so inclined 
politically, raising taxes is an extraordinarily difficult thing for states to do. 
(Italics added) 
[Wulf 2002, 273]   
 
In order for states to provide services without raising taxes, their publicly elected custodians 
explore under the radar approaches which give them the ability to meet budgetary demands.  
Voters do not want to give up services, but they also do not want to pay more for what they get.  
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 According to the APCTO website, ―Taxpayers can enjoy significant savings by utilizing public-private 
correctional partnerships to design, finance, build, and operate prisons, jails, community corrections facilities, and 
juvenile justice programs. These savings are derived from a variety of benefits offered by privatization and are 
documented by numerous independent research studies.‖  Their references for this statement are found on the same 
website. 
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―More taxes for few services!‖ (Savas 1992, 2), an early 1990s New York Senate Advisory 
Commission Report exhorts.   
 Later in this chapter, it will be shown that many subnational governments extend the cost 
savings arguments right into rhetoric about economic improvement.  In other words, a private 
firm is said by advocates to both cost less and be able to provide a localized benefit such as more 
jobs for citizens.   A localized economic benefit from a new prison could exist.  If it does, it 
would have to be because of one of two components of economic effects: direct or indirect 
(Crompton and McKay 1994).  Direct economic effects include the initial injection of money 
caused by prison construction and local industry purchases.  Indirect economic effects, also 
called successive effects or induced effects, is the spending that comes later in the form of 
increased government revenue, continued local industry purchase, or subsequent increased  local 
household purchasing.   
 The final reason why governments look to privatize part of their bureaucratic fiefdoms is 
a highly understandable one: they are told to by a judge.  Prisons were poorly run in the 1970s 
and 1980s.  Prior to a late twentieth-century prison reform movement, many prisons suffered 
from overcrowding, inmate on inmate sexual and non sexual assault, abuse by guards, gang 
problems, illegal drug problems, and administrative corruption.  Federal judges ordered some 
prisons to be shut down because they violated the cruel and unusual punishment provision of the 
Constitution (Robbins 1986).   
 
The Untidy Birth of Prison Privatization 
 The politics of prison privatization cannot be understood apart from the experience of the 
Corrections Corporation of American (CCA).  Founded in Tennessee in 1983, the CCA grew out 
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of a cooperative relationship between business entrepreneurs and government officials, most of 
whom were active in the Republican Party.
81
  The backdrop to the scene is economically 
depressed
82
 1980s Tennessee.  The Volunteer State would serve as the potential first customer to 
the creative drive of certain enthusiastic financiers.  Well-connected and well-heeled individuals 
would come together to form a new answer to the question of the state‘s ailing penal system.  
CCA was founded and established in 1983 by Tom Beasley, a former chair of the Tennessee 
Republican Party (Schneider 2000, 203); Doctor  R. Crants (Doctor is his legal name, not a title),  
a banker and financier (Schneider 2000, 203); and Don Hutton, the former head of the American 
Correctional Association (Schneider 2000, 203-204).
83
  Venture capitalist Jack Massey, known 
for building Kentucky Fried Chicken into a fast food powerhouse (now known as KFC), backed 
the venture.  Massey, while developing the Wendy‘s hamburger chain and while taking ―Colonel 
Sanders‖ onto the New York Stock Exchange, would form Hospital Corporation of America84 
with Republican Senator Bill Frist‘s father (Cumberland 2005).  Political connections did not 
stop with these four individuals: ―Several high-ranking political officials in Tennessee owned 
CCA stock, including Honey Alexander (wife of the Governor, Lamar Alexander); the state 
insurance commissioner, John Neff; and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, Ned 
McWherther‖ (Schneider 2000, 204).85  Soon this group of investors would receive a court 
decision to bolster Governor Alexander‘s intent. 
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 Though the convict lease system flourished in the south from post civil war years to the late 1920s (Kahn and 
Minnich 2005, 73-77; Sarabi and Bender 2000). 
82
 In 1985Tennessee had an 8% unemployment rate, .8% higher than the national rate (BEA statistics).  It taxed at a 
rate of $996 per capita, compared to KS‘s $1357 (DOC).  The state‘s personal income was $12,297 as compared to 
KS‘s $14,451 (BEA statistics). 
83
 The ACA was in 1985, and still was in 2009, the primary accrediting body of prisons in the United States (ACA). 
84
 HCA is the nation‘s largest for profit hospital chain. 
85
 Honey and Lamar Alexander divested themselves of CCA shares in 1985 to ―avoid conflict of interest ((Schneider 
2000, 204)‖. 
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 State legislators however set the stage for this action from the bench.  The Tennessee 
statehouse was the real prime mover on state prison privatization.  Judges and juries do issue 
particular sentences, but existent statutory guidelines set the range of prison stays.  State level 
office holders in 1980s Tennessee were in a particularly unforgiving mood.  The Nashville 
statehouse was handing down increasingly strict sentencing guidelines, which contributed to 
overcrowding. 
 Poor prison conditions in Tennessee drew the attention of the federal district courts.  
Inmates argued that their right to be protected against ―cruel and unusual‖ punishment had been 
violated.  In October 1985, a U.S District Judge ordered Tennessee to reduce its prisoner 
population from 7,700 to 7,019 (Grubbs v. Bradley 1985).  This order was issued because ―In 
1984 Tennessee had the dubious distinction of having the highest rate of violent inmate deaths of 
any state in the union‖, which was representative of the state‘s prison crisis (Folz and Scheb 
1990).  CCA developed the following plan:  they would take over the entirety of the state‘s 
prison system and pay Tennessee $100 million while making a $250 million investment in 
facilities.  In turn, the corporation would receive an exclusive 99-year lease on the state prisons 
and would receive $170 million a year from public coffers, which happened to be exactly the 
size of the current state budget for prisons (Schneider 2000).  In the end, interest groups such as 
the Tennessee Bar Association, the Tennessee State Employees Association, and the American 
Civil Liberties Union lobbied and prevented this ―radical proposal‖ from becoming law (Folz 
and Scheb 1990, 100).  Labor unions in particular would prove to be a worthy adversary to the 
forces of privatization (AFSCME 2005; Hart, Shleifer, and Vishny 1997, 1146).  
 While in theory privatization would invoke market principles to reduce cost and improve 
the quality of service, the implementation of privatization in Tennessee went in a different 
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direction.  Thus, though the company lost its bid to take over the entirety of the state‘s system, 
CCA did begin the operation of a single county prison in Hamilton County, Tennessee.  They 
went on to win Bay County‘ Florida county‘s bid and then later their first two individual state 
level contracts in 1987 (Tennessee and Texas).  Over the next few years stretching into the early 
1990s, the company not only survived, but grew significantly.  In fact, in the mid 1990s, CCA 
tried again, and failed again, to take over Tennessee‘s entire carceral system.  CCA would go on 
to command a 52% market share by 1996 and would acquire competitors Concept Inc. in 1995 
and U.S. Corrections Corp. in 1998 (Mattera and Khan 2001, 1-3).  By this time, the industry had 
grown from a fantasy of a handful of connected venture capitalists into a billion dollar plus 
establishment.  See Appendix VIII for a list of CCA operated American facilities in 2005.   
 
Prison Privatization Today  
 It is well known among criminal justice scholars and field practitioners that the US locks 
up a greater percentage of its citizens than any other nation offering reliable statistics.
86
  The 
incarceration rate of the US in 2001 was more than ten times greater than many countries in the 
industrialized world and significantly higher than countries with voids of personal freedom such 
as Singapore and Belarus (DOJ; Gottschalk 2006).  The American statistics on incarceration rate 
were relatively close to the rest of the globe until the early 1980s.  Since that time, the population 
of people locked up has grown exponentially (Abramsky 2007; Bosworth 2002; DOJ 2009).  
Today one in 31 adults in this country, or about three out of every 100 citizens, are in jail or 
prison, on probation, or on parole (BOJS 2009).     
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 Some less developed countries such as Eritrea have turned themselves into gulag-like nation states but not 
surprisingly, fail to provide reliable statistics on this. 
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 It was in the early 1980s that a number of factors converged to create what one political 
scientist has dubbed the ―carceral state‖ in America (Gottschalk 2006). Gottschalk examined 
different theories for the explosive growth in American imprisonment.  She begins her book by 
looking at the growth of the illegal drug trade, the politicization of law and order by elected 
officials, cultural shifts, public opinion change, and the private prison industry as drivers of a 
high incarceration rate.  She dismissed these in turn as not being as powerful explanatory factors 
as the combined role of interest groups and social movements within the American political-
institutional context.   
 Employing the guiding framework of American political development, Gottschalk notes 
that private prisons number under 150 and that they are not the causal drivers of the high rate of 
lockup.  Rather, these private institutions are byproducts of other processes.  In particular, she 
points to the law and order faction of society working in conjunction with victim‘s rights and 
anti-rape or women‘s groups as the causes of the high rate of incarceration.  Gottschalk is correct 
in her assertion that a relative handful of private companies are not driving the high lockup rate, 
a rate that soars greatest among drug offenders and African–Americans.  As in other areas of 
privatization, each operating within its own issue network, prison companies are taking 
advantage of the business environment with which they have been presented.  They need not be 
especially resourceful policy entrepreneurs to aggressively pursue the low hanging fruit 
generated by America‘s broader desire to jail people.  While they certainly benefit financially 
from harsh sentencing measures, they should not be seen as drivers of the American carceral 
state.  Rather, they are along for the free ride until they are kicked out of the car.   
 Privatization in any given arena is both a business venture and a public policy.  One 
man‘s profit is another man‘s tax dollar.  The published business analysis concerning 
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privatization is usually focused exclusively upon financial information.  There are corporate 
reports and investment analysis, but this information is of limited utility in a policy study 
concerned with the public good.  Put another way, the business literature often focuses on the 
firm‘s health because of the effect of the greater environment, rather than on the greater 
environment‘s health because of the effect of the firm.  It is through public policy impact 
analysis that the most critical questions regarding privatization‘s effect on all of the community 
should be asked, but they often have not been asked.           
 After years of glowing reviews from financial sources, the industry still only housed 
about 6% of the aggregate U.S. inmate population.  This had not become the industry dreamed 
up by prison privatization advocates in the early 1980s.  The one time chairman of CCA who 
concluded, "Privatization may therefore be the spark not only for increased efficiency at the 
individual facility level, but also for the creation of a Pareto-efficient and perfectly competitive 
market‖ (Crants 1991, 58), was no longer at the company‘s helm.  Charles Thomas, the professor 
at the University of Florida, who founded the often-cited Private Corrections Project and cranked 
out pro-industry articles and quotes was found to have been a paid board member of the CCA 
Prison Realty Trust (Freidman 2003a, 154-155).
87
   
 Critics of the US penal system have complained that prisoners are badly treated and 
pointed to high recidivism rates as evidence of the failure of the system.  Some argue that these 
problems are worsened when the prison is administered by a private firm.  The treatment of 
prisoners by guards (Greene 2003; Mattera and Khan 2001, 5-6), the lack of transparency in 
prisoner treatment issues when compared to public facilities (Herivel and Wright 2003), the 
prisoner performance of labor for which the prison company is compensated, the unjust denial of 
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 Professor Thomas resigned after having been discovered to have received industry grants totaling over $400,000, 
calling into question his prior research. 
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convict release by profit motivated companies (Freidman 2003b, 164-165), the legal questions 
concerning inmate protection lawsuits typically filed under federal civil rights statutes,
88
  and the 
treatment of juveniles by privately employed guards (Friedman 2003c, 148-153) are perhaps 
meritorious (Kahn and Minnich 2005, 77-87) but outside of the scope of this study.  
Furthermore, data is difficult to gather on these topics, a point that raises its own questions about 
the industry.  One legal scholar asked:  Who will be responsible for maintaining security if the 
privately paid personnel go on strike?  Will the company be able to refuse prisoners with AIDS?  
What will happen if the private prison company declares bankruptcy?
89
  Is the state potentially 
liable for the actions of private contractors? (Robbins 1986).   
 The study of a policy subsystem can begin with a number of different topics, such as 
policy adoption, entrepreneurship, and subsystem membership.  The first step, though, is to get at 
the heart of the matter by examining how private prisons impact the communities in which they 
operate.  The question this chapter poses is:  do private prisons provide an economic benefit or 
do they not?   
 
II. The Economic Focus of Prison Privatization 
 
I feel it‘s going to be a win-win situation for Perry County and the State of 
Alabama…It will provide about 140 jobs for the area.  That‘s going to make a big 
difference.  I believe it will altogether change the economic base for our county. 
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 Federal Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 
89
 All business involves risk, and despite the constant supply of prisoners, this industry remains more so than most.  
For example, CCA made the speculative decision to complete construction on the 1,524 bed Stewart, GA prison 
facility though it has no prisoners earmarked for being held there.  The company stated in their annual report that 
they ―can provide no assurance that we will be successful in utilizing the increased bed capacity resulting from these 
projects (CCA 2003)‖. 
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- Perry County, Alabama ,County Commission Chairman Johnny Flowers 
(Matthews 2006) 
 
 Despite a few high profile public prison system meltdowns such as in Tennessee, private 
prisons are generally not making up for an inability of public prisons to hold convicts reasonably 
well (CA DCR 2009; Camp 2002; MO DOC 2006; VA 2009).  It is accepted and popularly 
known that public prisons offer inferior medical services than that available to the free public 
(Robbins 1999), and that they suffer from issues such as illegal drug availability and sexual 
violence (Earley 1992; Florida DOC 2007; PL 108-79 Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003).  In 
spite of notable problems such as these, this nation does continue to build a sufficient number of 
competently staffed and reasonably well managed public prisons within both federal and state 
justice bureaucracies (Bosworth 2001; Bureau of Prisons 2009; e.g. West Virginia 2008).    
 Of course, prisons are no more built to benefit prisoners than Burger Kings are built to 
benefit fast food junkies.  There is a minority of people whom private prisons are truly built for, 
the prison company‘s investors, whose motive is moneymaking.  They are in it for the profit to 
be had from the provided service.  To put yet a finer point on it, those providing the service are 
in it for the money that comes directly from taxpayers.  If it was not for the profit, they would not 
be motivated to build prisons.  The very different yet symbiotic motivations are highlighted by 
this statement:  
CCA has been a strong community partner with Eloy since 1994, when the Eloy 
Detention Center opened here.  Over the past several years, we have welcomed 
three more CCA facilities in Eloy.  CCA has brought nearly 1,500 new jobs to 
Eloy through these facilities.  This is no small feat for the job growth and 
economic development that Pinal County is experiencing. 
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Eloy, Arizona City Manager and Community Development Director Joseph A. Blanton said this 
in cooperation with CCA.  It was posted as part of a public relations effort on the company‘s 
website.     
 Like two bugs circling each other in an awkward mating dance, the private prison 
industry and bureaucratic carceral agencies engage in odd and ritualistic behavior to court each 
other. 
90
 What makes it ritualistic is its similarity to the public-private partnerships contained in 
other policy subsystems.  In essence, prison privatization can be studied systematically right next 
to other privatization industries, such as trash pickup and city airports.  Private prison companies 
sell themselves and public agencies try to lure them further in with promises of profits and 
longevity (Kolbert 1989).  What makes prison privatization odd is the utter strangeness of a 
game of mutual persuasion whose preferred outcome is the construction of what many would 
consider a blighted project, or at the very least an eyesore.
91
  Quite proudly it would seem, 
Leavenworth, Kansas‘ Convention and Visitors Bureau has used the travel slogans ―How ‗bout 
doin‘ some time in Leavenworth?‖ and ―You don‘t have to be indicted to be invited‖.  A local 
sandwich shop in Tamms, IL celebrated their new prison by renaming its specialty dish the 
―supermax burger‖ (Gottschalk 2006, 29).   
 Counties and state politicians are attracted to the private prison companies for the 
possibility of economic development (Hooks et. al 2004).  The Director of the California 
Department of Corrections said, ―Prisons are like military bases, a steady source of income and 
employment (ibid)‖.  On the other coast, New York Corrections Commissioner Thomas 
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 It should be noted that Beeville, Texas Chamber of Commerce representatives actually dressed as bees to make 
their pitch to a local administrative board (Deitch 2004).  
91
 There is not an abundance of literature addressing the impact prisons have on local crime, though there is a very 
real stigma of a town being a ―prison town‖, such as Leavenworth, KS.  The few studies that have been done show 
little dispute over prison construction having a negative effect on property value or crime rate (Abrams and Lyons 
1987; King, Mauer, and Huling 2003, 12).  
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Coughlin said, ―Prisons are viewed as the anchor for development in rural areas‖ (Smith, 1990).  
Experts on incarceration note that officials see prison construction as a way to perk up their local 
economies (Brooke 1997; Gottschalk 2006, 29). ―So many communities very, very much want 
them, and it is clearly a factor…they will tell their legislator, ‗You get me a prison‘ said New 
York State Assemblyman Daniel Feldman (Metzgar, The Times Union, 1996)‖.  He went on, 
―This is quite the opposite of a ‗not in my backyard scenario.‘‖  Because of the depression of 
agrarian and oil economies, small towns in rural America have looked strongly at playing this 
game of speculative prison construction (Kahn and Minnich 2005; Kilborn 2001; King, Mauer, 
and Huling 2003).   Shelby County, Montana School Superintendent Matt Genger said nearby 
Crossroads Correctional Center‘s 180 employees ―are a definite plus for the school district 
(Johnson 2009).‖  The same small town newspaper article quotes the town medical center‘s CEO 
Mark Cross touting the merits of the new prison: ―Crossroads Correctional Center has been a 
good business partner (ibid, emphasis added)‖.   
 The New York Times has chronicled the exploits of upstate New York politicians working 
to land private prisons in their communities to help ailing economies.  Roger E. Poland, Town 
Supervisor of Chesterfield, New York said, ―A business comes and in a year or two it can‘t 
support itself and bang – it‘s gone.  A prison in contrast is something you know is going to be 
here for a long time (Kolbert, New York Times June 9, 1989, A1)‖.  Johnstown, New York 
Supervisor Richard Smullen told a reporter, ―We‘ve been trying to get a prison built here for 
years.  It would bring a lot of jobs, and that would be pretty nice for the town (Hernandez, New 
York Times, February 26, 1996, A1)‖.  In the same article, Altamont supervisor Dean D. 
Defebvre said, ―There‘s much more competition today for a prison than there was a few years 
ago because of the economy.  But we‘ve been after a prison a lot longer than anyone else and 
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have the best site‖.  Citizens quoted in the articles have been presented as more ambivalent.  One 
said ―[Prison employees] They‘re solid taxpayers.  They will buy homes and shop at our stores.  
They‘re the kind of people we need around here.  So it‘s probably worth putting up with the 
undesirables‖ (ibid).  A later New York Times article looked at former mill town and current 
prison town, Cape Vincent, New York.  By 2001 (pre 9/11), prison populations were seen as 
holding steady or declining nationally.  The reporter focused on the employment plight of former 
industrial workers who had turned to lives as corrections officers.  Michael Jacobson, a John Jay 
College criminology professor said, ―Regions and towns that have based their whole economies 
on prisons are going to be confronted with some really serious problems (Rohde, New York 
Times, August 21, 2001, A1).‖92.    
 Later New York Times articles captured the same phenomenon of rural development using 
prisons as tools in Colorado and Oklahoma.  While noting the muscle of federal prison money in 
Colorado, the reporter denotes a list of towns making use of both privately and publicly run 
facilities for economic growth (Brooke, New York Times, November 2, 1997, A20).  Four years 
later, in 2001, Sayre, Oklahoma city manager Jack McKennon said, ―In my mind there‘s no more 
recession-proof form of economic development‖.   McKennon had persuaded CCA to put a 
private facility in his town.  Since the prison was located there he noted that his salary has 
doubled and street improvement efforts have improved.  He added, ―We wouldn‘t have got the 
Flying J without the prison (Kilborn, New York Times, August 1, 2001, A2)‖.  
 Evidence of public officials seeking private prisons extends beyond the front pages of the 
New York Times.  Cibola County, New Mexico County Manager Joe Murietta said, ―It‘s terrible 
to say, but prisoners and trash are big business (Oswald, The Sante Fe New Mexican, January 27, 
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 Jacobson is a noted criminologist at the City University of New York who has studied prison downsizing and 
parole. 
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1996, B3)‖.  When the oil boom collapsed in Oklahoma, the town of Hinton raised $24 million to 
lure a for-profit prison.  ―The only reason in the beginning was to create jobs.  We never 
considered how much we might actually make‖, said Ken Doughty, vice-chairman of the Hinton 
Economic Development Authority (Hoberock and Branstetter, Tulsa World, December 13, 
1999).  Alexander County, Tennessee commissioner Joel Harbison made landing a prison larger 
than Alcatraz one of his campaign pledges.  He got his new prison but angered voters with its 
construction and was voted out in 2002 along with another prison backer (Mitchell and Harbison 
2004).  In order to win the prison the state gave the county 25 acres behind an older prison for 
erecting ―Al-Co-Traz‖ (ibid).  
 The benefits offered to prison companies include free land, farmland that can be used to 
generate further corporate income, road construction, new airplane hangars, administrative 
housing units, and communications infrastructure improvement (Ammons, Campbell, and 
Somoza 1992; King, Mauer, and Huling 2003).  Financing for prisons has been provided by 
government in the form of industrial revenue bonds, a rarely understood and risky use of 
taxpayer‘s money (Abramsky 200793, 101; Mattera and Khan 2001).  These are not passive 
efforts to dole out benefits, either.  Government officials will wage lobbying campaigns to get 
their prison (e.g. Hernandez 1996).  ―What we‘ve seen in New York and other states is that one 
prison led to another prison and led to another prison, creating the notion that there‘s no other 
economic development option than to build prisons to foster stability in rural areas‖, said New 
York prison consultant Tracy Huling (Santos 2008, New York Times, 25).     
   It is hard to force the willing into what they would otherwise do themselves however, 
and by every measure the prison industry corporate lobby is at least as willing to seek prisons as 
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 Pecos, Arizona was a busted oil town in Reeves County.  County officials issued $90 million in bonds in a county 
with a $5 million annual budget.  The motivation for luring private prison contractors was economic development 
(ibid, 100-104) 
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the government lobby (Sarabi and Bender 2000).  ―The community is knocking on our door…It 
used to be ‗not in my back yard‘.  Now, they want it in the front yard‖, said CCA Vice-President 
of Operations Jimmy Turner (Erskine and Graham 2000).  The advocacy group, The Western 
Prison Project, has tracked the millions of dollars flowing from prison companies to political 
campaigns in the American west (Western Prison Project 2009).  Part of the corporate strategy of 
prison companies is to lobby government for their services, not to just sit around and wait (CCA 
2003, 2006, 2007).
94
  The CCA website includes an economic report prepared by Elliott D. 
Pollack and Company that espouses the positive fiscal impact upon Arizona by new private 
prisons (CCA 2010).
95
  Companies such as CCA are not in business to stagnate but rather to 
grow.
96
  Once they have taken root in a local community, they continue their lobbying effort 
through such tools as community relation committees composed of local leaders (CCA 2005).    
  
III. Methodology of the Study and Hypothesis 
Population Studied and Sampling     
 This study uses data spanning from 1979 until 2005.  The number of people in prison is a 
moving target for study.  Taking 2001 as a snapshot, there were approximately 1.7 million 
people in prison or jail in the US (Austin 2001, x).  This same DOJ study states that, ―The 
estimated 116,626-bed capacity of private correctional facilities makes up less than 7 percent of 
the U.S. market‖.  Building private prisons is often a speculative business.  Capacity to hold 
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 CCA‘s 2007 Annual Report states: ―Forecasts for inmate population growth remain strong throughout our 
markets.  We also believe our future growth will be driven by the compelling value and flexible solutions we offer 
our government partners as they face budgetary constraints due to a slowing economy‖. 
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 For a lobbying pitch which leaves out regional economic impact see MTC‘s at  
http://www.mtctrains.com/institute/publications/Privatization%20in%20Corrections-Final.pdf  
(June 1, 2010). 
96
 Avalon‘s business strategy is designed to elevate the company into a dominant provider of community 
correctional services by expanding its operations through new state and Federal contracts and selective acquisitions 
(Avalon 2007).  
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prisoners must exist before prisons can begin receiving inmates.  Therefore, the average daily 
population held is typically different than the number of available beds (CCA 2006).  When the 
stated bed capacity of private prisons is not counted, but rather the actual number of prisoners 
housed in them is, the share dropped to about 6.5 percent of the 2001 total (Austin).  In 2003, 
95,522 inmates were housed in private facilities, indicating a slight increase over the 93,912 
housed in private facilities in 2002 (DOJ 2004).  These people were housed in 118 private jails or 
prisons spread throughout the country (Refer to Appendix IV for the 2002 list of contracting 
state agencies).
97
   
 The companies owning or operating these prisons range from organizations that run a 
single detention facility, to industry leader CCA, which runs 65 facilities (CCA 2007).  
Gathering the most current data on these private prison corporations is akin to drinking out of a 
fire hose.  The semi-public environment in which they conduct business sometimes documents 
them as heroic problem solvers (as in during a budget crunch), and sometimes as inept robber 
barons (as in after a prison disturbance or cost dispute).  The dizzying combination of elected 
officials possessing variant support levels, hostile advocacy lawyers, the ever disappearing 
investigative local media, skeptical academics, eager investors, courts, taxpayers, and diverse 
interest groups that compose this issue network lends itself to providing a volatile information 
environment regarding the profit-seeking corporations.  Further, since the rise of this industry in 
the 1980s, the larger companies have grown by continuing to swallow up the smaller companies, 
as has been the case with CCA (Mattera and Khan 2001, 3).  Further complicating matters from a 
data gathering standpoint is that many states export their prisoners for incarceration in other parts 
of the country.  Thus a particular prison might not hold prisoners solely from the surrounding 
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 The Corrections Yearbook was last published in 2002, which is why this year of the study was selected rather than 
the latest one modeled: 2005. 
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communities, but instead could be charged with the keep of individuals from out of state and 
even quite often out of the country.  This muddies the waters of any local economic impact 
regarding a higher local incarceration or crime rate.     
 The state that contains a private prison provides a poor unit of analysis because of 
numerous economic complexities that would dilute the effect of a single correctional institution-- 
or for that matter, a handful of them (Brace 1991, 1993; Feiock 1991; Fosler 1988; Helms 1985; 
Jones 1990; Turner 2003). Likewise, cities make poor objects of study in the question at hand 
because of their greatly divergent size and the fact that many private prisons are located in 
distant rural areas.  Also, data available is more limited for metropolitan areas, and makes a weak 
unit of comparison across the universe studied.  Des Moines, Iowa is quite different from 
Atchison, Kansas or Phoenix, Arizona.   
 The choice then becomes the selection of a unit of analysis that is the best available.  In 
that vein, the best unit of analysis is the counties that have a prison located within their borders 
no matter the jurisdiction of the agency housing prisoners there.  This puts the focus of the study 
on the macro-level economic effects of the policy, rather than on the ins and outs of a certain 
way of operating a jail or prison.  Due to the rural slant of modern prison construction, counties 
that hold prisons are more alike than cities and states that hold prisons.     
 In an earlier version of this study, only prisons operated by CCA were used as a 
representative sample from the greater body of private prisons.  Of the private prison operators, 
CCA had (and continues to have) the most information publicly available regarding its operation.  
This could be due to its multi-jurisdictional business, its sheer size in terms of capacity and 
prisoners held, CCA‘s more developed web presence, and its robust annual reports to 
shareholders.  Several other prison companies are publicly traded, thus falling under the same 
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SEC disclosure laws that CCA abides by (e.g. Cornell Corrections Inc., Wackenhut).  However, 
the public information available from these firms is more minimalistic than from CCA.  
According to CCA‘s 2003 annual report to shareholders, titled ―Leading the Industry for 20 
Years,‖ the company was operating over 50 percent of the country‘s private prison beds and 
overall was ―the sixth largest prison operator in the United States‖.  More recently, in 2007, their 
77,000 beds with 74,000 inmates made them the fifth largest prison operator in the nation.
98
 
 Because of the sample used for study, this dissertation chapter is more comprehensive 
than my earlier research effort in two ways.  First, the present study builds on the earlier work by 
studying the entire universe of private prisons.  (See Appendix V for a complete list of facilities 
studied in this universe).  The information from this list was compiled by the author from a 
variety of sources ranging from individual state correction department websites to newspaper 
accounts and advocacy groups.  Thus, CCA is now not the sole object of study.   
 While it is certainly interesting and worthwhile to learn how counties benefited or 
suffered from the construction of a private prison, it makes a richer study to compare those 
counties that had a new private prison located in them with a subset of counties who have a 
public prison located in them.  In that way, statements can be made about the effect a private 
prison has as compared to the effect a public prison had.  Differences between the two‘s 
economic effect can be spotted.  The question, ―Would this economic effect hold for any prison, 
whether public or private?‖ is answered.   
 Another subsample has been added to this study, and that is a subset of counties that do 
not have prisons at all contained in them.  Sampled counties included with no new prison 
construction serve as a control group.  In this way the question ―Would this economic effect hold 
for any county, whether it has a prison operating in it or not?‖ can be addressed.  It is both wise 
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 Only the Federal Bureau of Prisons, California, Texas, and Florida incarcerate more people (ACA 2007, 2008). 
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and fair to doubt an economic study that only studies a targeted fraction of the population while 
pretending as if the entirety of the rest of the population does not exist.  This study addresses that 
problem by including all three possible types of counties: private prison counties, public prison 
counties, and those with no prison built.   
 This study defines a prison as any state affiliated carceral institution that legally holds at 
least some felons.  Institutions holding only criminals with misdemeanor offenses are not 
included, which means most local jails.  Likewise, institutions holding only those awaiting trial 
are not included; however, pre-release post-sentence institutions are included.  These pre-release 
institutions serve as prisons for a part of the prison population that is almost free, thus they can 
be expected to economically behave as standard prisons.  Half-way houses (for parole violators) 
are not counted, nor are military facilities, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) 
processing centers, Bureau of Indian Affairs facilities, juvenile facilities with only a therapeutic 
community setting, group homes (which again eliminates many juvenile facilities), facilities with 
a capacity below 50
99
, drug or alcohol treatment centers, wilderness education youth facilities, 
youth boot camps, women‘s units which exist as constituent parts of otherwise male prisons, 
adult work camps, juvenile sex offender programs, or low risk facilities for underage females.  
Some facilities designated by the American Correctional Association as medical or psychiatric 
are included because many youth facilities have this designation even though their primary 
purpose is carceral rather than treatment.   
 The time span used in the sample frame was chosen based upon the development of the 
private prison industry.  The first modern era juvenile private prison was the Weaversville 
Intensive Treament Unit in North Hampton, Pennsylvania.   The privatization of this facility was 
followed by the Okeechobee Schools for Boys in Florida (Austin and Conventry 2001, 12).  
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 The American Correctional Association defines an institution with below 50 individual beds as ―small.‖ 
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These facilities turned private in 1976 and 1982 respectively.  The first two privately run 
facilities for illegal aliens were contracted out by the now defunct Immigration and 
Naturalization Service in 1984.
100
  It should be noted that the Department of Justice has traced 
the privatization of prisons back to the colonists in the early 1600s (Austin and Coventry 2001, 
9).  As noted, the first modern era private adult facility was opened in 1984 in Hamilton County, 
Tennessee.  The time period studied dates to five years before this initial opening.  Analysis 
ranges from 1979 to 2005.  The first year of study is 1979 because it provides data to capture 
economic trends prior to this first private prison.  The final year is 2005 because it was the most 
recent year for which data was readily available when sample construction began.  This provides 
a statistically healthy 27 year range of observation covering a diverse set of American counties.     
 Random samples are the cornerstone of data selection in modern quantitative social 
science.  Any method used to intentionally select a non random sample to study from a 
population universe should be explained.  In this instance, a research design employing a 
stratified sample construction method is used.  There are 3,158 county or county equivalents in 
the United States.  The number reported in the U.S. Census is 3,141, but the present 3,158 figure 
includes all non county incorporated cities, most abundant in Virginia.  Of this population 
universe of 3,158 counties, 2,547 of them (81%) contain no prison at all, 492 contain at least one 
public prison (15.5%), and 107 contain at least one private prison (3%).  Clearly these three 
numbers are not close to being equal to each other.    
 Simple random samples are one way to assemble data, but systematically selected 
random samples are both common to the handling of many political science research questions as 
well as practically useful (Manheim, Rich, and Wilnat 2002, 109).  The sample used in this study 
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 These ―prison facilities‖ included the old Olympic Motel in Houston, Texas which was surrounded by cyclone 
barb wire and filled with detained Latino men from the area (Mattera and Khan 2001).  This was CCA‘s first 
operation. 
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contains data from all 107 private prison counties, which hold 119 private prisons (See Appendix 
IX to see which counties hold multiple prisons).  In this instance, a matched sample of 107 
counties containing at least one public prison as well as 107 counties containing no prison were 
randomly selected from their respective subpopulations.  This was done by assigning each of 
these county elements a number and then randomly selecting them based upon the output 
generated from a randomizing program.  This is similar to a multistage random area sample 
commonly used in public opinion survey work (Fowler 1993).  It also is like comparing an equal 
number of student pupils from three variously sized school districts. 
 Of course, the n of 321 counties could have been selected ―purely randomly‖ by treating 
the entire universe of all county and county equivalents as the population of interest.  However, 
as with public opinion research interested in a minority population‘s reaction to a political event, 
this study effectively oversamples a subset of the known population.  There are specific 
quantitative estimation procedures which could have been employed to address what would have 
become a ―rare event‖ (e.g. King 1988; King and Zeng 2001) under a pure random sampling 
technique.  However, the estimating of such methods are more fully developed for single level 
models (Jansakul 2005) and are a reaction to a specific sort of sample universe.  They are 
typically employed as a response to probability underestimation rather than as an ideal model 
from which to begin research.  These models, such as the Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial and 
Zero-Inflated Poisson are used in engineering to search for the cause of defects in a 
manufacturing process (Lambert 1992), but they deal with cases that  rarely occur and whose 
cause is being understood.  In this instance, private prisons are not a rare event being studied for 
their cause but rather are being studied in their totality to investigate any effects.  A scientifically 
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designed sampling frame is the most cogent way to begin making inferences about these three 
types of target populations (Traugott and Lavrakas 2008).   
 Effects are better studied with all of the known data rather than some of the known data.  
Bureau of Prison researchers strongly noted that ―very little attention has been given to 
developing detailed and interrelated propositions about how private prisons operate differently 
from public ones‖ (Camp and Gaes 1999, 5)‖.  To expand on this ―use of actual data‖ point, 
there are procedures which would have allowed for the generation of artificial data with some 
degree of predictive accuracy.  It is, however, preferred to use the real data rather than artificial 
data.  One-sided selection, Snythetic Minority Over-Sampling Technique, and DataBoost-IM are 
all available and useful when the data does not present itself.  In this study, the data issue is one 
that can be tackled with random sampling of the majority population, rather than one centered 
upon a lack of minority population data (Suman, Laddhad, and Deshmukh 2005).  The single 
step away from pure random sampling, to what could be called an ―oversample,‖101 is not 
confined to political science but is also commonly used to account for the performance of 
minority schoolchildren in education (DiGaetano, Judkins, and Waksberg 1995; Greer 2003; 
Riordan 1985).  
 
Hypothesis    
 The core question of this study is: ―Does a prison, either public or private, help the local 
economy‖?  And second, ―Does it economically matter to a locality if the new prison is public or 
private‖?  The answer depends at least in part upon the structure of the prison market. 
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 The term oversample is technically inaccurate because the entire population of private prison containing counties 
is studied. 
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 The supposed benefits of competition will not materialize unless there is a healthy 
marketplace of competing firms that bid for the right to provide services.  In the same way that 
the effort to privatize the allocation of cellular phone frequencies and pollution through auctions 
was, to an extent, unsuccessful, the privatization of prisons will fail if there is no actual 
competition.  The claim that a private prison will improve the economy of the community in 
which it is located is based upon dubious logic.  First, there is the idea that service contracting 
improves economic performance through introducing free market competition into what was 
formerly bureaucratically run (Boyne 1998; Morgan and England 1988), and this idea extends 
into the development of private prisons (Camp and Gaes 1999; Crants 1991).  Second, the 
difficulty with that claim here is that one private company, and in a few eyes two, dominate the 
field.
102
  A Federal Bureau of Prisons study prefaces its empirical work with the following 
statement: 
 
We simply assume that there is competition in the market even though Corrections Corporation 
of America and Wackenhut Corrections Corporation (WCC) control approximately 70 percent of 
the world-wide market.  
  
[Camp and Gaes 1999, p.9] 
 
Two years later, in another FBOP study, the same authors conclude that CCA and WCC now 
held 81.3% of the inmates in secure, adult, private prisons (Camp and Gaes, 2001, 5).   
 A distinction to make in analyzing the prison market is that between a duopoly and a 
monopoly.  If it were a true monopoly, then only the government could provide prisons, in the 
way only the government can provide policing or fire protection services in a metropolitan area.  
The prison market is not like that, but instead it is more like some models of urban trash 
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 Much like the private hospital industry, one competitive advantage of large firms is the substantial barrier to 
market entry of up front capital costs associated with real estate and construction. 
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collection or ambulance service (e.g. Deffenbaugh Inc. and Mast in Kansas City).  In these 
markets, a single large firm competes with the government, seemingly at the government‘s 
behest.  To illustrate, there might be two dumps: a public land dump and a single privately held 
dump that has obtained a permit to operate.  The key point here is that capacity is more in play 
than price.  There are only so many jail cells, so the price becomes responsive to a scarce supply 
of resources.      
 A monopolist or duopolist will reduce the quantity of service provided in order to drive 
up the price.  The government may not save money if it transfers the business of running prisons 
from the governmental monopoly of state run prisons to a private monopoly of prisons 
administered by a single company.  The private prison market poses extreme entrance costs: the 
specialized resources and capital demands requisite to housing prisoners in the custody of the 
state.  Incarceration also has a most unique exit penalty, the creation of prisoners who would not 
have a cell if the company opted out of the business venture.  These entrance/exit impediments, 
which strictly limit the self-interested behavior of firms, pose significant problems to the pricing 
structure for government customers.   
 Price considerations are often put aside, though, because Americans want prisoners to be 
arrested and held in prison.  Get-tough on crime campaign rhetoric is the fourth most popular 
topic the New York Times carried on the corrections debate (Welch, Weber, and Edwards 
2003).
103
  Indeed, citizens want to adopt this tough stance without having to pay for the prisons 
necessitated by longer sentences for offenders.  Donahue cites three mid 1980s opinion polls, 
conducted in Kentucky, Florida, and New Mexico, that show a then-prevailing sentiment of 
getting tough on crime without wanting to actually have to pay for it with more taxes (Donahue 
1989, 153; Crants 1991).  What do public officials do in such a situation?  They can turn to 
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 The next most talked about issue in a content analysis of the New York Times was privatization of corrections.   
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private corporations who use their own capital to build an expensive prison, thus saving the time-
consuming, expensive, and sometimes futile task of putting a bond issue before the voters.  As 
put in a prison and jail administration reference work: 
 
Private firms would build the needed facilities using their own capital and then charge the 
government a price that would recoup both the capital investment and ongoing operating 
costs.  Governments could pay for these services using funds appropriated for operations, 
thereby avoiding the need to gain voters‘ approval of increased public debt (McDonald 
1999, 430). 
 
Note that this book blithely skips through its explanation as if the taxpayers‘ subsidization of 
corporate profiteering does not exist as an additional cost. 
 One study found that 78% of CCA‘s facilities are financially supported by their own 
―customer,‖ the contracting government.  This financial life support takes the form of generous 
economic development subsidies.  The researchers then ask, ―Has the private prison industry 
been subsidized by the public sector in the name of economic development?‖ (Mattera and Khan 
2001).  Economic development incentives are usually employed to give a competitive advantage 
to a firm competing elsewhere in the private sector, such as a land developer.  But here they are 
used to benefit firms which would not exist but for the public entities collectively granting them 
the subsidies.  The Gordian knot here is are governments getting any long term economic gain 
for their difficult to come by cash?     
 Past research has indicated that the realization of cost savings is questionable (Pratt and 
Maahs 1999).  But, advocates of this policy as well as the companies themselves have written a 
tidal wave of information showing cost savings that the private sector can offer.  These cited cost 
savings are arrived at through claims of less staff, lower salaries, the absence of a labyrinthine 
government bidding process for purchasing supplies, the use of specialized incarceration 
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technology, and lower initial construction and architectural costs.  However, consider that a 
recent Bureau of Justice Assistance study found that there was not realization of an expected 
20% cost savings associated with prison privatization, but rather ―only about 1%‖ savings 
(Austin and Coventry 2001).    From reading cost studies, one might optimistically conclude that 
private prisons are slightly better at containing operating costs.  Or, one could conclude, as 
Donahue did when looking at juvenile facilities (1989), that the small difference in expense 
might be, explained another way:  
Public centers are more efficient, since they deal with slightly older and potentially more 
troublesome residents, have higher turnover, and – with less control over the flow of 
juvenile delinquents sent to them by courts or social agencies – are more plagued by 
undercapacity and overcapacity.   
 
Put another way, Donahue is pointing out that private institutions can ultimately select who they 
house, an often unheralded reality.  Further, studies that make comparisons on a strictly prisoner 
cost per diem basis make no allowances for the state‘s expenses associated with oversight, legal 
issues, and other administrative concerns which are present when a private prison contract is 
awarded. 
 Operational cost savings and economic development can be at odds with each other in the 
instance of prisons.  Consider that private prisons make money the way a McDonald‘s makes 
money for a franchisee, by operating as cheaply as possible while selling a product.  A 
substantial portion of any cost savings realized by private prison firms often comes in the form of 
lower paying jobs for less people than would be present if the prison were publicly run.  The 1% 
savings the BOJ study found was mostly achieved through lower labor cost (Austin and 
Coventry 2001), explaining why labor unions representing public employees are so vehemently 
opposed to private prisons.  One potential source of a local economic windfall would be the 
spending of workers‘ compensation on local goods.   If private prisons are built with the creation 
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of economic prosperity for neighboring communities in mind, it is an untidy fact that a solid 
portion of their efficiency gains are realized through savings on wages and benefits.   
 In one of the few publicly distributed studies, albeit a privately funded one, dealing with 
the economics of this policy area, it was found that 
 
To a great extent, the private prison projects developed over the past 15 or so years have 
been located in economically distressed areas.  In Mississippi, for instance, facilities were 
sited in some of the poorest counties in the entire nation.  Communities such as these were 
desperate for jobs, and in many cases their leaders saw prisons as a form of economic 
salvation. 
 (Mattera and Khan 2001, 22). 
 
So it is often with an eye towards saving dollars that a state deals with private contractors 
(Cotterell 2005; Gaes et.al. 2004 85-108; Kyle 1998; Stolz 1997).  This move to privatize for the 
sake of cost containment is not limited to this policy area.  68.4% of all privatizing governments 
did so to save money (Chi, Arnold, and Perkins 2004, 467).  Despite this driving motivation, a 
survey of state budget directors and state legislators indicated that about 24% of respondents said 
cost savings were unknown, while 18.4% said there were no cost savings, and an additional 
10.5% answered there was 1% or less (ibid. 468).  These fairly dismal results were by far the 
most common responses to the question.       
 But it is with an eye towards somehow making-- one could say conjuring-- dollars that 
counties as self-interested organizational sub-units of states let firms dip into the public cookie 
jar of subsidies (Logan 1990; Mattera and Khan 2001).    
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Variables  
Dependent Variables.  A two-pronged approach is used to capture local economic performance.  
The dependent variables are per capita income and unemployment. Personal income per capita, 
as expressed in constant dollars, best realizes any gains a family in one of the studied counties 
might realize from the creation of better jobs.  The other dependent variable specified is the 
county‘s unemployment rate, as it best reflects the realization of an improved job market offered 
by a private prison facility‘s construction.  This approach of looking at change in earnings 
simultaneously with employment is standard within the domain of regional economic impact 
analysis centered on institutional placement (e.g. Chakraborty and Edmiston 2006).   
 Both of the dependent variables are also regressed upon the other as an independent 
variable to check for a causal effect.   
Independent Variable.  The heart of this paper is a dichotomous variable that indicates the 
presence of a private prison.  The data behind the variable comes primarily from the Private 
Corrections Institute (PCI 2009) and the American Correctional Association (ACA 2007, 2008).  
Though the PCI data was an exhaustive start, it represents the work of a dedicated advocacy 
organization, not the output of an impartial bureaucratic agency or trade group.
104
  When 
                                                          
104 Just a note about the ACA, particularly as it relates to the impartiality of data used on this issue.  Their mission 
statement is:  “The American Correctional Association provides a professional organization for all individuals and 
groups, both public and private that share a common goal of improving the justice system (ACA 2009).”  Based 
upon the group’s observed  magnanimous approach on the privatization issue, one can be confident that there is 
H1:  The presence of a privately operated or owned prison will not improve the long term economic 
prosperity of a county.   
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available, ACA data was used in its place.  Government websites for all fifty states‘ prison 
bureaucracies as well as newspaper and magazine accounts of prison privatization were also 
checked.   
 To account for a delayed effect of the presence of a private prison, this variable was 
lagged for durations of one, two, and three years in the model.  A lagged effect in this study is 
not some mere afterthought to the modeling work.
105
  It can be expected that construction of 
virtually any sort will provide some degree of local economic boost because of a surge in blue 
collar labor needs.  It can be argued that it is sound public policy to create temporary jobs 
through public construction efforts, but undoubtedly that is a quite different effect than the 
generation of sustainable jobs.  So a logical outcome of prison construction is that jobs would be 
generated only at first, and then they would disappear.  This effect would be more pronounced if 
the prison sits idle or underused, as in speculative building.  Research on New York State found 
that some ―new‖ prison employees do not live in the host county but instead make a long 
commute (King, Mauer, and Huling 2003).  Another dampening effect on unemployment decline 
is corporate in-house employee transfer rules that earmark a percentage of any new jobs for those 
already on the payroll.  These people would potentially benefit a local economy by moving, but 
no previously unemployed native resident would receive that job.   
 There are in fact three distinct pools of jobs that could be realized when a prison is built.  
The first are temporary construction positions for infrastructure development and the prison 
building‘s erection.  The second category of new job is related to day-to-day prison operation.  
Workers in this category include prison guards, operational managers, and support staff such as 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
no systematic bias in their collection aimed against public or private institutions.  The ACA deals with not just 
private firms but also public employee unions. 
105
 Random effects estimators mix short and long term effects.  Logically, there is reason to parse out temporal 
effects to reflect the time dynamics of economic impacts. 
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clerical and janitorial employees.  And finally, in some instances, a prison could be so large that 
it generates a second order multiplicative effect for new employment.   This effect can be driven 
by new retail services for resident workers, such as grocery stores, gas stations, and dry cleaners.  
It can be expected that these second order jobs would be more sustained than new construction 
employment.   
 The public variable is analogous to the private variable.  It differentiates between the 
placement of a public and private prison.  As with the private variable, there are three lag years 
accounted for in the analysis.  And again, as with the private variable, lags were not continued 
beyond the third year for three reasons.  First, the sample size of the number of prisons existing 
over three years was so low that basing conclusions on it would be a tenuous proposition.  
Second, by the third year it is reasonable to assume that the economic environmental change 
caused by the new prison‘s construction would have been mostly complete.  Finally, because 
counties are open environments, other economic changes would have likely spilled over any 
impact seen from the construction of the carceral facility.    
 There are separate variables to account for the presence of a women‘s or juvenile facility.  
These are coded positive whether the women‘s or juvenile prison is public or private.  Women‘s 
facilities and juvenile facilities are different than men‘s facility in more than name only.  
Because they serve different inmate populations, they have a different approach in incarceration 
and a potentially unique economic effect.   
 To account for the idea that larger prisons will have a correspondingly larger economic 
impact, the variable ―average daily population‖ (ADP) is included.  Average daily population is 
used rather than the raw inmate capacity whenever possible.  Some prisons are built and remain 
empty because of strategically undertaken speculative construction (Kahn and Minnich 2005).   
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When the actual head count of currently held prisoners was available it was used.  In actuality, 
this means that public prisons are here represented by the actual count of inmates but private 
prisons are reported with a capacity figure.  Private institutions simply do not have the open 
access to data that public institutions offer, which of course raises issues of transparency outside 
the present bounds of study.   
 Some counties have more than one prison.  In these instances the ADP numbers were 
added together for each institution and modeled based upon that total. 
 Population density is based upon the average inhabitants per square mile of land as 
reported to the Census Bureau.  It is recognized that rural areas have different characteristics than 
urban areas, and prisons are often located in one or the other.  There are not many prisons in 
suburbs or medium sized cities.  They tend to be located in either urban crime and population 
centers or in sparsely inhabited rural counties.  Controlling for density is logical when looking at 
the effect of prison construction upon a local economy.  
 The BA variable is the percent of the population over the age of 25 with an undergraduate 
degree, as measured by the Department of Education.  Undergraduate education is known to be 
positively correlated with a higher income (US Department of Education 2009).   
 The Social Security Income Program is directed by the Social Security Administration.  It 
provides supplemental cash payments in accordance with nationwide eligibility requirements to 
persons with limited income and resources who are aged, blind or disabled (US Social Security 
Administration 2009).  This variable is a rate of individual benefit reception per 100,000 people 
in the measured population.  Poverty is a difficult concept to measure over time on a sub-state 
level, primarily due to data limitations, so the rate of enrollment of this program is used as a best 
proxy.  This variable is coded as ―supplement.‖  
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 The crime variable is a measure of violent crime committed per 100,000 residents.  In 
this study, crime is not included as a dependent variable.  The study centers on prisons: the 
places people go when they are caught committing crime.  At its core, the present analysis is not 
about crime but rather about the economic effects of coerced housing units for a segment of the 
US population – who happen to be criminals.  Rather, county crime rate is included here as a 
control variable to separate out the effect community violence might have on income and 
unemployment, nothing more.  Rising crime may or may not be associated with prison 
construction, but that is a topic for another study.  Crimes‘ effects are used here, but questions of 
their origins are not explored. 
 Local economies are complicated phenomenons that exist in an open environment.  Much 
like with studying incarceration and arrest rates, researchers have to confront issues of 
simultaneity and spurious variable correlation.  Respecting this concern, it is important to 
remember that many development projects shape economies other than prisons.  It is widely 
accepted that things such as airports, universities, shopping malls, and stadiums will have an 
economic effect on a county.  Yet, to the extent possible, it is important to control for local 
economic occurrences that exist independent of prison construction.  Quite simply, is something 
else causing the jump that could be seen in either employment or income?  The best way to do 
this with existing data is to control for housing starts.  Controlling for the quantity of housing 
starts is the most coherent way to control for the effects of growth upon the dependent variables.  
To state the obvious, new housing unit construction is not indicative of new prison construction.  
Though the present economy has seen residential developments sitting empty, the number of 
licenses granted for housing construction remains a coherent indicator of any upward population 
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movement in a county.  While houses might be conceivably constructed because prisons are 
being built, we can assume that they are generally constructed for many other reasons.
106
   
 
Model Notes 
  The regression model used, as with the juvenile death penalty chapter, is a generalized 
linear model that accounts for unobserved variation by including a latent variable.  This latent 
variable is composed of random intercepts and coefficients rather than common factor form. 
107
  
Any present latent variables will be referred to as random effects. The conditional distribution of 
the responses given my explanatory variables and the state non-random and random effects is 
specified via a family and a link function (McCullah and Nader, 1989).  The GLM employed 
allows for the specification of the link and family of distribution desired for modeling (Rabe-
Hesketh and Skondral 2008; Rabe-Hesketh, Skondral, and Pickles 2004).  In both of these 
models, the conditional distribution of the responses was specified via the gamma family (see 
Greene 2003, 855; Jambunathan 1954).
108
  The gamma family is the natural choice for this data 
because the regressands are continuous (unemployment rate and personal income) rather than 
discrete.
109
   
 While the gamma distribution is the correct one in the present case, the choice of which 
link is employed in a generalized linear model has more impact on the quality of the model than 
which distribution is selected (Gill 2001, 29).  The canonical link is used in this model because it 
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 It should also be kept in mind that there will be a lag between the employment of more workers and the 
construction of the issuance of new housing permits to meet increased demand. 
107
 In this study the model was run using GLLAMM, a statistical module developed specifically for STATA (Rabe-
Hesketh and Skondral 2008; Rabe-Hesketh, Skondral, and Pickles 2004). GLLAMM stands for Generalized Linear 
Latent and Mixed Models.   
108  
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 The Gamma distribution has been used before to study income distribution specifically (Atoda Suruga, and 
Tachibanaki 1980; Kloek and Van Dijk 1978; Salem and Mount 1974).   
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is preferred if it does not contradict the substantive idea of the research project (McCullah and 
Nader, 1989).  Once the gamma family form is selected, the link function identifies itself (Gill 
2001, 32).  The canonical link for a GLM with a gamma distribution is the reciprocal link:   -   
(Gill 2001, 31, 39; Johnson 2006 4).  
     As an artifact of the counties included in the sample (see Appendix V), there are 42 
separate states included in this study.  Political science theory suggests that states have strong 
effects upon behavior in the political world because of their unique environments (Gelman 
2008).  While Gelman looked specifically at electoral behavior in presidential contests, states 
also have very different public policies (Mooney 1998; Smith, Greenblatt, and Mariani 2008, 4-
25), perhaps caused by state culture (Elazar 1984; Hanson 1991) or state economy (Ringquist 
and Garand 1999).  It is my belief that not accounting for state effects in this regression model 
would create uncertain results due to misspecification of the parameter estimates.  The economic 
impact of a prison is believed to be dependent on the institutions and political structures of the 
state in which it is built, and this model recognizes that.   
 Recognizing that states should be understood as variant units, a hierarchical model with 
state effects accounted for was warranted.  The primary alternative would have been to treat each 
state as a factor.  Treating each state as a factor in a multivariate regression presupposes that one 
state has an influence on another, which is not being claimed.  Such a factored approach eats up 
degrees of freedom, making it inferior to a nested model.  This data has time invariant 
information in it that does not vary within an observation (a county) at any time.  For instance, a 
juvenile prison is always a juvenile prison in every year of the model.  Using a fixed effect 
model would have been flawed because its transformation would have wiped out these static 
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observations‘ effects from the model.110  Further, the target of inference for this study is not the 
variation among the states.  Rather, the topic is the aggregate effect of the unique states on 
unemployment and personal income.  It was also considered that this data is not a comprehensive 
set of all information for all American counties.  Because the model is a tool to draw inferences 
regarding other members of the population, including any related future events, the random 
effect is more appropriate (Kennedy 2008, 291).   
 The equations for this two level regression are as follows: 
 
Level 1: Using Gamma probability distribution as in footnote 33:    
 
Level 2:       
 
The level one data are the 8,524 individual county-year dyad observation sets.  This number 
represents the complete cases of study over the 27 year time span.  It is denoted above that the 
function makes use of the reciprocal link.  The j subscripts in the level one equation indicate that 
a different level one model is being fitted for each of the level-2 units, which are the states.  
Epsilon is a stochastic disturbance term that is not constant.   
  is the effect of the level-2 predictor and indicates how the first equation is a function 
of the second level units‘ variability.  The j symbolizes which state effect is being accounted for 
in the equation (the states are numbered one to forty-two arbitrarily) in alphabetical order   is 
the error for unit j, and hence part of the calculation in equation one.  
                                                          
110
 The value of these variables is constant so subtracting one from the other to find an average would have 
transformed them all to zero during the estimation process. 
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IV. Summary and Discussion of Results 
 
Table 1 
        
         Variables   PI (Constant Dol.)   Unemployment Rate 
  
Coefficients 
 
S.E. 
 
Coefficients 
 
S.E. 
Private Prison 
 
-2.44 
 
1.32 
 
.027 * .007 
Private - 1 yr 
lag 
 
-1.49 
 
1.87 
 
-.002 
 
.01 
Private - 2 yr 
lag 
 
7.33 
 
1.94 
 
.006 
 
.01 
Private - 3 yr 
lag 
 
-1.43 
 
1.48 
 
-.007 
 
.008 
Public Prison 
 
-6.71 * 9.06 
 
.001 
 
.004 
Public - 1 yr 
lag 
 
2.65 
 
1.44 
 
.004 
 
.006 
Public - 2 yr 
lag 
 
-4.24 
 
1.6 
 
.0007 
 
.007 
Public - 3 yr 
lag 
 
-1.47 
 
1.17 
 
.005 
 
.005 
Women's 
Prison 
 
1.61 * 4.03 
 
-.01 * .001 
Juv Prison 
 
1.29 * 4.58 
 
.01 * .002 
ADP 
 
1.12 * 1.16 
 
-3.55 * 3.19 
Pop. Density 
 
-2.01 * 1.1 
 
-4.37 * 7.33 
BA 
 
-6.46 * 2.24 
 
.003 * .0001 
Supplemental
 
.0002 * 7.31 
 
-.14 * .008 
Crime 
 
-9.17 * 6.82 
 
-5.26 * 2.61 
Housing Units 
 
-.0001 * .00002 
 
.046 
 
.06 
Unemployment 
 
1.63 * 4.63 
 
na 
 
na 
PI Constant 
Dol. 
 
na 
 
na 
 
7.18 * 1.81 
Constant  .00007 * 5.72  0.02 * .002 
         Pearson Χ² 
 
272.6
   
1160.502
  
         Degrees of 
Freedom 
  
8506 
    Number of Level 1 Units 
 
8524 
    Number of Level 2 Units 
 
42 
    
         *<.01 
         
Summary  
 The quantitative findings, shown above in Table 1, demonstrate that hosting a private 
prison offers no economic panacea to concerned state or local policy-makers.  Within the field of 
economic development, it is not rare to find that a new construction project or event either causes 
little to no economic growth or even presents itself as an economic drain (e.g. Baade and Dye 
 134  
 
1990; Coates and Humphreys 2000; Colclough, Daellenbach, and Sherony 1994; Goetz and 
Swaminathan 2004; Hooks et. al 2004, 2010).     
 This study was done with a hierarchical model which took state effects into account.  The 
unit of study was ―counties with prisons – year‖ dyads.  A 27 year time span with a national 
scope allowed for analysis of prison construction in different economic and political 
environments.  The sample included all private prisons and random selection of public prisons 
and localities without prisons. 
 The dependent variables selected, unemployment and personal income, were chosen as 
the best aggregate measures of economic impact.  Employment levels and rising income are 
typically how economists conduct economic impact analysis barring individual level data 
typically gathered through survey and sector level analysis (e.g. Baade and Dye 1990; Crompton 
and McKay 1994)
111
.  Economic performance could be represented solely by per capita income 
(e.g. Brace 1991; Gray and Lowery 1988; Hendrick and Garand 1991).  However, employment 
level is also commonly recognized as an important measure of economic health (Economic 
Development Review 1995; Gazel and Schwer 1997; Jones 1989; McDonald 1983; Newman 
1983).  This pair of measures has been used before to look at prison privatization.  But in that 
study, only a single state‘s rural areas were examined (King, Mauer, and Huling 2003).  A more 
recent study of the economic impact of prisons only looked at employment (Hooks et. al 2010). 
 
Discussion of Results 
      To begin a discussion of these results, consider the example of Kansas City, Missouri.  In 
2008 Kansas City had a budget crisis.  In response to that, the council and mayor have 
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 Property values, if there is data for it, is another way to assess economic impact beyond employment and income 
in a study without survey data developing an accurate multiplier (e.g. Debrezion, Pels and Rietvold 2006). 
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considered closing the municipal jail and housing inmates in a yet to be built private prison in a 
rural area.  This was thought by some to be the cheapest course of action.  Ultimately, it was 
decided to close the city jail and merge with the nearby Jackson County, Missouri facility.  In 
this instance, politically engaged Kansas City residents spoke up about the reduced services a 
private jail would offer, as well as its distant location (K.C. Star, February 18, 2009).  This 
example typifies the prison privatization decision making model employed by public officials 
today and shows the merits of policy outcome analysis for this topic.  The privatizing notion was 
publicly mentioned as an ―innovative‖ and ―modern‖ cost saver, but as is often the case, was 
ultimately not used by the city.  Proper critical policy evaluation could reduce the situations in 
which it is seriously considered, thus serving to save the time of officials for other matters 
(Crompton 1995).  Alternatively, studies like this one could provide evidence for its furtherance.      
 By law, some states have no option to contract for incarceration.  Between 1987 and 
1997, 26 states enacted legislation authorizing the private management of secure correctional 
facilities (Nicholson-Crotty 2004, 45).
112
  As recently as 2002, that number still stood, with 
Washington D.C. and the Federal Bureau of Prisons opening themselves to private contracts as 
well (Camp 2002).  A snapshot of a single year, listing the private companies that contract with 
each jurisdiction, is labeled Appendix VI.  Appendix VII lists the contracting firms in 2002 and 
the number of facilities each operates. 
 There is such a thing as the politics of place.  Research in the state policy subfield has 
discovered real subnational differences regarding substantive issues.  There are differences 
between factors such as personal income, crime rate, unemployment, and economic growth 
which are neither arbitrary nor the product of chance.  Beyond basic geographical and legal 
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 See Appendix IV for a listing of states and agencies which solicit contracts for private prison facilities in the 
sample year 2002. 
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boundaries, states vary in their cultures, politics, and demographic characteristics (see The Book 
of the States).  States also differ in their relative economic prosperity (BEA 2009), owing this 
variance to such things as the level of government intervention (Buchanan 1975; Friedman 1962; 
Hayek 1962; Hirschman 1982; Olson 1982; Osborne 1988, 1993; Srinivasan 1985) or the quality 
of the labor pool (Florida 2002a, 2002b; Fosler 1988; Moriarity 1988; Smith and Rademacker 
1999; Wheat 1980).  Though there has been a nationalizing trend in federal government 
economic intervention since the 1960s (Atkinson 1993; Eisenger 1995; Turner 2003), with a few 
downward hiccups
113
, state policy conditions still matter in determining economic conditions 
(Canto and Webb 1987; Jones 1990; Jones and Vedlitz 1988; Newman 1983; Plaut and Pluta 
1993; Schneider 1987).   
 However, as Paul Brace cautions at the beginning of his study on state economies, ―States 
have open economies with labor and capital moving freely from state to state (1993)‖.  Studying 
the economy of states is both similar to and different from studying the economies of different 
nations (e.g. Lehne 2002; Lindblom 1977; Wilson 2003).  Because states have different 
governments, laws, business environments, and cultures, they can be conceptualized as unique 
units (Brace 1991; Felman and Florida 1994).  Yet Brace is correct to issue a disclaimer at the 
front of his book (1993), that there are regional and national effects which alter the states‘ 
economic environment (Florida 1996; Florida and Smith 1993; Hendrick and Garand 1991).  For 
instance, stagflation in the 1970s touched all states, as did the ―dot com boom‖ of the 1990s to 
early 2000s.  Likewise, to treat the counties within states as totally separate from them would 
present a spatial econometric problem.   
 Because the present study does indeed drill down one level further than states, to the 
county, the question of the containing state‘s influence on local economy becomes pertinent.  A 
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 The devolutionary administrations of Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush. 
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model that uses one regression line for all states would be poorly specified because of state 
differences.  The nested regression of this study is justified because it allows for the regressors to 
vary with the latent variation of the states.  In other words, the model recognizes the reality of the 
data in its design.       
 This study uses a long span of time in answering the question:  Do private prisons 
economically benefit the counties in which they are located, or do they stand only to make 
money for the parent companies‘ owners?  The time series aspect of the study‘s design is 
important because it allows for a larger sample that contains both economic upturns and 
downturns.  If the sample only contained data from the tech boom or only data from the 
tumultuous 1960s than any effect seen could be an artifact of the times.  The present span 
captures a diverse collection of both recessionary and growth years; years of both slow sustained 
change, as well as abrupt economic shocks such as after 9/11.   
 One recent study of the economic development subsidies given to private prison 
operators noted that 
Local governments are not systematically assessing whether the subsidies they 
have provided to prison companies have had the desired effect.  Not a single 
official we interviewed could point to a formal economic impact study that had 
been done of the private prison built in his or her community (Mattera and Khan 
2001, vi). 
 
The economic impact of this policy is an important question that has not been addressed in 
academic work.  A prison administrator‘s reference book stated, "Little systematic research has 
addressed…whether privatization has furthered government objectives other than cost 
containment (McDonald 1999, 431)‖.   
   Recall that the two measures used to assess impact on a county‘s economy are personal 
income per capita and unemployment.  These measures best perform economic impact analysis 
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as defined as the measurement of economic growth stimulated by increased in fiscal demand for 
products produced in a regional economy (Bergstrom et. al 1990).  Another similar working 
definition of economic impact is the net economic change in a host community, excluding non-
market values, which results from spending attributable to an event (Crompton and McKay 
1994).    
 Taking first the unemployment results, there is no substantial change in local 
unemployment brought about because a prison is constructed in a community.  In economic 
impact analysis, it is common to distinguish between construction jobs that are short lived and 
new permanent jobs (e.g. Batey, Madden, and Scholefield 1992; Colclough, Daellenbach and 
Sherony 1994).  It would be predictable if unemployment briefly declines during new 
construction.  The findings here indicate no real differences in employment at anytime because 
of a prison.  The only statistically significant variation is during the first year a private prison is 
constructed, when unemployment actually went up a small amount.   
 Despite this finding, prison construction remains a labor intensive process.  The prison 
industry is a brick-and-mortar business similar in some ways to big-box electronic retailing, and 
dissimilar to a financial services company.  The erection of a prison complex requires at least the 
usual number of blue collar jobs, just as any specialized construction project would.  Further, 
prisons are not empty concrete shells like warehouses, but are filled with the unique materials 
required to hold inmates.  Prisons have elaborate locking systems, closed circuit cameras, riot-
proof food service equipment, and sturdy perimeter fences, just to highlight a few things.  The 
integration of all of these pieces employs specialists from other geographic areas. It is also worth 
considering that private companies build prisons for less money, so perhaps they are more apt to 
use temporary staffing agencies during the building process.   Another reality is that private firms 
 139  
 
simply make use of trained people already on their own payroll.  A core competency touted by 
private firms is the cheap construction of new prisons, particularly regarding empty speculative 
ones
114
, so if they are to be believed, they use less labor.    
 Whatever the case, a positive effect on unemployment is just not presenting itself in the 
data.  This is logical because of the fact that prisons typically do not grow.  A prison is built to 
hold a certain number of people, and by design their original buildings offer little flexibility in 
this.
115
  Once initial hiring is finished, it is not likely there will be a large uptick later down the 
road.  Prisons do not grow the way a manufacturing plant or a research facility might.  In fact, 
one might normatively hope that they shrink as crime declines.  So, given the mitigating effects 
mentioned above that prison staffing has on local employment, and their static nature, this result 
is not surprising.   
 The presence of a juvenile prison, whether public or private, has a minimal effect on the 
employment picture.  It could be expected that prisons create a change in local employment, but 
not a major one.  At one time, juvenile prisons were very different than adult prisons because of 
the more therapeutic setting they typically provided.  Perhaps it would not have been surprising 
that they could lower unemployment because of the more diverse type of staff they once 
required.  Now, however, they are more likely to resemble their adult counterparts.  From a local 
economic development standpoint, it is noteworthy that youth facilities also tend to be smaller 
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 CCA 2006 Annual Report (6), reads:  In addition to the new Red Rock and Saguaro facilities, we are expanding 
several existing facilities by approximately 4,000 beds.  The new beds are expected to come on-line throughout 2007 
and during the first half of 2008.  Roughly 2,600 of these beds are being developed for specific customers; however, 
none has a guarantee of occupancy.  We are optimistic that the remaining expansion beds will be utilized by federal 
and state customers. 
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 With some notable exceptions.  The first being the so-called ―tent cities‖ used to detain illegal immigrants in 
southwestern border states, such as the one in Willacy County (Raymondville), Texas.  The second being the 
expansionary tendency of industry goliath CCA to construct new holding wings to keep up with rising incarceration 
rates. 
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than adult facilities.  Even if they might now have more staff per inmate, however miniscule of a 
difference this is, such small facilities should not be seen as robust hiring engines. 
 Women‘s prison construction causes no appreciable change in unemployment, which is 
not surprising.  This is not a lagged variable but simply indicates the presence or absence of a 
female holding facility in any year.  There is no sound reason to expect women‘s prisons would 
impact a local employment situation more than a male one.  They are managed and run in much 
the same manner as male or mixed gender facilities. 
 The average daily population of a prison alters the employment landscape significantly, 
which is an interesting result.  The data strongly indicates that the size of the complex matters.  
The larger a facility is, in other words the more prisoners it has present at roll call, the lower the 
unemployment rate.  Recall that the public and private prison variables parsed out the years with 
a lag effect, but the ADP variable will not fluctuate much with a prison‘s age.  But caution 
should be taken before this result is interpreted as standing against evidence for the ―prison as 
community blight‖ argument.  Larger prisons are often constructed in rural areas with 
unemployment rates structurally different than those of urban areas.  It could be that another 
study should be done focusing just on larger prisons.  Perhaps there are insightful differences 
between the construction of a large prison and a small one.     
 The regression controls for some environmental effects.  Population density, education 
level, social security assistance, crime rate, new housing construction, and personal income all 
show significance in the model.  Crime and population density are associated with lower 
unemployment, but it is likely these are proxies for how urban a prison community is.   These 
results therefore do not indicate any appreciable change in unemployment driven by prisons, so 
much as they point out labor differences driven by broader contextual factors.    
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 Turning now to personal income, the second model‘s results are aligned with the changes 
seen in the unemployment rate.  Private prisons do not raise a county‘s average personal income.  
This result holds for the one, two, and three year lags as well.  Perhaps private prisons do more 
economic harm than good given the average 1997 starting salary of $17,246 reported in a 
government study (Austin and Coventry 2001).  Data beyond that number are hard to come by 
because of the more secretive nature of private profit-driven institutions.  Firms‘ own literature 
and sales information does tout their lower labor costs, so firms themselves would, in all 
likelihood, not be surprised to see that they are not driving up local incomes. 
 The results for public institutions reinforce the notion that prison construction is not a 
strong economic catalyst for communities.  There is a negligible drop in personal income the first 
year a prison is built.  This is explainable because the lower paying blue collar jobs required of a 
large construction project might be nudging this number downward.  There is no economic boom 
seen here as when a local government builds an airport (Batey, Madden, and Scholefiled 1992; 
Butler and Kiernan 1986),  develops its agricultural industry (Birkhaeuser, Evenson, and Feder 
1991; Degner, Moss, and Mulkey 1997), hosts a concert (Gazel and Schwer 1997), creates 
another transportation node (Debrezion, Pels, and Reitveld 2006; McDonald and Osuji 1995; 
Vessali 1996), or hosts a university (Agapoff and Harris 2000; Beck, Elliott, and Wagner 1995; 
Caffrey and Issacs 1971; Chakraborty and Edmiston 2006; Marshall University 2006).   
 The other variables studied as drivers for income do not produce any shocking results.  It 
is noteworthy, yet completely unsurprising, that unemployment is associated with lower income 
while other variables are associated with microscopic variable fluctuations.  The model shows 
significance for a number of variables, but at a very small level of change.   
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 In conclusion, these results hold some important information for policymakers weighing 
out the construction of a private prison facility.  They reinforce the idea that construction of just 
about any public project will likely create at least a few jobs that may or may not pay well for 
locals.  Prisons holding all manner of people at all manner of detention level certainly qualifies 
as ―about any‖ public project.  Of course, what is being built has an appreciable effect on its 
surrounding community down the road.  People could also be employed building a road, a 
bridge, or a genetic research center at least as well as they could a carceral facility.  Educational 
or research facilities are prized economic engines sought after by local governments (Aued 2008; 
Fagan 2007; Friedman 2002).  Private prisons are a convenient yet strange solution to the 
question of economic growth.   
 Any long term economic gain for citizens, the effect sought after by politicians, does not 
present itself in the data.  It is understandable that local officials, particularly during a recession, 
could try to sell a private firm‘s new business as a driver of jobs.  If CCA or Avalon Inc. remain 
the only ones talking, then politicians are sure to listen.           
 This study, if nothing else, raises important questions about the effects private prisons 
have upon the communities in which they are located.  Too often both published policy work and 
more informal, less systematic studies concerning individual privatization issues focus on short 
term cost savings.  When conducting research in this manner, policy analysts take on the role of 
operations managers rather than objective analysts. This approach overlooks the greater structure 
of the relationship between the public and the private, and its consequent effects on this nation‘s 
communities.  Examining income and unemployment is a start, but what about other effects?  
What types of jobs are created, and what do they pay?  Who moves next to a prison?  Who are 
these ―new‖ people and what are they going to do with their time?  Are people relocating 
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because of a prison-caused drain on local social services such as public health care clinics or 
social welfare agency offices?   
 A 1997 General Accounting Office report said that privatization requires a politician 
willing to champion the cause (GAO 1997).  A profile of these champions of privatization would 
be a useful tool for researchers in the field.  Who is seduced by the siren song of a 2,500 bed 
cinder block building and why?  Are they not able to think of another way to generate local jobs, 
and if not, why not?  Is this appealing because of the ―get tough on crime‖ attitude coupled with 
job creation?  Or is this purely a financial move?  A survey sent to local officials who have 
overseen a private prison could get at these questions.  It could shed light on the relative 
importance of crime reduction stance versus economic growth. 
 A businesses‘ customer is who pays the bill, not necessarily who received the service.  In 
that regard, prisons do not operate at all like hotels, with the occupants paying for their own stay.  
The customer base in this industry has always been and will always be the American taxpayer.  
For this service, there is a line of entrepreneurs willing to take the public‘s money.  The inmate is 
more like a product being built at a manufacturing plant than they are a paying customer.  
Focusing on a prison as a piece of crime reduction is a distraction to a purely economic study.  
The appeal of getting tough on crime serves to disguise what are often financial boondoggles for 
subsidizing localities.  Just as prisoners are confined to a cell, so are taxpayers confined to the 
environment created by public private partnerships.  Policymakers should turn to long term 
economic studies considering the experience of other communities when analyzing prison 
construction.    
 A step forward from this study could be to select a smaller subsample of this population 
to conduct individual level analysis of thorough site surveying.  These surveys would discover 
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the wages and spending patterns of new prison employees or families of prisoners who move to a 
specific area.  Survey data would provide information that could be used to build an impact 
multiplier, which is the key ingredient in determining local economic effects in studies that zero 
in on one area (e.g. Bergstrom et. al 1990; Colclough, Daellenbach, and Sherony 1994; Degner, 
Moss, and Mulkey 1997; Gazel and Schwer 1997). 
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 Conclusion  
 This dissertation began by explaining how it fits within Harold Lasswell‘s well developed 
ideas on public policy analysis.  Accordingly, its three chapters are multidisciplinary, practical, 
problem oriented, and adaptable to the normative ideas of criminal justice policymakers.  
Though they all address criminal justice policy, they share much in common, both stylistically 
and methodologically, with work in other substantive policy areas.  It is not just helpful, but 
indeed essential, that research such as this in criminal justice policy can be studied alongside 
efforts tackling other topics of public concern such as environmental regulation, public health 
care, or disaster preparedness.  However, as explained in the introduction, criminal justice policy 
also possesses a set of different characteristics when compared to other policy areas.  Recall that 
criminal justice policy is dictated by policymakers‘ get tough on crime rhetoric, subject to the 
unpredictability of deviant human behavior, and disjointed because of its disjointed multi domain 
nature.  Further, it is complicated by the American federal system, particularly the dual structure 
of the American legal system‘s federal and state courts.       
 With these underlying characteristics in mind, the three chapters‘ results can be studied 
alongside each other to shed light on common themes.  Though specific implications of each 
chapter deal with different policy sub-domains, together they form an interlocking narrative 
regarding criminal justice policy.  Indeed, to study the constituent units and activities of the 
criminal justice system independently would encumber policymakers‘ ability to effect intelligent 
system wide change.  For example, the cost analysis of per diem prison incarceration rates makes 
little sense without commensurate knowledge of recent criminal sentencing trends.  Similarly, 
looking at crime deterrence does little good with no understanding of a society‘s tolerance level 
of crime rates.  
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 The three chapters have shown, respectively, that the juvenile death penalty (JDP) was 
not a deterrent to juvenile violent crime, that African-Americans react differently to police 
officers than whites, and that private prison construction is not an economic panacea.  In this 
conclusion each chapter‘s results will be discussed in terms of their broad implications, as well 
as contribution to the relevant literature.  In each topical area, possibilities for further research 
work will be explored.  Finally, the work ends with some brief thoughts on this area of study. 
 The first chapter of this dissertation makes an important, and unique, contribution to the 
mountain of literature on capital punishment.  Recall that this study concerns a clearly defined 
portion of the death penalties that were applied in the modern era from 1974 to 2005.  It uses a 
robust collection of author requested FBI crime statistics
116
 to look for any effect of a juvenile 
death sentence or juvenile execution upon the national juvenile murder rate and the national 
juvenile violent crime rate.  In summary, the results of the study show that the presence or 
absence of a rarely used punishment has no discernible effect on the tiny portion of the juvenile 
population that commits violent crime.  This chapter‘s finding fits into public debate on the 
controversial punishment, and adds to the academic literature on deterrence studies.  Its 
methodology presents a worthwhile way to analyze the efficacy of the death penalty on targeted 
criminal subpopulations, while modeling a valuable way for policy analysts to contribute to 
public debate on a topic often framed in terms of morality or perpetrator innocence.        
The death penalty is a state‘s penultimate penalty that might be imposed on a criminal.  It 
is intended to not just serve as a comeuppance to a single individual, but also to send the harshest 
of signals to would be offenders:  if you commit a capital offense you might be killed by your 
government‘s justice system.  For present purposes ethics based arguments regarding the state 
sanctioned killings will be set aside.  So clearly, the primary value in the penalty to citizens lies 
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in its crime deterrent effect to potential capital offenders.
117
  To the extent that it deters violent 
crime it can be declared a success by proponents.  Likewise, analysis should address the validity 
of the deterrence claim.  Importantly, the punishment remains controversial, with 31% of people 
disapproving of its use on convicted murderers (Gallup 2009).
118
  This lack of public consensus 
is not just because of normative arguments about the taking of a life by the government.    
    Beyond morality arguments Baumgartner, De Boef, and Bodystun identified four other 
shifting frames of public debate regarding capital punishment (2008, 108-110).  In an exhaustive 
study of 3,939 New York Times article abstracts covering 1960 to 2005 the authors identified 
efficacy, morality, fairness, constitutionality, and international issues as the major categories of 
public discussion (ibid).  Their work keys in on the frame of fairness, particularly as it surrounds 
the idea of innocents being sentenced to death.  What they explain as the ―innocence frame‖ has 
dominated media description of the penalty during a period of public reconsideration of the issue 
(Gottschalk 2009; Morone 2009; Sarat 2009; Shapiro 2009).       
 Chapter one of the dissertation makes an argument that would fit most obviously in the 
issue frame of efficacy, because its deals with crime deterrence.  However, this first study also 
steps into the media dominating issue frame of fairness/innocence.  Taking first how the chapter 
fits into other deterrence studies, it is worth noting what legal historian Stuart Banner calls the 
―folk wisdom of deterrence‖ (Banner 2002, 281).  For years, Banner documents, it was simply 
accepted by policymakers that the punishment just had to deter crime.  However, econometrics 
can make quick work of folk wisdom (Fagan 2006).   
 The notion of punishment as deterrence, as spelled out in the first chapter, can be traced 
back to historical criminologists such as Cesare Beccaria ([1764] 1963).  Basic statistical 
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 Though I must concede that some derive a satisfaction from the atonement of the punishment (Banner 2002, 23). 
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 For aggregated trends in death penalty approval among the public from 1953-2006 see Baumgartner, De Boef, 
and Boydstun 2008 (p. 174). 
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analysis conducted as early as 1959 (Sellin) established the modern scholarly practice of looking 
at the death penalty‘s effect in an environment filled with external factors.  The work of first 
Nobel winning Gary S. Becker, and then more frequently Isaac Ehrlich, added to the 
sophistication of earlier quantitative techniques.  In fact, it is possible to trace much of the 
evolution of time series modeling techniques through the scholarship of this one oft written about 
policy area.   
 As recounted in detail in the chapter, the present study adds to the corpus of death penalty 
analysis by continuing the basic formula set out by those noted above and then practiced and 
shaped by others (e.g. Bowers and Pierce 1975; Chressanthis 1989; Decker and Kohfeled 1984; 
Fox 1977; Jongmook 2009; Mocan and Gittings 2003; Yunker 1976).  Though some work has 
strayed from this basic formula and has investigated underling theoretical deterrence questions, 
such as the certainty of the punishment versus its severity (e.g. Mendes and McDonald 2001), 
and the utility of a portfolio approach to crime analysis (e.g. Cloninger 1992).       
 What makes this study unique is not its widely accepted statistical methodology, but 
rather its more narrow focus on the JDP.  Though the death penalty has been the subject of a vast 
number of serious studies, the penalty has rarely been broken down for analysis by population 
subgroup.  Such minority group studies, when done, most often are legal analysis (e.g. Ackerson, 
Brodsky, and Zapf 2005; Blume and Johnson 2003; Hall 2004; Horstman 2002; Jones 2004; 
Slobogin 2003; Tobolowsky 2003, 2004, 2007) rather than quantitative social science studies.  
For example many of these legal journal studies are published after a Supreme Court decision, 
such as with Atkins v. Virginia (2002).  When scholarly work outside of the legal profession has 
strayed into minority population groups and the death penalty, it most often does not deal with 
deterrence.  Rather, it deals with prosecutorial decision-making (Songer and Unah 2006), 
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sentencing outcomes (Eberhardt et al. 2006; Stauffer et al. 2010), execution application after 
sentencing (Jacobs et al. 2007), or more basic existential considerations of the death penalty 
(Zimring and Whitman 2006).             
 This dissertation carries out an important disaggregation of national crime occurrences 
into those committed by adult and juveniles.  Naturally, every category of large statistical data 
can be further broken up into yet more subcategories. In this case, because of data limitations, 
non-capital murders are folded into capital ones.  Work has begun however, by a scholar that 
attempts to break down murder into types, so that the deterrence of capital punishment can be 
assessed as to so-called crimes of passion (Shepherd 2004).
119
  Herbert Simon‘s model of an 
actor making decisions with limited information in a finite period of time, using decision making 
heuristics, is pushed to the limit with deterrence models dealing with instances of violent 
personal rage (1957).
120
  Scholarly work that examines the deterrence effect of a punishment, 
including capital punishment, within certain populations such as a race or age group can put a 
finer point on such examinations.     
 Policymakers could benefit from quantitative analysis of the enormous amount of 
existing crime data to make finer conclusions.  This study makes a solid step in the right 
direction by matching a punishment targeted at one group, the JDP, against a corresponding set 
of committed crimes.  Future death penalty deterrence studies examining for instance, African-
Americans, Latinos, the elderly, or urban dwellers could follow.  While the special quality of 
examining a holistic set of capital sentences and executions would not be possible as uniquely is 
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 This work is based on the Bureau of Justice Statistic‘s Supplemental Homicide Reports and while valuable, needs 
further scholarly development.  In the world of legalities, their use would not be settled law. 
120
 This refers to the boundedly rational model of decision-making (Simon 1957). 
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with the defunct JDP,
121
 there would be added value in analyzing an ongoing practice rather than 
a historical one.
122
  Future research that pairs up slices of the population with categories of 
capital offenses would allow for deterrence modeling that moves beyond present day work. 
 Clearly, finer analysis of the FBI‘s BJS crime statistic data could develop studies 
analogous to this one.  A family of studies dealing with different population groups could be 
conducted that move beyond the apparent syndrome of death penalty deterrence work that lumps 
together the entirety of the US population.  While it is appreciated that the literature has 
demonstrated advancement of time series modeling techniques, the intelligent design of datasets 
could strongly stand to catch up to available analytical tools.   
 Such studies can allow for conclusions that incorporate into them subgroup 
characteristics.   In this instance, scholarly work on adolescent brain development is what is 
relevant because it speaks to the more limited cognitive functions and impulse control of minors.  
The policymaking institution, in this case the Supreme Court in Roper v. Simmons (2005), used 
psychiatric data in its majority decision to reason out that the JDP is not an effective deterrent on 
such a lower functioning population group.  Notably absent were disaggregated juvenile murder 
rates that corresponded with juvenile sentences and executions over time.  The justices made the 
leap of logic from the medical literature to an abolitionist stance without presenting data as 
contained in this study that makes the direct connection between crime and punishment.  Future 
work along these lines would have obvious value to those directly involved with the capital 
punishment issue. 
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 Though one could imagine a study regarding Atkins and the mentally challenged.  However, FBI UCS data is not 
as readily broken down into offenders that deemed to be mentally deficient.   
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 Historical at least for now.  Recall that over the last handful of decades that the entirety of the punishment has 
come and gone in correspondence with popular mood and Supreme Court decision-making. 
 151  
 
 Turning now to the second chapter, the dissertation moves from punishment to policing.  
This chapter explored citizen and police officer interactions using survey data on traffic stops.  It 
the course of exploring symbolic bureaucratic representation, it was found that African-
Americans are more likely to believe police stops are illegitimate.  This was not an especially 
surprising finding (Baylery and Medelsohn 1968; Boggs and Gallier 1965; Brunzon 2007 Erez 
1965; Fine et al. 2003; Frank et al. 1996; Hindelang 1974; Percy 1980; Scaglion and Condon 
1980; Theobald and Haider-Markel 2008; Perry and Sornoff 1973; Roberts 2004; Weitzer 2000; 
Weitzer and Tuch 2002), given the well document differential treatment of African-Americans in 
the United States (Spitzer 1999; United States Commission on Civil Rights 2000).  Evidence for 
a race based interaction effect between the citizen and the stopping police officer was found 
however, as it had been in earlier research (Theobald and Haider-Markel 2008).  Though as 
reported in the second chapter, it was found for a single variable.  Recall that African-American 
males were more likely to think a black police officer ―behaved properly.‖ 
 Because police are the most visible of all criminal justice institutions (Chermak and 
Weiss 2005, Goldsmith 2010), any sort of varied response they elicit from a large minority 
group, such as African-Americans is noteworthy as a standalone fact.  Regarding policing, the 
chapter highlighted the importance of minority officer hiring programs, with the obvious 
connection being the increased respect given black officers by black citizens.  Police officials 
can also learn from survey data like the 2002 and 2005 PPCS in order to form officer training 
programs.  If African-American citizens react different than white citizens in traffic stops, then 
surely that is information police patrol managers would like to have for instructional 
development purposes. 
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Methodologically, this chapter provided an exciting insight.  By including both the 2002 
and 2005 PPCS and producing logically consistent results between them, it exhibited internal 
validity for these measurements.  Also, because it is directly comparable to an earlier similar 
research work using the 1999 PPCS it speaks to that effort‘s validity.  But perhaps most enticing 
is the different results gathered for each of the four 2005 questions.  Because respondents 
answered these differently, yet in a coherent manner, it provides evidence that these citizen 
surveys are indeed very precise instruments of public attitude and feeling. 
But this chapter is more than about a narrowly defined traffic stop, or even the survey 
analysis of policing.  It is more broadly about bureaucratic representation as exhibited by this one 
function of the government.  Public policy scholar Anthony Downs (1967) did not take issue 
with how demographically representative bureaucracy was when compared to the general 
population,
123
  but he did develop a list of four conditions that must be met for proper 
bureaucratic representation: 
1) Value alignment between bureaucrats and citizens, 
2) Shared values must be relevant to the bureaucratic task at hand, 
3) Officials must share a desire with citizens to shape their bureaus behaviors to align with 
citizen values, 
4) Supervising officials must have the authority to employ these shared values in 
determining bureau behavior 
 
One criminal justice policy implication for this chapter is that police departments should be 
aware that minority citizens possess different attitudes regarding traffic stop behavior.  Police 
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 In  fact, Downs questioned if bureaus would simply ―spontaneously‖ form which represented a cross-section of 
society (Downs, 1967, 233) 
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departments should be interested in striving for Down‘s third point, ―Officials must share a 
desire with citizens to shape their bureaus behaviors to align with citizen values,‖ because police 
are the public‘s agents for detecting, solving, and ultimately preventing crime.  Police chiefs are 
doubtlessly aware that they conduct essential functions which necessitate citizen cooperation 
(Gourley 1954; Sunshine and Tyler 2003; Tyler 2004; Tyler and Fagan 2008).  Consequently, 
police departments should actually desire to shape their values to those of the citizens they are 
charged with protecting from crime.  To reach that end, departments should consider active 
minority hiring practices.  At this point in time, minority citizens view the actions of minority 
bureaucrats more positively than they do actions of white bureaucrats.  This result holds true in 
the contentious area of traffic stops.  At a minimum, if departments are already changing hiring 
habits as recent data seems to indicate, then perhaps they should also incorporate knowledge of 
attitudinal predispositions held by minority citizens into police academy curriculum.  This would 
allow all officers to be made aware of the effects a discretionary traffic stop has on the citizen 
involved.   
 The PPCS is conducted every three years as an addendum to the NCVS.  The most 
current data publicly available at ICPSR is 2005, but the 2008 data should publish soon.  An 
ensuing study analogous to this one will allow for insights that carry across 1999, 2002, 2005, 
and into 2008.  Frankly, the study of police officers offers the best available opportunity for 
separating symbolic representation from active representation.  Datasets that track, for example, 
minority student performance in the classroom of a minority teacher, confound active and 
passive pedagogical effect.  Police traffic stops are studied by many people because of the 
implications for criminal justice policymaking, so therefore abundant data exists allowing for 
exploration of this theory of bureaucracy.  This highlights the value in political scientists 
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examining criminal justice datasets for implications that reach beyond the policy sub domain, as 
well as the opportunity for the application of accepted public policy theory to criminal justice 
issues. 
 The final chapter of this work focuses on incarceration, but rather than making a 
statement about the efficacy of American incarceration rates or methods in reducing crime, it 
finds that private prison construction is not an economic boom to communities.  By way of 
background, it was brought up in chapter three that many local elected officials see prison 
construction as a way to grow an economy.  Particularly in a challenging economic environment, 
the pressure for elected officials to raise family incomes and lower unemployment is immense.  
Private prison companies have emerged in the last few decades as an option for cash strapped 
subnational governments to do something, anything, to create work environments.  The backdrop 
to this chapter‘s economic study is controversial.  While not as recently salient as private 
contractors such as Xe conducing the war in the Middle East, private prison companies are 
treading on territory that has been traditionally carried out by public bureaucracies.  
Consequently, rhetoric over economic change can blend with rhetoric concerning the proper 
scope of government activity. 
An economic impact study of private prisons is worthwhile to policymakers because it 
can serve as a basic analytical tool to predict how a prison might change the local economy.  On 
one side of their decision-making will be a well oiled private prison company providing evidence 
of their economic prowess.  Simply put, there is not such a well organized group on the con side 
of the private prison building question.  In fact, while there is a large lobby of anti-prison 
advocacy groups of debatable power, they most often do not touch on economic arguments.  
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Perhaps the groups with the loudest voices making economic statements against private prison 
construction are the prison guard unions.
124
     
The contribution made by this chapter however, is broader than this single policy area.  
First, the exploration of privatization on economic terms is valuable because it offers up the 
objective view of social scientists to officials.  A study such as this one can be done on any area 
of government that is being reworked by a private business.  For example, just how much 
cheaper is private logistics or food service for the military?  While there has been much 
controversy over empowering private soldiers in a war zone, is it indeed cheaper?  That part of 
the debate is often taken for granted.  Additionally, the methodology of this chapter models how 
an author constructed dataset, as opposed to the DOJ one used in chapter two, can be shaped to 
answer a substantive policy question.  Using a random sample of public prisons, this chapter was 
able to move beyond a simple dual comparison of counties with private prisons and counties 
with no prisons, to a more logical comparative analysis that included counties with existing 
public prisons.  In that way the difference between public and private facilities could be 
explored.    
   To conclude, crime is a complex social phenomenon, and policy dealing with it is not 
simple fare.  While ultimately crime is an aggregation of individual illegal acts, it remains 
heavily shaped by the external environment.  Though the motives behind illicit acts give crime 
much of its veil of mystery, the coupling of questionably rational actors with environmental 
complexity accounts for crime‘s confounding nature.   History has proven that there will always 
be crime and it will always exhibit variance.  It is stubbornly persistent and maddeningly 
pervasive, yet highly varied in both intensity and form.  Studying it, and government‘s response 
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to it, is at least as challenging as the study of any other complex policy area such as 
environmental pollution and social welfare.       
 Murder will always be the intentional killing of another human being with malice 
aforethought and likewise robbery will always be taking someone‘s property by force or fear.  
And even more basically, as long as human nature remains flawed, the crimes of murder and 
robbery will forever exist.  However, the face of killing and stealing reveal themselves quite 
differently in the hills of South Dakota and in the urban core of Manhattan.  The variance in the 
incidence rate of criminal acts is not attributable to something mysterious found in the water of 
the Black Hills or in the center of the Bronx, though crime‘s malleability sometimes has this 
appear to be the case.  Crime rates vary depending upon the environment, but identifying the 
particular causal drivers in the environment that provide its shape is one of the thorniest 
questions in modern social science.  In the same way, the complex public institutions that 
respond to crime can be challenging to analyze.  And in some instances, these public institutions 
even morph into the private. 
 In the subfield of criminal justice policy data gathering is a challenge because of the 
duration of time that must be explored, crimes multi-jurisdictional nature, its multi-faceted causal 
stories, and the many policy domains involved in responses to it.  However, there is valuable 
data publicly available that is sufficiently accurate and systematically gathered.  Likewise, there 
are qualitative and quantitative data analysis techniques that, like peeling an onion away layer by 
layer, allow for the dissolution of the shroud of mystery surrounding crime management and 
prevention. 
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Appendix I 
 
Capital Offenses Among Former Juvenile Death Penalty States 
Alabama Intentional murder with 1 of 8 aggravating factors 
Arkansas Capital murder with 1 of 9 aggravating circumstances 
Arizona 1st degree murder accompanied by 1 of 10 aggravating factors 
Delaware 1st degree murder with certain aggravating circumstances 
Florida 1st degree murder, felony murder, capital drug-trafficking 
Georgia 
Murder, kidnapping with bodily injury or ransom where victim dies, aircraft 
hijacking, treason 
Idaho 1st degree murder, aggravated kidnapping 
Kentucky Murder with aggravating factors, kidnapping with aggravating factors 
Louisiana 1st degree murder, aggravated rape of victim under age 12, treason 
Mississippi Capital murder, aircraft piracy 
Nevada 1st degree murder, with 10 possible aggravating circumstances 
New 
Hampshire Capital murder 
North 
Carolina 1st degree murder 
Oklahoma 
1st degree murder with at least 1 of 9 aggravating circumstances as defined by 
statute 
Pennsylvania 1st degree murder with 1 of 17 aggravating circumstances 
South 
Carolina 1st degree murder with 1 of 10 aggravating circumstances 
Texas Criminal homicide with 1 of 8 aggravating circumstances 
Utah 
Aggravated murder, aggravated assault by a prisoner serving a life sentence if 
serious bodily injury is intentionally caused 
Virginia 1st degree murder with 1 of 9 aggravating circumstances 
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Appendix II 
 
Survey Questions and Descriptive Statistics: The Police-Public Contact Survey  
(U.S. Department of Justice, 2002) 
 
Dependent Variable 
 
Would you say that the police officer(s) had a legitimate reason for stopping you? 
 
 0 No 15.92%   (862) 
 1  Yes 84.98%  (4551) 
 
Independent Variables 
 
Respondent Race 
 0  Other Race    90.45%  (4896)  
 1  Black   9.55%  (517) 
 
Respondent Gender  
 0 Female 41.81%  (2263) 
 1 Male 58.19%  (3150) 
 
Respondent Age 
 Mean:  38.13    Min:  16  Max:  90 
 
Popsize: Size of jurisdiction where respondent reported living. 
 1 Under 100,000   77.52%   (4196) 
 2 100,000-499,999 14.34%   (776) 
 3 500,000-999,999 3.90%   (211) 
 4 1 million or more 4.25%  (230) 
 
Work: Did the respondent have a job or work at a business last week? 
 0 No 20.47%  (1099) 
 1 Yes 79.98%  (4271) 
 
Income Under $20,000 
 0 No 72.22%  (3909) 
 1 Yes 27.78%  (1504) 
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Income over $50,000 
 0 No  57.51%  (3113) 
 1  Yes 42.49%  (2300) 
 
How many face-to-face contacts with a police officer did you have during the last 12 months? 
  1 75.85% (4106) 
  2 15.5%  (839) 
  3 5.1%  (276) 
  4 1.74%  (94) 
  5 .83%  (45) 
  6 .42%  (23) 
  7 .13%  (7) 
  8 .09%  (5) 
  9 .02%  (1) 
 10 .13%  (7) 
 12 .11%  (6) 
 20 .02%  (1) 
 21 .02%  (1) 
 30 .04%  (2) 
 
Officer race: Was/were the police officer(s) (mostly) black? 
 0 No 91.13%   (4933) 
 1 Yes 8.87%   (480) 
 
Interaction: Driver Black, Officer Black 
 0 No 98.06%   (5308) 
 1 Yes 1.94%   (105) 
 
Did the police officer(s) find any of the following items during (this search/these searches)? (yes 
for any of the following: illegal weapons, illegal drugs, open containers of alcohol, such as beer 
or liquor, r other evidence of a crime) 
 0 No 99.5%  (5386)  
 1 Yes .5%  (27) 
 
During (this/the most recent) incident, were you: given a ticket? 
 0 No 39.48% (2137) 
 1 Yes 60.52% (3276) 
 
 
 
 210  
 
Appendix III 
 
Survey Questions and Descriptive Statistics: The Police-Public Contact Survey 
(U.S. Department of Justice, 2005) 
 
Dependent Variables 
 
Would you say that the police officer(s) had a legitimate reason for stopping you? 
 0 No 16.26%    (729) 
 1  Yes 83.74%   (3755) 
 
During this contact do you feel that a majority of the police officer(s) were respectful? 
 0 No  10.65% (536)  
 1 Yes 89.35% (4499) 
 
Looking back on this contact, do you feel the police behaved properly or improperly? 
 0 No 11.01% (554) 
 1 Yes 88.99% (10565) 
 
Do you feel that a majority of the police officer(s) were professional? 
 0 No 10.14% (511) 
 1 Yes 89.86% (4527) 
 
Independent Variables 
 
(Figures listed here are for all PPCS respondents who indicated having been involved in a traffic 
stop) 
Respondent Race 
 0  Other Race    91.04%   (4604)  
 1  Black   8.96%   (453) 
 
Respondent Gender  
 0 Female  43.17%   (2183) 
 1 Male  56.83%   (2874) 
 
Respondent Age 
 Mean:  38.98    Min:  16  Max:  89 
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Popsize: Size of jurisdiction where respondent reported living. 
 1 Under 100,000   75.26%   (3806) 
 2 100,000-499,999 15.09%   (763) 
 3 500,000-999,999 5.28%   (267) 
 4 1 million or more 4.37%  (221) 
 
Work: Did the respondent have a job or work at a business last week? 
 0 No 21.00%  (1051) 
 1 Yes 79.00%  (3954) 
 
Income Under $20,000 
 0 No 71.50%  (3616) 
 1 Yes 28.50%  (1441) 
 
Income Over $50,000 
 0 No  53.04%  (2682) 
 1  Yes 46.96%  (2375) 
 
How many face-to-face contacts with a police officer did you have during the last 12 months? 
  1 75.89% (3838) 
  2 15.88% (803) 
  3 4.65%  (235) 
  4 1.72%  (87) 
  5 .67%  (34) 
  6 .38%  (19) 
  7 .16%  (8) 
  8 .16%  (8) 
  9 .04%  (2) 
 10 .16%  (8) 
 11 .04%  (2) 
 12 .08%  (4) 
 13 .04%  (2) 
 15 .04%  (2) 
 20 .06%  (3) 
 24 .02%  (1) 
 30 .02%  (1) 
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Officer race: Was/were the police officer(s) (mostly) black? 
 0 No 93.43%   (3657) 
 1 Yes 6.57%   (257) 
 
Interaction: Driver Black, Officer Black 
 0 No 98.62%   (4987) 
 1 Yes 1.38%   (70) 
 
Did the police officer(s) find any of the following items during (this search/these searches)? (yes 
for any of the following: illegal weapons, illegal drugs, open containers of alcohol, such as beer 
or liquor, or other evidence of a crime) 
 0 No 98.62%  (4987)  
 1 Yes 1.38%   (70) 
 
During (this/the most recent) incident were you: given a ticket? 
 0 No 40.90% (1875) 
 1 Yes 59.10% (2709) 
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Appendix IV 
 
States and Federal Agency Contracting for Correctional Institutions, 2002 
 
Jurisdiction 
Number of Private 
Facilities 
Alaska 11 
Arizona 4 
California 9 
Colorado 4 
Florida 5 
Georgia 4 
Hawaii 4 
Idaho 1 
Indiana 2 
Kansas 2 
Kentucky 2 
Louisiana 2 
Michigan 1 
Mississippi 5 
Montana 1 
Nevada 1 
New Mexico 4 
North 
Carolina 2 
North Dakota 1 
Ohio 2 
Oklahoma 6 
Tennessee 2 
Texas 22 
Virginia 1 
Washington 
D.C. 3 
Wisconsin 3 
Wyoming 9 
FBOP 5 
Total 118 
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Source:  2002 Corrections Yearbook, Camille Graham Camp, ed. California data is from 2001.
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Appendix V 
 
Sample 
 
County State Prison Name Contractor 
Barbour AL Easterling Correctional Facility public 
Cullman AL n/a n/a 
Jackson AL n/a n/a 
Madison AL 
William E. Donaldson Correctional 
Fac. public 
Pickens AL n/a n/a 
Sumter AL n/a n/a 
Izard AR North Central Unit public 
Logan AR n/a n/a 
Apache AZ n/a n/a 
Maricopa AZ Phoenix West GEO Group 
Mohave AZ Kingman MTC 
Pinal AZ Eloy Detention Center CCA 
Amador CA Mule Creek State Prison public 
Del Norte CA Pelican Bay State Prison public 
Imperial CA California State Prison - Solano public 
Kern CA Taft Correctional Institute CCA 
Lassen CA High Desert State Prison public 
Madera CA Valley State Prison for Women public 
Riverside CA Chuckawalla Valley State Prison public 
Santa Barbara CA n/a n/a 
Solano CA California State Prison - Solano public 
Bent CO Bent County Correctional Facility CCA 
Chaffee CO n/a n/a 
Crowley CO Crowley County Correctional Center CCA 
El Paso CO Cheyenne Mountain Re-Entry Center CEC 
Huerfano CO Huerfano County Correctional Center CCA 
Kit Carson CO Kit Carson Correctional Center CCA 
Montezuma CO n/a n/a 
Montrose CO n/a n/a 
Morgan CO Brush Women's Facility GRW 
Sussex DE n/a n/a 
Broward FL Thompson Academy Choices JFS Development LLC 
Gadsden FL Bristol Youth Academy Keystone Educ. & Youth 
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Services 
Hardee FL Hardee Correctional Institution public 
Hernando FL Eckerd Challenge Program Eckerd Youth Alternatives 
Highlands FL Avon Park Youth Academy G4S Youth Services 
Highlands FL Avon Park Youth Academy G4S Youth Services 
Hillsborough FL Riverside Academy Riverside Youth Services 
Jefferson FL Jefferson Correctional Institution public 
Manatee FL Manatee Regional Detention Center public 
Marion FL Marion Youth Development Center JFS Development LLC 
Martin FL Martin Correctional Institution public 
Okaloosa FL Okaloosa Youth Academy 
Premier Behavioral 
Solutions, Inc. 
Okeechobee FL Eckerd Youth Development Center Eckerd Youth Alternatives 
Palm Beach FL 
Palm Beach Juvenile Correctional 
Facility JFS Development LLC 
Polk FL Polk Juvenile Correctional Facility G4S Youth Services 
Santa Rosa FL Milton Girls Residential Facility 
Premier Behavioral 
Solutions, Inc. 
St. Johns FL Hastings Moderate Risk/High Risk G4S Youth Services 
Taylor FL Taylor Correctional Institution public 
Volusia FL Pines Juvenile Residential Facility Stewart Marchman 
Brooks GA n/a n/a 
Bryan GA n/a n/a 
Calhoun GA Calhoun State Prison public 
Carroll GA n/a n/a 
Charlton GA D. Ray James Prison Cornell 
Coffee GA Coffee Correctional Facility CCA 
Colquitt GA n/a n/a 
Crisp GA 
Crisp Regional Youth Detention 
Center JFS Development LLC 
DeKalb GA 
Metro Regional Youth Detention 
Center public 
Johnson GA Johnson State Prison public 
McIntosh GA McIntosh Youth Development Campus JFS Development LLC 
Paulding GA 
Paulding Regional Youth Detention 
Center JFS Development LLC 
Stewart GA Stewart County Detention Center CCA 
Telfair GA McRae Correctional Facility CCA 
Webster GA n/a n/a 
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Wheeler GA Wheeler Correctional Facility CCA 
Des Moines IA n/a n/a 
Howard IA n/a n/a 
Muscatine IA n/a n/a 
Webster IA Ft. Dodge Correctional Facility public 
Ada ID Idaho Correctional Center CCA 
Bannock ID 
Pocatello Women's Correctional 
Center public 
Nez Perce ID n/a n/a 
Crawford IL Robinson Correctional Center public 
Fayette IL Vandalia Work Camp public 
Macon IL Decatur Correctional Center public 
Mercer IL n/a n/a 
Brown IN n/a n/a 
Cass IN 
North Central Juvenile Correctional 
Facility public 
Henry IN New Castle Correctional Facility GEO Group 
Kosciusko IN n/a n/a 
Madison IN Correctional Industrial Facility public 
Miami IN Miami Correctional Facility public 
Morgan IN n/a n/a 
Porter IN n/a n/a 
St.Joseph IN n/a n/a 
Douglas KS n/a n/a 
Kearny KS n/a n/a 
Labette KS Labette Women's Correctional Camp GRW 
Leavenworth KS Leavenworth Detention Center CCA 
Stanton KS n/a n/a 
Thomas KS n/a n/a 
Floyd KY Otter Creek Correctional Center CCA 
Johnson KY n/a n/a 
Larue KY n/a n/a 
Lee KY Lee Adjustment Center CCA 
Marion KY Marion Adjustment Center CCA 
Mercer KY n/a n/a 
Taylor KY n/a n/a 
Allen LA Allen Correctional Center GEO Group 
Caddo LA n/a n/a 
Concordia LA n/a n/a 
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Lincoln LA n/a n/a 
St.Bernard LA n/a n/a 
Tensas LA Tensas Parish Detention Center LCS 
Winn LA Winn Correctional Center CCA 
Suffolk MA n/a n/a 
Allegany MD Western Correctional Institution public 
Baltimore City MD Baltimore City Correctional Center public 
Garrett MD n/a n/a 
Wicomico MD n/a n/a 
Hancock ME n/a n/a 
Alger MI Alger Maximum Correctional Facility public 
Arenac MI 
Standish Maximum Correctional 
Facility public 
Baraga MI 
Baraga Maximum Correctional 
Facility public 
Gratiot MI St. Louis Correctional Facility public 
Ionia MI Bellamy Creek Correctional Facility public 
Iron MI n/a n/a 
Lake MI Michigan Youth Correctional Facility GEO Group 
Macomb MI Macomb Correctional Facility public 
Montmorency MI n/a n/a 
Newaygo MI n/a n/a 
Lake of the 
Woods MN n/a n/a 
Norman MN n/a n/a 
Swift MN Prairie Correctional Facility CCA 
Buchanan MO 
Western Reception, Diagnostic, and 
Cor. Ctr. public 
Clinton MO Western Missouri Correctional Center public 
Gentry MO n/a n/a 
Greene MO n/a n/a 
Johnson MO Integrity Correctional Centers ICC Management 
Marion MO n/a n/a 
Mississippi MO Southeast Correctional Center public 
Moniteau MO Tipton Correctional Center public 
Pettis MO n/a n/a 
Amite MS n/a n/a 
Grenada MS n/a n/a 
Jefferson MS Jefferson/Franklin County Reg Cor. public 
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Fac. 
Lauderdale MS East Mississippi Correctional Facility GEO Group 
Leake MS 
Walnut Grove Youth Correctional 
Facility Cornell Companies 
Leflore MS Delta Correctional Facility CCA 
Lincoln MS n/a n/a 
Marshall MS Marshall County Correctional Facility GEO Group 
Panola MS n/a n/a 
Rankin MS 
Central Mississippi Correctional 
Facility public 
Simpson MS n/a n/a 
Stone MS 
Stone County Regional Correctional 
Fac. public 
Tallahatchie MS 
Tallahatchie County Correctional 
Facility CCA 
Tunica MS n/a n/a 
Wilkinson MS 
Wilkinson Country Correctional 
Facility CCA 
Blaine MT n/a n/a 
Chouteau MT n/a n/a 
Toole MT Crossroads Correctional Facility CCA 
Hertford NC Rivers Correctional Institution GEO Group 
Onslow NC n/a n/a 
Randolph NC n/a n/a 
Wilkes NC n/a n/a 
Kidder ND n/a n/a 
Nelson ND n/a n/a 
Rolette ND n/a n/a 
Sioux ND n/a n/a 
Douglas NE Omaha Correctional Center public 
Valley NE n/a n/a 
Coos NH 
Northern New Hampshire Correctional 
Fac. public 
Monmouth NJ n/a n/a 
Morris NJ n/a n/a 
Union NJ Elizabeth Detention Center CCA 
Bernalillo NM Camino Nuevo Correctional Facility CCA 
Cibola NM 
New Mexico Women's Correctional 
Facility CCA 
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Guadalupe NM 
Guadalupe County Correctional 
Facility GEO Group 
Harding NM n/a n/a 
Lea NM Lea County Correctional Facility GEO Group 
Sante Fe NM 
Sante Fe County Adult Detention 
Center Cornell Companies 
Torrance NM Torrance County Detention Center CCA 
Humboldt NV n/a n/a 
Cattaraugus NY Gowanda NY public 
Cayuga NY Cayuga Correctional Facility public 
Chautauqua NY 
Lakeview Shock Incarceration Cor. 
Facility public 
Chenango NY n/a n/a 
Essex NY 
Moriah Shock Incarceration Cor. 
Facility public 
Franklin NY Franklin Correctional Facility public 
Fulton NY 
Hale Creek Alcohol/Substance Abuse 
Center public 
Greene NY Greene Correctional Facility public 
Jefferson NY Cape Vincent Correctional Facility public 
Livingston NY Livingston Correctional Facility public 
Orleans NY Orleans Correctional Facility public 
Queens NY Queens Private Correctional Facility GEO Group 
Seneca NY Five Points Correctional Facility public 
St. Lawrence  NY Gouvernour Correctional Facility public 
Tioga NY n/a n/a 
Ulster NY Shawangunk Correctional Facility public 
Washington NY Washington Correctional Facility public 
Wayne NY Butler Correctional Facility public 
Allen OH Allen Correctional Institution public 
Ashtabula OH Lake Erie Correctional Institution Mgt. & Training Corp. 
Geauga OH Lighthouse Youth Center Lighthouse Youth Services 
Jefferson OH n/a n/a 
Lawrence OH n/a n/a 
Lucas OH Toledo Correctional Facility public 
Mahoning OH Northeast Ohio Correctional Facility CCA 
Pickaway OH Pickaway Correctional Institution public 
Richland OH Richland Correctional Institution public 
Trumbull OH Trumbull Correctional Institution public 
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Beckham OK North Fork Correctional Facility CCA 
Blaine OK Diamondback Correctional Facility CCA 
Caddo OK Great Plains Correctional Facility Cornell Companies 
Carter OK n/a n/a 
Comanche OK Lawton Correctional Facility GEO Group 
Craig OK 
Northeast Oklahoma Correctional 
Center public 
Hughes OK Davis Correctional Facility CCA 
McClain OK n/a n/a 
Nowata OK n/a n/a 
Payne OK Cimarron Correctional Facility CCA 
Pittsburg OK Jackie Brannon Correctional Center public 
Woods OK 
Charles E. "Bill" Johnson Correctional 
Center public 
Clackamas OR Coffee Creek Correctional Facility public 
Gilliam OR n/a n/a 
Josephine OR 
Rogue Valley Youth Correctional 
Facility public 
Lake OR Warner Creek Correctional Facility public 
Union OR n/a n/a 
Wasco OR n/a n/a 
Cambria PA Cresson State Correctional Institution public 
Centre PA 
Moshannon Valley Correctional 
Complex BOP 
Columbia PA n/a n/a 
Crawford PA 
Cambridge Springs State Cor. 
Institution public 
Forest PA Forest State Correctional Institution public 
Franklin PA 
South Mountain Secure Treatment 
Unit public 
Luzerne PA Retreat State Correctional Institution public 
Jasper SC Ridgeland Correctional Institution public 
Lancaster SC n/a n/a 
McCormick SC McCormick Correctional Institution public 
Sanborn SD n/a n/a 
Chester TN n/a n/a 
Greene TN n/a n/a 
Hamilton TN Silverdale Detention Facilities public 
Hardeman TN Hardeman County Correctional Center CCA 
 222  
 
Monroe TN n/a n/a 
Tipton TN West Tennessee Detention Facility CCA 
Unicoi TN n/a n/a 
Wayne TN South Central Correctional Facility CCA 
Anderson TX Michael Unit public 
Angelina TX Diboll Correctional Center CCA 
Bexar TX Dominguez State Jail public 
Bowie TX Telford Unit public 
Brooks TX Brooks County Detention Center LCS 
Brown TX Havins Unit public 
Burnet TX Halbert Unit public 
Caldwell TX 
Lockhart Work Program Facility 
(women) GEO Group 
Cherokee TX Hodge Unit public 
Cochran TX n/a n/a 
Coke TX Coke County Juvenile Justice Center GEO Group 
Concho TX Eden Detention Center CCA 
Coryell TX Hughes Unit public 
Cottle TX n/a n/a 
Crockett TX n/a n/a 
Dallam TX Dalhart Unit public 
Dallas TX Hutchins State Jail public 
Dawson TX Smith Unit public 
Dickens TX Dickens County Correctional Center GEO Group 
Ector TX Ector County Detention Center Civigenics 
Edwards TX n/a n/a 
El Paso TX Sanchez State Jail public 
Elis TX Sanders Estes Unit CCA 
Falls TX Hobby Unit public 
Freestone TX Boyd Unit public 
Frio TX Briscoe Unit public 
Garza TX Giles W. Dalby Correctional Facility 
Management & Training 
Corp. 
Glasscock TX n/a n/a 
Hale TX Formby State Jail public 
Harris TX Houston Processing Center CCA 
Harrison TX n/a n/a 
Haskell TX 
Rolling Plains Regional Jail & Det. 
Center Emerald Companies 
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Hays TX Kyle Correctional Center 
Management & Training 
Corp. 
Hidalgo TX Lopez/Segovia Unit public 
Howard TX Big Spring Correctional Center BOP 
Hudspeth TX West Texas Detention Facility Emerald Companies 
Irion TX n/a n/a 
Jack TX Lindsey State Jail (John R. Lindsey) CCA 
Jasper TX Goodman Unit public 
Jefferson TX Stiles Unit public 
Jim Wells TX n/a n/a 
Jones TX Robertson Unit public 
Karnes TX Connally Unit public 
Kinney TX n/a n/a 
LaSalle TX Cotulla Unit public 
Liberty TX Cleveland Correctional Center GEO Group 
Limestone TX Limestone County Detention Center Civigenics 
Medina TX Torres Unit public 
Newton TX Newton County Correctional Center GEO Group 
Nueces TX Nueces County Jail LCS 
Palo Pinto TX 
Mineral Wells Pre-Parole Transfer 
Facility CCA 
Pecos TX Lynaugh Unit public 
Polk TX IAH Polk County Detention Center Civigenics 
Reeves TX Reeves County Detention Center GEO Group 
Roberts TX n/a n/a 
Rusk TX Bradshaw State Jail CCA 
Stephens TX Sayle Unit public 
Terry TX 
Brownfield Intermediate Sanction 
Facility MTC 
Travis TX Travis County State Jail public 
Val Verde TX 
Val Verde County Jail & Correctional 
Facility GEO Group 
Walker TX Estelle Unit public 
Webb TX Laredo Contract Detention Center CCA 
Wheeler TX n/a n/a 
Wichita TX Allred Unit public 
Willacy TX Willacy County State Jail CCA 
Williamson TX Bartlett State Jail CCA 
Wise TX Bridgeport Correctional Center GEO Group 
 224  
 
Salt Lake UT Salt Lake Valley Detention Center Cornell Companies 
Sanpete UT Central Utah Correctional Facility public 
Utah UT Promontory Correctional Institution 
Management & Training 
Corp. 
Bland VA n/a n/a 
Brunswick VA Lawrenceville Correctional Center GEO Group 
Lee VA n/a n/a 
Roanoke VA n/a n/a 
Spotsylvania VA n/a n/a 
Clallam WA Clallam Bay Corrections Center public 
Franklin WA Coyote Ridge Corrections Center public 
Jefferson WA n/a n/a 
King WA INS Seattle Detention Center GEO Group 
Kitsap WA n/a n/a 
Okanogan WA n/a n/a 
Pierce WA Northwest Detention Center GEO Group 
Whatcom WA n/a n/a 
Columbia WI Columbia Correctional Institution public 
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Appendix VI 
 
Firms Jurisdictions Contract With, 2002 
 
Alaska Mississippi 
Cornell Corrections, Inc. CCA 
CCA Montana 
Gastineau Human Services CCA 
TJM Nevada 
North Slope Borough CCA 
Arizona New Mexico  
Correctional Services Corp. CCA 
Management and Training Corp. North Carolina 
California Evergreen Center 
Alternative Programs, Inc. Mary Frances Center 
Cornell Corrections, Inc. North Dakota 
Management and Training Corp. CCA 
Maranatha Production Company Ohio 
Wackenhut,Inc. CiviGenics, Inc. 
Colorado Management and Training Corp. 
CCA Oklahoma 
Dominion CCA 
Florida Tennessee 
CCA CCA 
Wackenhut,Inc. Texas 
Georgia Bowie Co. 
Cornell Corrections, Inc. CiviGenics, Inc. 
CCA Comanche Co. 
Bobby Ross Group CCA 
Hawaii Correctional Services Corp. 
CCA Management and Training Corp. 
Dominion Titus County 
Idaho Wackenhut, Inc. 
CCA Virginia 
Indiana CCA 
CCA Wisconsin 
Kansas CCA 
GRW, Inc. Wyoming 
Kentucky CCA 
CCA Dominion 
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Louisiana Reckson Strategies Venture 
CCA Volunteers of America 
Wackenhut,Inc. FBOP 
Michigan Cornell Corrections, Inc. 
Wackenhut, Inc. 
Corrections Corporation of 
America 
  Management and Training Corp. 
  Wackenhut, Inc. 
 
Source:  2002 Corrections Yearbook, Camille Graham Camp, ed. California data is from 
2001. 
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Appendix VII 
Contracting Firms, 2002 
 
Company Facilities 
Alternative Programs Inc. 1 
Bobby Ross 1 
Bowie Company 1 
Civigenics 2 
Comanche Company 1 
Cornell Corrections (see source 
note) 14 
Correctional Service Corporation 5 
Corrections Corporation of 
America 44 
David Green 1 
Dominion 6 
EFEC 1 
Extended House 1 
Gastineau Corporation 1 
GRW Corporation 1 
Hope Village 1 
Management and Training 
Corporation 9 
Maranatha Production Company 1 
North Slope Borough 1 
Patricia Snyder 1 
Reynolds & Associates 1 
Titus 1 
TJM 1 
Wackenhut 22 
Total 118 
 
Source:  Source:  2002 Corrections Yearbook, Camille Graham Camp, ed. California data 
is from 2001.  The Yearbook does not list Cornell Corrections as running the Walnut 
Grove Youth Correctional Facility, though they have operated it since March of 2001 
(Camp 2003, 110; Cornell). 
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Appendix VIII 
Corrections Corporation of America Facilities, 2005 
 
Prison Name State 
B.M. Moore Correctional Facility Texas 
Bartlett State Jail Texas 
Bay Correctional Facility  Florida 
Bay County Jail  Florida 
Bay County Jail Annex  Florida 
Bent County Correctional Facility Colorado 
Bradshaw State Jail Texas 
Bridgeport Pre-Parole Transfer 
Facility Texas 
California City Correctional Center California 
Central Arizona Detention Center Arizona 
Cibola County Correctional Center  New Mexico 
Cimarron Correctional Facility Oklahoma 
Citrus County Detention Facility Florida 
Coffee Correctional Facility Georgia 
Correctional Treatment Facility 
Washington 
D.C. 
Crossroads Correctional Facility Montana 
Crowley County Correctional 
Facility Colorado 
David L. Moss Criminal Justice 
Center Oklahoma 
Davis Correctional Facility Oklahoma 
Dawson State Jail Texas 
Delta Correctional Facility Mississippi 
Diamondback Correctional Facility Oklahoma 
Diboll Correctional Center Texas 
Eden Detention Center Texas 
Elizabeth Detention Center New Jersey 
Eloy Detention Center  Arizona 
Florence Correctional Center ) Arizona 
Gadsden Correctional Facility Florida 
Hardeman County Correctional Tennessee 
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Center 
Hernando County Jail Florida 
Houston Processing Center Texas 
Huerfano County Correctional 
Center Colorado 
Idaho Correctional Center Idaho 
Kit Carson Correctional Center Colorado 
Lake City Correctional Facility Florida 
Laredo Processing Center Texas 
Leavenworth Detention Center Kansas 
Lee Adjustment Center Kentucky 
Liberty County Jail Texas 
Lindsey State Jail Texas 
Marion Adjustment Center Kentucky 
Marion County Jail II Indiana 
McRae Correctional Facility Georgia 
Metro-Davidson County Detention 
Facility Tennessee 
Mineral Wells Pre-Parole Transfer 
Facility Texas 
New Mexico Women's Correctional 
Facility New Mexico 
North Fork Correctional Facility Oklahoma 
Northeast Ohio Correctional Center Ohio 
Otter Creek Correctional Center Kentucky 
Prairie Correctional Facility Minnesota 
San Diego Correctional Facility California 
Shelby Training Center Tennessee 
Silverdale Detention Facilities Tennessee 
South Central Correctional Center Tennessee 
T. Don Hutto Correctional Center Texas 
Tallahatchie County Correctional 
Facility Mississippi 
Torrance County Detention Facility New Mexico 
Webb County Detention Center) Texas 
West Tennessee Detention Facility Tennessee 
Wheeler Correctional Facility Georgia 
Whiteville Correctional Facility  Tennessee 
Wilkinson County Correctional Mississippi 
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Facility 
Willacy County State Jail Texas 
Winn Correctional Center Louisiana 
 
Source:  CCA website (April 27, 2005).  Note that the CCA headquarters is listed as a 
facility on their ―CCA Facility Locations‖ list, but is not included in this study. The 
Stewart Correctional Facility in Lumpkin, Georgia is also included on their website‘s 
facility list, but it is not included in the study because it now sites empty after a dispute 
with the state over cost.  The Mineral Wells Pre-Parole Transfer Facility is included in 
the empirical analysis. 
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Appendix IX 
 
Counties in Sample with Multiple Prisons 
 
For the models‘ samples the total number of prisoners was added together, and the oldest facility 
and year used. 
 
Pinal (AZ): 
Eloy Detention Center (in sample; 3400) 
Marana Community Correctional Treatment Facility (500) 
Florence West (750) 
Central Arizona Correctional Facility (1000) 
Red Rock Correctional Center (1596) 
Florence Correctional Center (1824) 
Central Arizona Detention Center (2304) 
 
Kern (CA) 
California City Correctional Center (in sample; 2650) 
Taft Correctional Institute – California (2048) 
 
Hillsborough (FL) 
Riverside Academy (165) 
Columbus Juvenile Residential Facility (in sample; 50) 
 
Okaloosa Youth Academy (FL) 
Okaloosa Youth Academy (in sample; 100) 
Gulf Coast Youth Academy (104) 
 
Tensas (LA) 
Tensas Parish Detention Center (in sample; 440) 
Tensas Parish Detention Center (512) 
 
Cibola (NM) 
New Mexico Women‘s Correctional Facility (in sample; 596) 
Cibola County Corrections Center (1614) 
 
Sante Fe (NM) 
Sante Fe County Juvenile Detention Center (129) 
Sante Fe County Adult Detention Center (in sample; 672) 
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Lorain (OH) 
Grafton Correctional Institution and Camp (2190) 
North Coast Correctional Treatment Center (635) 
 
Cambria (PA) 
Cresson State Correctional Institution (in sample; 834) 
Cresson Secure Treatment Unit (52) 
 
Hardeman (TN) 
Whiteville Correctional Facility (1536) 
Hardeman County Correctional Center (in sample; 2016) 
 
Angelina (TX) 
Lufkin Detention Center (300) 
Diboll Correctional Center (in sample; 518) 
 
Caldwell (TX) 
Lockhart Work Program Facility Men (500) 
Lockhart Work Program Facility Women (in sample; 500) 
 
Dallas (TX) 
Hutchins State Jail (in sample; 2276) 
Dawson State Jail (2216) 
 
El Paso (TX) 
Sanchez State Jail (in sample; 1100) 
El Paso Multi Use Facility (324) 
 
Frio (TX) 
Briscoe Unit (1342) 
Frio County Detention Center (391) 
South Texas Detention Center (1020) 
 
Hidalgo (TX) 
Lopez/Segovia Unit (in sample; 2564) 
East Hidalgo Detention Center (954) 
 
LaSalle (TX) 
LaSalle County Regional Detention Center (548) 
Cotulla Unit (in sample; 606) 
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Rusk (TX) 
Billy Moore Correctional Center (500) 
Bradshaw State Jail (in sample; 1984) 
 
Webb (TX) 
Laredo Contract Detention Center (in sample; 350) 
Webb County Detention Facility (500) 
 
Willacy (TX) 
Willacy County Regional Detention Facility (540) 
Willacy County State Jail (in sample; 1069) 
Willacy ICE Facility (2000) 
 
Williamson (TX) 
T. Don Hutto Correctional Center (600) 
Bartlett State Jail (in sample; 1001) 
 
Wise (TX) 
Bridgeport Pre-Parole Transfer Facility (200) Bridgeport Correctional Center (in sample; 520) 
 
 
